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Introduction 
 
The Millennium Development Goals remain a powerful symbol of international consensus 
on tackling poverty. The months leading up to the United Nations Summit on the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in September 2010 were filled with a great deal of 
reflection and analysis about progress towards the targets and priorities for the next five 
years. This was a time to learn from the decade of experiences following the launch of the 
MDGs, to ask what has been working, to evaluate remaining challenges and to prioritize 
investments against a backdrop of increased global uncertainty and austerity. At the 
Summit, world leaders reiterated their commitments to the MDGs and agreed a plan of 
action for the next five years.1  
 
Progress reports on the MDGs present a mixed picture of successes and challenges. Despite 
the setbacks caused by global economic shocks, progress has been made in many countries 
on fighting poverty, increasing primary school enrolment and improving health. To sustain 
this progress, the Summit Declaration highlighted the importance of using strategies, 
policies and approaches that have proven to be effective to sustain this progress. The United 
Nations Secretary-General's Report to the Summit reflected on the critical challenges that 
remain, including scaling up successful initiatives through inclusive planning that promotes 
state accountability and developing and sustaining effective public service delivery 
mechanisms (Greeley, 2010). 
 
Sustainability, equality and human rights have emerged as fundamental cross-cutting issues 
that should inform the goals and targets of a post-2015 development framework. While 
highlighting this imperative, the report of the UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN 
Development Agenda, Realizing the Future We Want for All, which was submitted to the 
Secretary-General just before the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 2012, also underlined the relevance of the Millennium Declaration as 
a valid framework for development. 
 
The wide-ranging national and thematic consultations taking place worldwide between the 
United Nations and multiple constituencies indicate support for a post-2015 agenda that 
builds on the MDG framework and keeps the focus on human development while tackling 
emerging challenges, including sustainable development, inclusive growth, inequalities, 
demographic dynamics, human rights and continuing conflict.  
 
These consultations reiterate the need for sustainable development, public accountability 
and equality that have long been the focus of development work the world over. That these 
issues are resurfacing as priorities underscores the fact that the Millennium Declaration 
recognized—13 years ago—a more ambitious form of human development, one that is 
indivisible from human rights, equality, peace, security and sustainable development. In 
practice over the past several years, resources, reporting and public mobilization have been 
directed at the measurable agenda contained in the MDGs. Indeed, the final meeting review 
of outcomes from the Global Thematic Consultation on Governance and the Post-2015 
Framework notes that “democratic governance goes beyond the building of institutions and 
includes developing the very relationship between institutions and people, to ensure that 
institutions are responsive to individual and community aspirations, to support 
participation and, in so doing, address imbalanced power dynamics” (UNDP and OHCHR, 
2013).  
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Whatever the content of the new framework, the post-2015 development world is likely to 
see an evolving approach to measuring results. Public perceptions and new forms of data 
will likely come into play in measuring progress in human rights, good governance, 
inequalities and environmental protection. The post-2015 framework should thus provide 
many opportunities for strengthened accountability mechanisms that involve citizens in 
varying capacities.  
 
The revived prominence of accountability stems from the increasing numbers of 
development scholars and practitioners who, over the past decade, have argued that 
relationships of accountability between different social actors are central to improving 
service delivery and to making policy and planning processes more inclusive. Based on this 
discourse, many development institutions have adopted social accountability agendas that, 
on one hand, support civil society and citizens to engage in processes of service delivery and 
to exerting various kinds of pressure on their governments and, on the other hand, also 
support state capacity to respond to those voices and to live up to policy commitments.  
 
Emerging from these agendas is a range of methods that have been used to implement social 
accountability initiatives in diverse governance contexts, from front-line service delivery to 
international policy processes. These initiatives have aimed at strengthening civic 
engagement in policy and planning and building responsive and capable institutions. They 
have involved a varied and expanding array of actors, from intergovernmental bodies and 
bilateral and multilateral donor institutions to international, national and local 
configurations of civil society organizations. 
 
In the current context, the time is ripe to reflect on lessons from these initiatives and ask how 
they can further support positive changes in service delivery and democratic governance to 
deliver progress towards the MDGs and how they can influence the development of a new 
framework. Based on a review of available literature, this paper presents comparative 
experiences of social accountability initiatives across four themes: the use of information and 
communication technology (ICT); issues specific to the urban poor and the informal sector; 
countries in or emerging from conflict; and social inclusion.  
 
This paper supplements the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Guidance 
Note on Fostering Social Accountability, which explains the organization’s approach to 
social accountability and provides direction for programming. The following four chapters 
capture diverse examples of adopting a social accountability approach to existing 
programming and of new initiatives in which social accountability principles and tools were 
used to promote two-way dialogue between citizens and the state, address social exclusion 
or increase citizen engagement in service delivery. They also illustrate the possibilities for 
making democratic governance more effective in delivering development outcomes.  
 
1.  The social accountability agenda 
 
Broadly defined, accountability is the obligation of power-holders to take responsibility for 
their actions. It describes the dynamics of rights and responsibilities that exist between 
people and the institutions that have an impact on their lives, in particular the relationship 
between the duties of the state and the entitlements of citizens.  
 
The concept of accountability is at the heart of both democratic, rights-based governance 
and equitable human development. A democratic and inclusive society is based on a social 
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contract between a responsive and accountable state and responsible and active citizens, in 
which the interests of the poorest and most marginal are taken into account. Such contracts 
"have to be constructed over time, through mutual interactions between states and citizens" 
(Kabeer, 2010). Over the past decade, many international development actors have used 
social accountability initiatives as their preferred route for reinforcing this construction. 
 
‘Social accountability’ refers to a form of civic engagement that builds accountability 
through the collective efforts of citizens and civil society organizations to hold public 
officials, service providers and governments to account for their obligations with responsive 
efforts (Houtzager and Joshi, 2008). It describes the principle of a vibrant, dynamic and 
accountable relationship between states and citizens underpinning efforts to ensure 
equitable development. A social accountability initiative is a managed intervention guided 
by this principle. 
 
Accountability is often classified as either ‘horizontal’ or ‘vertical’. While horizontal 
accountability prevails within the structures of the state (legislature, judicial bodies, 
ombudspersons, etc.), providing formal, institutional checks and balances to guard against 
abuse of power, vertical accountability originates outside the state. Unlike other forms of 
vertical accountability, such as periodic elections, social accountability can be exercised on a 
continuous basis or catalysed on demand. Based on ‘voice’ rather than votes, social 
accountability initiatives provide a channel for direct political participation (Norris, 2010), 
casting civil society actors in leading roles in the process of constructing more democratic 
states by facilitating their engagement with government bureaucracies in an informed, 
systematic and constructive way (Sadasivam and Førde, 2010). 
 
At the same time as strengthening civic engagement and amplifying ‘citizen voice’, social 
accountability initiatives aim to increase the transparency of governance in many arenas, 
ranging from local service delivery to national processes of development policy formulation. 
Information is central to this improved transparency. Social accountability initiatives 
frequently involve citizens in either seeking information from government in such areas as 
budgets, expenditures or compliance with international legal frameworks or in creating new 
information about access to and quality of services. They provide information to citizens 
about their rights and legal and institutional procedures. Building awareness of these issues 
is often a first step to fostering active and effective citizenship and encouraging citizens to 
engage (Gaventa and Barrett, 2010).  
  
Early social accountability initiatives aimed to improve the efficiency of service delivery, 
and mechanisms and instruments of interventions included citizen report cards and 
scorecards, community monitoring, participatory planning tools and social audits. The social 
accountability agenda has developed against a background of broader democratization and 
decentralization trends and new mechanisms and instruments have been developed and 
refined in response to the broader changes. The new social accountability mechanisms 
include participatory budgeting, public expenditure tracking, gender budgeting, citizen 
juries and other forms of public hearings, participatory monitoring of donor commitments to 
advance the MDGs and reporting to international treaty-monitoring bodies. It is important 
to point out that many of the more recent initiatives have not aimed at increasing efficiency 
but at claiming rights. 
 
The diverse range of mechanisms means that there can be no common template for the 
strategies included in a social accountability initiative. Nonetheless, there are broad patterns. 
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Box 1 describes social accountability initiatives as generally comprising four elements, each 
of which uses a context-specific mixture of strategies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The balance between these elements in any particular context influences the kind of outcome 
that a social accountability initiative achieves. Outcomes include increasing both the 
efficiency and equity of service provision and strengthening active citizenship. Although 
social accountability initiatives can directly influence policy outcomes, they can have an 
equally important impact on the way that policy is made. 
 
2.  Linking the MDGs and social accountability 
 
The holistic nature of the MDGs and the comprehensive, systematic efforts that have been 
made to finance, implement and monitor them separates them from other promises for 
poverty reduction (Hulme, 2010). They provide a framework for what is to be achieved and 
for how to achieve it.  
 
The social accountability agenda is conceptually linked to the MDGs in many ways. In 
theory, the pursuit of MDG-based development called for the involvement of all local actors 
and for actions at the national and subnational levels to adapt the ambitions to meet local 
realities (UNDP, 2009a). The eight MDGs, their 34 targets and 60 indicators provided 
expectations for progress by 2015 and an important benchmark for evaluating government 
activities. The post-2015 development framework will, if anything, intensify the 
accountability agenda, given the growing demands of people in industrialized and 
developing countries for equitable policies and responsive governance. Diminishing 
traditional forms of aid and financing will likewise sharpen the focus on demonstrable 
results from interventions. 
 
In practice, progress towards the MDGs has been mixed. As the chapters ahead explore, the 
success or failure of many interventions has depended on how policies, processes and 
relations were structured, organized and refined (ECA et al., 2010). Where there have been 
successes, either in terms of individual country performance or in regional or global 
advances towards one target, there is a range of common contributory factors. These include 
long-term institutional reforms to make the public sector more accountable to citizens, 
devolution to local government levels of responsibility and accountability for service 
Box 1: Elements of social accountability2 
 Preparing community and civil society groups to engage—includes raising the 
awareness of citizens, building confidence and capacity for engagement, building networks 
and coalitions. 
 Collecting, analysing and using information—includes finding, securing and analysing 
information on government activities, translating it into different formats, styles and 
languages, and sharing it through the media and social and political networks. 
 Undertaking accountability engagements with governments—includes using 
instruments such as scorecards, audits and budget analysis to engage with a government, 
either by using existing formalized spaces for participation in planning or policy cycles or by 
developing new ones, or by mobilizing social protests.  
 Using information from accountability engagements with governments—includes 
advocacy, lobbying and campaigning work to follow up on the delivery of commitments. 
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provision, and community and civil society participation encouraged by government (ODI, 
2010). The various analyses of progress achieved demonstrate how social accountability 
principles and practices have underpinned the successful development outcomes. 
 
Measures of MDG progress towards the targets reflect averages, however, without showing 
how the progress has been distributed. It is widely argued that individual country successes 
have not been evenly distributed among social groups and that people are still excluded 
from the benefits of development because of race, ethnicity, religion, gender and/or 
geographic location. In a background paper for the MDG Summit that focused on the MDGs 
and social justice, experts argued that such “inequalities matter for achieving MDGs”—not 
least because they slow down the translation of economic growth into poverty reduction 
(Hulme, 2010; Kabeer, 2010; ECLAC, 2010). Socially excluded groups tend to be left out of or 
left behind by broader national progress (see chapter 4). Thus, increasing efforts for greater 
accountability of governments towards all their citizens and working to increase the number 
and range of spaces for interaction between the state and its citizens are useful starting 
points to approach the challenge of overcoming entrenched exclusion and marginalization.  
 
With little time remaining until 2015, priority areas have emerged in which social 
accountability approaches could be used to sustain the progress towards the MDGs. At the 
global level, the 2010 Millennium Summit outcome document reflects the continued 
commitment to broad consultation with and participation of all stakeholders in the design, 
implementation and monitoring of development strategies and to strengthening 
partnerships between stakeholders. A series of multiple-agency regional MDG monitoring 
reports illustrate how different contexts shape the regional variations on the broad priorities 
(ECA et al., 2010):  
 The Africa report prioritizes the adoption of new models for service delivery and for 
scaling up interventions that work. It also highlights the importance of building capacity 
to strengthen MDG-based planning at all levels of government, promoting the private 
sector, civil society involvement in efforts to achieve the MDGs and giving greater voice 
to developing countries in international financial institutions. 
 The Asia–Pacific report prioritizes greater policy coherence, reducing corruption, 
strengthening regulations and increasing accountability and stakeholder participation. It 
highlights the importance of community participation and mobilization in this disaster-
prone region to improve the quality and accountability of infrastructure maintenance 
services as well as expanding the coverage of financial services to overcome financial 
exclusion. 
 The Arab region report documents the depth and persistence of gender inequality in the 
region and notes that women lack participation in decision-making. 
 The Europe and Central Asia report prioritizes building capacities to help governments 
shift from over-regulation to better regulation, which includes increasing the 
transparency and accountability of decision makers. It also highlights the importance of 
securing access to justice and to enforceable property rights and in seeking the views of 
different constituencies when formulating policy. 
 The Latin America and Caribbean report emphasizes the need to establish a new social 
covenant in which the government has a greater capacity to redistribute resources and 
advance equality. Central to this is the empowerment of women through meaningful 
participation in different decision-making spheres. It recommends that spaces for social 
dialogue between stakeholders in the labour world be strengthened so that productivity 
gains go hand in hand with social protection and benefits for workers. 
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The regional perspectives on development priorities mark out broad areas where social 
accountability initiatives can find traction and support positive change. Greeley (2010) 
singles out six priorities for achieving improved country performance to accelerate progress 
on the MDGs. Among them are increased local accountability in planning and 
implementation, support to community participation and partnerships, and inclusion, which 
means specifically targeting public services to address inequality, discrimination and social 
exclusion. Ultimately, though, decisions about priorities in meeting the remaining 
challenges lie with governments. 
 
How have social accountability initiatives made a difference so far? In different contexts, 
they have enhanced development outcomes by strengthening links between governments 
and citizens to:  
 Improve the efficiency of public service delivery and increase the responsiveness of 
services to a range of users; 
 Improve budget utilization; 
 emphasize the needs of vulnerable, marginalized and traditionally excluded groups in 
policy formulation and implementation; 
 Tackle gender-based imbalances;  
 Demand transparency and expose government failure and corruption; 
 Facilitate links between citizens and local governments in the context of de-
centralization; 
 Construct new democratic spaces for political engagement and ensure that existing 
spaces are used to the best possible effect. 
 
Many of these themes are echoed in the consultations for the post-2015 development 
framework. Notably, civil society organizations in a ‘red flag’ letter to the High-level Panel 
on the Post-2015 Development Agenda echoed many of the themes: Goals need to be 
universal. Ending inequality is paramount. Women, children, youth, indigenous peoples, 
marginalized communities and differently abled people must be at the centre of 
development. The responsibilities of the rich and powerful need to be spelled out. It is 
critical to respect and build upon the principle of equitable sharing of atmospheric space, 
taking into account historical responsibility between and also within states as well as inter-
generational justice. Commitments by all stakeholders must be time-bound; accountability 
and transparency are also paramount.3 
 
What is particularly interesting to see is that people being consulted today emphasize the 
need for the new development agenda to be universal rather than regionally focused. They 
are saying that they see persisting challenges regardless of economic growth and that they 
see a much more inter-connected world than in 2000.  
 
Although the commitment to a global framework that advances the quality of life of the 
poorest people is not under question, the jury is still out on how this can best be advanced. 
For example, the consultations are presenting issues like stunting in countries that face food 
insecurity and obesity among the poor in wealthier countries as two ends of a single 
malnutrition continuum. Likewise, reducing violence, particularly against women, and 
improving citizen security in the broader sense is emerging not only as an issue that affects 
countries experiencing conflict and fragility but also as a phenomenon that can diminish 
quality of life in any country. 
 
In many of the post-2015 consultations, people talk about increased interdependence across 
countries. This includes the cross-border nature of sustainable development challenges, such 
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as climate change, but also economic volatility, disease epidemics, trade regimes and food 
waste in both producing and consuming countries. People seem to be asking global leaders 
to surpass the confines of current global consensus to address the universal and 
interconnected challenges.  
 
Above all, an insight emerging from the consultations of particular relevance to this paper is 
the demand for stronger forms of accountability in the new development agenda. Advances 
in technology and the increased awareness of human rights have made so much more 
change possible than in 2000. The people being consulted—from parliamentarians to front-
line civil society organizers—expect a framework that holds governments and others to 
account for the commitments in the post-2015 agenda. Many ask that the new agenda be 
aligned with human rights standards and accountability mechanisms, such as the Universal 
Periodic Review. Across national and thematic consultations, people are asking for the 
tangible delivery of human rights, using modern technologies where possible. This can have 
transformative impact. In a world in which people lacking access to sanitation may have 
mobile phones to report on gaps in public services and human rights abuses, human rights 
accountability can take on an entirely new meaning.  
 
3.  Social accountability in practice 
 
Because opportunities for social accountability exist in all processes of governance, diverse 
processes can be labelled as social accountability initiatives. They differ from context to 
context, are initiated by a range of actors and occur at various levels and across sectors. 
Their goals also vary, from narrow, targeted objectives, such as the improvement of 
particular services in a particular location, to broader agendas, such as strengthening citizen 
participation in policy design (Greenhalf, forthcoming). 
 
This paper looks at four types of social accountability initiatives to illustrate practices across 
contrasting domains of intervention, from local to international: a community-based 
initiative with citizen participation, a national development policy and planning process, a 
formalized state accountability process and an international policy process.  
 
These domains reflect the broad landscape of social accountability, although in practice they 
are not definite and separate, but overlapping and interconnected. Each of the four examples 
relies on different strategies and activities, but is rooted in the concepts and practices of 
building accountable relationships between the state and its citizens for equitable 
development.  
 
The precise blend of strategies that makes up a social accountability initiative is partly 
shaped by the entry point and the level at which it goes on to work. While some strategies 
support existing formal frameworks for institutionalized civil society participation as their 
starting point, others are attached to particular events or openings in political processes. 
Existing processes initiated by local associations or rights-based social movements can be 
amplified by external support.  
 
Social accountability initiatives are also shaped by who triggers and drives the intervention 
and who else is involved. Donor-backed initiatives inevitably reflect institutional priorities. 
For example, early World Bank support for social accountability targeted the preparation 
and implementation of poverty reduction strategies, public sector reform and public 
expenditure management processes (Malena et al., 2004a). By contrast, bilateral donors have 
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done more work on voice than accountability, and a review of their activities found that they 
are sometimes unable or unwilling to work with governments on accountability issues 
(Rocha Menocal and Sharma, 2009). UNDP work has centred on accountability as a core 
human rights principle, making it intrinsic within the approach to which it is committed 
across its programming. 
 
Social accountability initiatives often interface with many agencies and branches of 
government. These efforts can make executive systems, legislatures and bureaucracies at 
every level, from capital cities to isolated rural areas, become more involved in accounting 
for their activities. It also allows involvement of an array of civil society organizations. Some 
international NGOs, for example, engage in programmes and activities to support the 
participation of national NGOs and citizens in social accountability processes by building up 
capacities and using their networking experiences to bring together government and non-
government actors. Other civil society organizations include advocacy and campaigning in 
their approaches to social accountability. At the community end of the civil society 
spectrum, there are many examples of local associations that have enhanced citizenship 
through awareness of rights and increased capacity for political participation, while social 
movements have, in some places, successfully pressed for state responsiveness to citizens' 
rights and agendas (von Lieres and Coelho, 2010, p. 3).  
 
Social accountability initiatives are thus found in many types of governance spaces, from the 
interface between communities and the planning processes of decentralized government to 
constructed spaces for civil society participation in global policy processes. The various 
types of rules for accountability in these spaces can be set by international agreements, 
government policy commitments or national legal frameworks. There is also diversity in the 
spaces and actors, ranging from bureaucrats at the national or local levels to youth and civil 
society leaders in such areas as education and human rights.  
 
4.  What influences outcomes? 
 
Outcomes from good practice in social accountability initiatives can strengthen democratic 
governance in ways that contribute towards achieving the MDGs. Sustaining the outcomes 
requires asking not only where new social accountability initiatives would be most 
strategically located but also how to deepen and extend the existing good practices. 
Answering both of these questions, however, demands a clearer picture of the factors that 
shape the impact that social accountability initiatives can have on development outcomes. 
 
The first of these factors is the nature of the state. The extent of democratic governance, the 
rule of law and existing practices of transparency and accountability affect the kinds of 
outcome that can be achieved. An established democracy is perhaps the natural terrain for 
social accountability work (Sadasivam and Førde, 2010); yet, in many new democracies, the 
quality of institutions and processes of development, including state accountability 
mechanisms, can be weak. Although positive development outcomes have been gained from 
pursuing social accountability in less established democracies (Gaventa and Barrett, 2010), 
entry points, agendas and the types of civil society partners included all differ from 
initiatives that take place in more functional democracies. In a context of fragile or emerging 
democracy, the most important outcomes of engagement are the further construction of 
democratic citizenship, building people’s capacity to press for their rights and the deepening 
and expansion of the practices of democratic participation (von Lieres and Coelho, 2010). 
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The institutional capacity of each branch of the state can limit the scope for positive 
outcomes from accountability work. As the following chapters point out, the state needs to 
respond to demands for accountability by making changes in policy or practice. Although 
responsiveness is partly a function of capacity, it is also a matter of prevailing policy culture. 
Dominating technocratic styles of policy-making and technical decision-making that is 
insulated from public scrutiny reduce the room for government officials and civil servants to 
respond to the citizenry (UNRISD, 2010). More open and deliberating styles of policy-
making, of course, enable these actors more room for manoeuvring. Where officials and civil 
servants with reformist tendencies are appointed, their responsiveness can help in bringing 
about more dynamic social accountability relationships. Thus, the predisposition of the state 
to citizen engagement in governance is a central determining factor for the success of social 
accountability.  
 
The second factor is the nature of civil society. Just as a functional democratic state cannot be 
taken as a given, neither can a capable, organized civil society with a strong, independent 
media be presumed. The formation and growth of local associations, interest groups, NGOs 
and community-based organizations depend on individuals having the capacity and the 
political space to take collective action, which in turn is strongly influenced by social 
cleavages along lines of gender, ethnicity and religion (UNRISD, 2010). Nor can it be 
assumed that all civil society organizations will want to become a voice for the poor and 
marginalized or engage with government. 
 
A number of ideal qualities and capacities of civil society organizations are associated with 
successful social accountability initiatives, such as (Sadasivam and Førde, 2010; McGee et al., 
2010): 
 Legitimacy—the authority to speak on behalf of constituents, through open and 
accountable membership-based organizational structures; 
 Managerial capacity—to plan and administer activities with coherent objectives and 
strategies; 
 Advocacy capacity—to negotiate with and lobby government and to optimize the 
benefits of working in coalitions and networks; 
 Connection to networks and coalitions—to strengthen collective efforts and address 
them at different levels, to share information and to create inclusive action; 
 Information and knowledge capacity—to seek, create, interpret and learn from 
information in order to provide evidence that informs accountability claims, to interpret 
technical information that enables open public debate and participation and to 
understand the domains that produce government development policies and 
programmes; 
 Leadership—to build alliances and identify strategic entry points for engagement with 
government; 
 Independence—to be seen as separate from decision makers and politicians, basing 
claims on evidence rather than political party positions or other identity. 
 
Most social accountability initiatives involve civil society organizations that build some or 
all of these capacities and attributes into their activities. The extent and duration of this 
capacity-development component affects the outcomes of the initiative.  
 
Even though the attributes of civil society and the state are important, the nature of the 
interaction between them is the third of the key factors that shape impact. A 2004 World 
Bank report on social accountability points out that “the success of social accountability 
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initiatives depends on some form of effective interaction between civil society and the 
state”(Malena et al., 2004a, p. 19).  
 
The dynamic between government and civil society can vary tremendously, from 
cooperative to confrontational. In contexts in which social accountability initiatives have 
resulted in strong democratic outcomes, there has been “a synergy between state and civil 
society that has created incentive and space for association; facilitated continuous learning, 
promoted deliberation and compromise; generated innovative solutions to tensions between 
participation and representation; and bridged gaps in knowledge and authority between 
technocrats and local citizens” (McGee and Gaventa, 2010, p. 59). Such a synergy is not 
devoid of conflict and contention, but it includes the capacity to negotiate and compromise. 
It often depends on the particular webs of partnerships and alliances between social actors 
rooted in organized civil society and reformers within the state.  
 
A fourth factor that shapes the impact of social accountability initiatives is the level of aid 
dependency and conditionality in any given context. There is repeated assertion that 
national ownership of the MDGs is critical to their attainment (see Greeley, 2010), and 
strenuous efforts have been made to connect the MDGs to national poverty reduction 
planning processes and to increase civil society opportunities to participate in those 
processes. Nonetheless, in countries where the international financial institutions and 
donors are powerful, the MDGs are integral to various forms of policy conditionality that 
have held the governments accountable upwards—to the international architecture of 
finance and aid. Certain economic policy conditions attached to aid by donors can mean that 
national governments are restricted in their ability to make their own policy choices, which 
can undermine their accountability towards their own citizens. 
 
On the other hand, in many countries where international development actors are 
influential, there are now strong domestic constituencies for inclusive national poverty 
reduction policy processes that use goals based on the trajectories of MDG-type indicators 
and develop plans to meet those targets (Vandemoortele, 2007). In some places, there is now 
more than a decade of experience with adapting international narratives on poverty 
reduction and placing them at the centre of national development planning processes. The 
concept of national decision-making processes based on the accountability of the state to its 
citizens is increasingly accepted by influential actors in both government and civil society. In 
such circumstances, social accountability initiatives are likely to resonate at different levels 
of intervention and are most likely to have a tangible, direct connection to the MDG 
outcomes. In some cases, in which the government either has more independence in setting 
the terms of the national policy agenda for development or has adopted democratic 
governance priorities only partially (or not at all), social accountability initiatives targeting 
policy and planning process reform are less likely to gain traction. 
 
Good practice in social accountability work always rests on some form of contextual analysis 
evaluating the tensions and trade-offs between the four factors enumerated here in order to 
seek entry points, identify changes that can happen and develop strategies for achieving 
them. 
 
5.  Good practice in social accountability 
 
Social change—whether in human rights, participation or democratic behaviour—is 
notoriously difficult to measure and evaluate (Hulme, 2010), and the pathway from social 
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change to actually improved development outcomes is almost never direct. Although the 
positive outcomes discussed previously resonate with the priorities for MDG attainment, 
challenges persist in directly attributing social accountability initiatives to MDG outcomes 
(McGee et al., 2010).  
 
There are long and complex chains of causality at play in translating an improvement in 
budget utilization or the inclusion of a marginalized group in a policy process into a 
concrete, target-related outcome. Few social accountability mechanisms cause a direct, 
measurable change that can be said to have contributed towards an MDG goal or target. 
Instead, they occupy what has been described as a middle ground of intermediary changes 
(McGee et al., 2010; Rocha Menocal and Sharma, 2009; McNeil and Malena, 2010). 
Developing indicators for process changes that identify alterations in attitudes, behaviour 
and capacities is the single most important current challenge for improving social 
accountability practice. Process indicators will contribute to a clearer understanding of the 
links between social accountability activities and progress towards outcome indicators, like 
with the MDGs, and thus help with programme design. 
 
This paper describes how the following good practices for improving social accountability in 
relation to attaining the MDGs have successfully led to positive development outcomes. 
 
 Taking a gendered perspective. Analyses carried out for the MDG Gap Task Force 
suggest that the biggest threat to reaching the MDGs is the failure to respond to the 
urgency of gender-based programming (Greeley, 2010). Equitable development is central 
to the concepts of social accountability, and initiatives have approached gender equality 
and women's empowerment both directly and indirectly. Some, such as women's budget 
projects, have gender inequality at the heart of their accountability campaigns and 
agendas. Others have supported the presence, autonomy and capacity of women's 
organizations in civil society. It is the centrality of gender equality, both to attaining the 
MDGs and to the principles of social accountability, which makes taking a gendered 
perspective the bottom line for good practice. 
 
 Actively working to engage socially excluded groups. This is a constant and often 
overlooked challenge, but it is crucial to link social accountability initiatives to the 
challenges of the inequalities that threaten progress towards the MDGs. 
 
 Working both sides of the equation (Gaventa, 2004). Initiatives that work 
simultaneously on building capability and responsiveness in government and on 
building capacities for collective action within civil society stand a better chance of 
achieving sustained change in accountable behaviour. 
 
 Creating effective links between levels. In the increasingly globalized world, part of the 
complexity of accountability in relationships lies in the overlapping domains in which 
they play out. In some cases, linking learning with solidarity in international civil society 
may be an important part of sustaining accountability processes involving international 
financial institutions or international corporations. In others, creating a link between a 
community youth group and a district development planning process may be integral to 
ensuring the representation of marginalized young people. Whatever the level of the 
entry point of the initiative, a strategy to ensure effective links—both vertical and 
horizontal—can be instrumental to building sustainable processes. 
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 Modelling social accountability practices. It is important that social accountability 
initiatives reflect socially accountable behaviour in their own practices and activities and 
those of their participating partners. For example, the positive outcome of a Plan Kenya 
initiative had its foundation in a lengthy period of preparatory work with young people 
to establish socially accountable governance within their own groups, while the 
Education for All Coalition worked hard to maintain principles of equitable 
representation within a complex, multi-level structure. Modelling socially accountable 
practices becomes particularly important in the light of the argument that initiatives are 
most effective and sustainable in the long-term when they are institutionalized and 
linked to existing governance structures and service delivery systems (Malena et al., 
2004). It is a particularly important factor when considering whether and how to scale up 
examples of good practice. 
 
 Pursuing the strongest possible form of accountability. Different types of 
accountability are possible in different circumstances. Answerability—the obligation to 
provide an account and the right to have a response differs from enforceability—
ensuring that action is taken or redress provided when accountability fails. As well, 
“voicing demands can strengthen accountability, but it will not on its own deliver 
accountable relationships” (O’Neill et al., 2007). Much social accountability work has 
resulted only in answerability. Even though it is important to create mechanisms 
rewarding positive behaviour, it is equally important to create mechanisms that sanction 
unaccountable behaviour (Agarwal et al., 2009). This is a critical aspect of translating 
accountability work into both sustainable changes in government behaviour and civil 
society's capacity to make such changes happen (Fox, 2010). 
 
 Defining assumptions about change. The changes that emerge from social 
accountability work are “highly iterative, rarely linear and often uneven” (Gaventa and 
Barrett, 2010, p. 58) and challenging to quantify. This makes clarifying at the outset the 
assumptions beneath the causal chain—from input to outcome to impact—an essential 
requirement for good practice. It is also necessary to calibrate realistic expectations and 
to justify investment in an area that is complex and intangible but that can also have a 
profound effect on progress towards reaching the MDGs. 
 
In the current global context of economic crisis and increased insecurity, why should social 
accountability initiatives continue to be a priority for investment? To manage the challenge 
of producing outcomes that distribute available resources more equitably, organizing and 
rights-claiming by groups representing people who are poor and marginalized are essential 
(UNRISD, 2010). Civil society advocacy is essential for ensuring more and better aid and the 
increased equity in international decision-making enshrined in MDG 8 on global 
partnerships for development. It is important that continued investment in social 
accountability initiatives does not come to be seen as a luxury in difficult times but remains 
a proven path towards stronger, more inclusive development. 
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Chapter overview 
 
Chapter 1, Social accountability and information and communication technology, begins 
with the recent advances, opportunities and limits of using ICT in social accountability 
initiatives. It reviews how a technological revolution has swept through industrialized and 
developing countries alike in recent years because of improvements in access to both mobile 
telephony and the Internet and how those improvement have unleashed a flood of 
innovative social accountability programmes and initiatives. Although such uses of ICT 
were originally restricted by access to the Internet—and often created a digital divide based 
on those with and without Internet access, the extraordinary recent growth of mobile 
telephone networks in developing countries has considerably eroded the divide. In 2011, 
there were 70.1 mobile subscriptions for every 100 people in developing countries (ITU, 
2011). The chapter documents the recent research that suggests that the platforms for mobile 
telephones can today allow for the same types of programmes and initiatives for improving 
governance and social accountability as those used for the Internet (Susanto and Goodwin, 
2010).  
 
While there is considerable reason for optimism, the chapter notes the importance of 
acknowledging and understanding the limits of ICT . Although the new technologies can 
support and facilitate civic mobilization, political and social factors are more important in 
realizing social change than the means of communication used. Fung et al. (2010) point out 
that there are few examples of the dramatic fix in which the innovation alone is 
transformative.  
 
Far more frequent are the incremental changes that ICT can support by facilitating 
communication and coordination and by working within existing accountability systems. A 
theme of this chapter is that use of ICT interventions must be appropriate to the wider 
governance, institutional and political context. Another theme is that the latest technology is 
not always the best. In many contexts, radio remains the best way to reach into people’s 
homes; the newer technologies are often best used in conjunction with more traditional 
communication tools (SDC, 2011; Panos, 2007; Greene, 2008).  
 
Despite these considerations, the new technologies offer great possibilities and have been 
used in many applications for supporting efforts in governance and social accountability. 
The chapter reviews how recent ICT interventions have acted within a framework of social 
accountability. Drawing from the available literature, it also offers examples within that 
framework. It then analyses certain successes and failures and suggests lessons for 
designing future programmes and initiatives for using ICT in social accountability work. 
 
Chapter 2, Social accountability in the context of urbanization, explores the relevance of 
social accountability mechanisms for addressing challenges posed by the dramatic increase 
in urbanization. It documents how urban residents and the organizations in which they 
engage have held government agencies to account for their policies, investment priorities 
and expenditures. It also reviews how such efforts have influenced what infrastructure and 
services urban residents receive, especially those related to the achievement of the MDGs. 
This includes their influence on how government decisions are made and implemented, how 
government funding is allocated and how diverging (and often conflicting) interests are 
reconciled in accordance with the rule of law.  
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The chapter considers the modalities that governments choose to deliver basic services to 
their citizens in urban environments and focuses on social accountability efforts to improve 
the relationships between urban governments and those who reside within their boundaries.  
 
Chapter 3, Social accountability in conflict-affected countries, reflects on the ways in 
which social accountability initiatives are used in the delicate context of crisis-affected 
countries. Given that more than 1.5 billion people currently live in ‘fragile’ and conflict-
affected states and that no fragile or conflict-affected country has achieved a single 
Millennium Development Goal, specialized approaches for social accountability must be 
carefully crafted for these contexts.  
 
In conflict-affected countries, poor or weak governance is often an underlying root cause of 
the conflict; state weakness either provides space and opportunities for insurgent or criminal 
challenges or the government repression and ineffectiveness fuel social grievances that give 
rise to revolution and insurrection. These conditions of state capture and social frailty may 
be exacerbated by strong drivers of disruption from environmental degradation, energy 
scarcity and food insecurity or conflicts generated from corruption in the exploitation and 
trade of natural resources and unequal income distribution. In many countries that have 
experienced conflict, there is often patterned economic and social discrimination and 
exclusion along identity lines, with such ‘horizontal inequalities’ leading to economic, social 
and political grievances among identity-based social groups.  
 
The chapter documents the growing momentum to define more precisely state capacity 
development as a central feature of peace building and state-building goals in the wake of 
conflict. It is becoming increasingly clear that peace building and state-building efforts can 
be supported by developing new methods and approaches for making the state more 
accountable to its citizens and by harnessing new approaches and methods for facilitating 
social accountability in the delicate context of post-conflict countries. A critical aim of peace 
building and, in turn, achievement of development targets, such as the MDGs, is to prevent 
the recurrence of conflict and to begin the process of transforming humanitarian responses 
into local capacities for maintaining peace and for fostering development that includes 
rebuilding the authority, capacity and legitimacy of the state.  
 
The chapter suggests that social accountability is critical to the success of building a 
responsive, inclusive, resilient state—accountability is a concern that transcends each of the 
dimensions of post-conflict governance. Voice, participation and empowerment are central 
to both conflict management and inclusion aims and to providing mechanisms for citizens to 
set the responsiveness agenda and monitor the international humanitarian and national 
delivery of services. The chapter thus underscores the importance of designing appropriate 
and effective social accountability programmes for conflict-affected countries that can build 
the capacity of the post-conflict state to govern. Such initiatives can strengthen the idea that 
contemporary states must be responsive to citizens’ needs in order to re-establish their 
legitimacy on an on-going basis as much as having the right to rule through traditional 
accountability mechanisms, such as periodic elections.  
 
Findings from the available literature on social accountability in conflict-affected countries 
and the ways in which conflict affects social cohesion and state authority, legitimacy and 
capacity are presented. The nature and roles of civil society are also discussed. The chapter 
explores how development partners have approached the conceptualization, design and 
implementation of social accountability programmes and projects, drawing on a range of 
literature and cases and provides a framework for analysis of social accountability 
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approaches as a way to systematically derive lessons learned. Using this framework, it 
explores five case studies of social accountability in UNDP programmes in Afghanistan, 
Guatemala, Kosovo, Liberia and Pakistan to highlight the variety of approaches and tools.  
 
Finally, Chapter 4, Social accountability, social inclusion and the Millennium 
Development Goals, underscores how the issues of social inclusion and social 
accountability are linked and why (and how) there are efforts to ensure that social inclusion 
is built into future social accountability initiatives. Although the two approaches overlap in 
practice in many cases, for analytical purposes they are treated separately in this chapter to 
highlight the routes through which, at least in theory, social accountability can contribute to 
social inclusion (and vice versa). Obviously, on normative grounds, social inclusion ought to 
be an important principle informing social accountability practice. Conversely, social 
inclusion efforts need to consider accountability demands as important indicators of 
empowerment. As a result, there is a strong argument to consider the links between 
development initiatives that stress social inclusion and those that attempt to strengthen 
social accountability.  
 
The chapter focuses on two significant and related questions that explore the links between 
social accountability and social inclusion, looking at whether social accountability initiatives 
lead to social inclusion and examining what the research shows on whether social inclusion 
initiatives lead to social accountability demands. It also explores related sub-questions: What 
are the intersections between the agendas of social inclusion and social accountability? How 
can they be brought together in a synergistic manner? Where does the greatest potential for 
mutual gains lie? What are the factors that enable reinforcing effects between them? Are 
there constraints that prevent the successes of one approach from benefitting the other? 
Answers to these are of importance for addressing issues of social and economic inequality 
and achieving the MDGs.  
 
The chapter explains that while similar motivations for inclusion and accountability drive 
the different efforts, there is a need to be explicit about the links between them. One of the 
common elements is their underpinning of rights-based approaches. Most transparency and 
accountability work is couched in the language of rights, such as the right to information or 
the right to carry out social audits on the use of public funds. Simultaneously, many 
inclusion movements are also framed in the language of rights, such as children’s rights or 
the rights of indigenous peoples. There is tremendous scope for increasing the ties and for 
social inclusion to become a more standard feature of future social accountability initiatives. 
 
The concluding chapter provides an overview of the insights and recommendations gleaned 
from the reflections offered in each previous chapter and specific recommendations for 
UNDP programmes, other donors and international development organizations engaged in 
supporting social accountability initiatives. 
 
 
16 | United Nations Development Programme 
 
Chapter 1: Social accountability and information 
and communication technology 
 
Revolutions technological and social—the advances, 
opportunities and limits of ICT in social accountability 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Technological revolutions have swept through industrialized and developing countries 
alike.1 Improvements in access to both mobile telephony and the Internet have unleashed a 
flood of innovative programmes and initiatives as people have harnessed the platforms, 
spaces and communication possibilities offered. The use of various types of information and 
communications technologies was originally restricted by access to the Internet and thus 
characterized by a digital divide in which elites could harness the technology exclusively. 
The extraordinary recent growth of mobile telephone networks in developing countries has 
eroded this divide to the point where there were in 2011 70.1 mobile subscriptions for every 
100 people in developing countries (ITU, 2011). Research suggests that the platforms for 
mobile telephones today can allow for the same types of programmes and initiatives for 
improving governance and social accountability as those for the Internet (Susanto and 
Goodwin, 2011).  
 
The technological revolutions have also been widely reported as supporting the social 
revolutions. The use of social networks and their importance to such events as in Egypt 
during the Arab Spring demonstrates their power. Applications of these technologies have 
arisen in the field of governance and social accountability as much as in entertainment, 
commerce and personal communication. Governments and donors have sought to fund 
innovative governance programmes, but equally interesting are the creative uses thriving 
and evolving through many decentralized networks. As a number of expert commentators 
have noted, programmes using ICT in social accountability efforts are as much about 
putting in place the enabling environment necessary to facilitate decentralized innovation as 
they are about funding specific applications.  
 
While there is considerable reason for optimism in the uses of ICTs, it is also important to 
acknowledge their limits in different political and social contexts. Using the Arab Spring 
example, Anderson (2011) remarks that a similar revolution happened in 1919 using no 
communication means more complicated than a telegraph. Even in the Arab Spring, the 
revolution carried on after the mobile and Internet networks were shut down (Dunn, 2011). 
Such sober assessments argue that the political and social factors were more important and 
that the means of communication were simply the means. In different transparency 
initiatives using ICT, there are few documented examples of the dramatic fix where the 
innovation alone is transformative.  
 
More frequent are the incremental changes, in which ICT facilitates communication and 
coordination within accountability systems. A theme of this chapter is that the use of ICT 
                                                          
1 This chapter was submitted in September 2011. 
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interventions must be appropriate to the wider governance, institutional and political 
contexts. Another theme is that the latest technology is not always the best—in a reflection 
of its 10-year history working with ICT in development programming, the Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation argues that the radio remains the best way to reach into 
people’s homes and that the newer technologies are often best used in conjunction with 
more traditional communication tools (SDC, 2011; Panos, 2007; Greene, 2008).  
 
Despite these considerations, ICT offers great possibilities and have been used in many 
applications for supporting efforts in governance and social accountability. This chapter 
reviews the available literature on how various types of recent ICT interventions have 
contributed within a framework of social accountability and offers examples. It then 
analyses certain successes and failures and suggests useful lessons to consider when 
designing future programmes and initiatives for using ICT in social accountability work. 
 
2.  Conceptual framework and scope 
 
Governments across the world are launching thousands of transparency and accountability 
initiatives, and the aid effectiveness and governance debates are replete with calls for open 
government data, which involves the use of ICT at some stage (McGee and Gaventa, 2010b; 
see the examples cited in TAI, 2011). Citizens and civil society have used such initiatives to 
mobilize, inform, advocate and even rebel with their demands for improved governance and 
accountability. This chapter defines a framework by which different ICT programmes can be 
understood as relating to social accountability. 
 
2.1. Defining the scope of social accountability 
UNDP describes accountability as “the obligation of power-holders to take responsibility for 
their actions” (UNDP, 2010). Tisné (ibid.) expresses it at greater length:  
 
“Broadly speaking, accountability refers to the process of holding actors responsible for their 
actions. More specifically, it is the concept that individuals, agencies and organizations 
(public, private and civil society) are held responsible for executing their powers according to 
a certain standard (whether set mutually or not).” 
 
This definition focuses on the process through which power-holders are held to account and 
is commonly divided into the notions of answerability and enforceability: the former a 
process of requiring a justification for the use of power and the latter a process of enforcing 
sanctions in the event that power is considered misused. 
 
If this is a starting point to understanding accountability more broadly, then social 
accountability is a specific type of accountability. UNDP (2010) defines it as: “A form of 
accountability which emerges from actions by citizens and civil society organization (CSOs) 
aimed at holding the state to account, as well as efforts by government and other actors 
(media, private sector, donors) to support these actions.” 
 
According to this definition, two aspects distinguish social accountability from other types 
of accountability. The first refers to the actors involved: Social accountability exists between 
citizens/civil society on the one hand and the state on the other. The second aspect is 
negative in nature and implicit: It excludes forms of ‘vertical accountability’, such as 
elections, comprising the formal legal means of accountability in which citizens hold the 
government to account (the chief example of which is elections).  
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Thus far, the definition focuses on the process of holding to account—of holding a 
government answerable and then enforcing sanctions (Goetz and Jenkins, 2005). McGee and 
Gaventa (2010b) note that social accountability is not simply a retrospective process of 
holding a power-holder to account for pre-established norms but involves an on-going role 
for voice and participation in the ‘upstream’ processes of formulating these norms. For 
example, budget formulation can support the engagement of citizens in subsequent 
processes of holding government to account. In their definition of social accountability, Joshi 
and Houtzager (2008) stress the on-going nature of the relationship. In the UNDP definition 
of social accountability, ‘voice’ is cited as an “essential building block” of accountability 
(UNDP, 2010) and concerns the ability of the citizens and civil society organizations to 
articulate their expectations and to have a role in defining the standards by which their 
government is held to account. This review of ICT and social accountability thus includes 
programme design, which focuses on using ICT to raise citizens’ voices and articulates 
standards for doing so.  
 
In addition to the two core processes (defining the standards through raising voice and 
holding the state to account accordingly), a third core process must be added to the 
definition of accountability: the provision of information, often defined as ‘transparency’. 
Information without the power to hold to account is not accountability. Although 
transparency is a necessary element of accountability, it is neither identical with nor 
sufficient for accountability (Jayal, 2008). Transparency can be an important and helpful 
factor in empowering or enabling citizens to engage in setting standards and holding the 
state to account, but as Fox (2007) poses, the critical question is: “Under what conditions can 
transparency lead to accountability?” 
 
2.2. Citizens and social accountability: Voice, choice and demand 
Social accountability connects the state to its citizens, and programmes for using ICT are 
commonly designed from the perspective of government or of citizens/civil society 
organizations. As observed by McGee and Gaventa (2010b), this leads to programmes that 
focus on reforms from one or other ‘side’—the citizen side (to use the market metaphor, the 
‘demand’ for accountability) or the state side (the ‘supply’ of accountability). The 
demand/supply approaches have characterized much of the programme designs for the use 
of ICT and thus form a prominent portion adopted by the framework presented here. When 
planning interventions, however, McGee and Gaventa (2010b) stress that successful projects 
need to look beyond such ‘simple dichotomies’ to how interventions can better connect 
citizens to the state, and thereby build bridges. 
 
A second element concerns the role of citizens. This has bearing on the goals of the 
intervention and the rationale for the social accountability effort. Houtzager and Joshi (2008) 
observe that projects in the field of accountability and social accountability more specifically 
are founded on two quite different philosophical premises. The first rests on the value of 
deliberative democracy, with the creation of a public sphere and an inclusive social 
discourse. The second is based on liberal notions of democracy and the new public 
management field (Joshi 2007; Ackerman, 2005). Joshi builds on this distinction by 
distinguishing between ‘choice reforms’ and ‘voice reforms’—with the former underpinned 
by market mechanisms and empowering the individual to demand services from the state 
and the latter about strengthening the ability of civil society to mobilize and to hold the state 
to account. Donors may emphasize different aspects when financing projects, depending on 
their perspective on democracy, social accountability and development.  
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This typology resonates with the impact of ICT on ‘digital democracy’. Dahlberg (2011) 
identifies four types of impact, each of which relates to a different way of framing how 
individuals engage with democratic discourse over the Internet and three of which match 
the ways of framing social accountability programming.1 One type is the liberal–
individualist and conforms to the aims of new public management, in which the individual 
is understood as a client, choice maker and receiver of services. The second type is 
deliberative digital democracy, in which the individual is seen as a member of a wider civil 
society and participant in public discourse. To these he adds the use of the Internet to create 
a counter-public, which “emphasizes the role of digital media in political group formation, 
activism and contestation”, such as what was displayed by various political and social 
movements in Egypt in 2011. 
 
Increasingly, UNDP work on e-governance has shifted away from the liberal–individualist 
perceptions of the role of citizens towards more of a deliberative democracy approach 
(UNDP, 2010). The different perspectives help to understand the values and drivers behind 
the programme design for the use of ICT in social accountability work. The purpose of each 
initiative varies considerably. Some are instrumental, such as reducing corruption and better 
allocating resources and the improved delivery of services (Rose and Sanford, 2007, p. 916). 
Others are intrinsic, such as the value of self-determination in making choices for oneself 
and shaping one’s environment. ICT has proven itself a tool for both the government and 
the citizens to communicate, coordinate and hold to account.  
 
2.3. Social accountability as a component of an accountability context 
Social accountability mechanisms do not develop in a vacuum but in the wider social, legal 
and political environment. Thus, social accountability mechanisms exist alongside more 
traditional vertical accountability mechanisms (notably elections) and the range of 
horizontal accountability mechanisms forming checks and balances in a modern democratic 
state (courts, legislative scrutiny, audits, accounting and independent ombudspersons or 
commissions).  
 
“Social accountability mechanisms thus complement and enhance formal government 
accountability mechanisms, including political, fiscal, administrative and legal 
mechanisms.” (UNDP, 2010, p. 8) 
 
Social accountability programme design often does not target the whole of an accountability 
mechanism or seek to cover all three of its primary processes—provision of information, 
participating in the formulation of standards and holding the state to account. Instead, it 
focuses on one process—one component of the broader accountability relationship—or it 
may focus on enabling the state or a particular group of citizens to take an enhanced role. 
Technically, those latter two potential approaches are not social accountability at all but may 
be necessary factors to enable successful interventions. 
 
There is a growing case for increasing the use of ICT for social accountability purposes. 
From their analysis of seven assessments of ICT projects, Fung et al. (2010) found that “home 
runs” (interventions that unleash a dramatic increase in accountability) are rare. More 
common are interventions that complement other mechanisms. New interventions that 
aggregate information, then digest and disseminate it can improve the quality of the public 
sphere and consequently provide the ‘straw’ that existing accountability systems (traditional 
media, elections, parliamentary democracy and so forth) can use in making ‘bricks’. For 
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example, a social accountability effort may seek to provide information on political parties. 
This is not in itself an accountability mechanism, but it seeks to provide information that 
will enable citizens to be better informed when using their right to vote, which is an 
accountability mechanism.  
 
In considering how many interventions can enhance and supplement existing accountability 
mechanisms, it becomes easier to counter one of the criticisms of social accountability, 
namely its lack of ‘teeth’—a lack of meaningful enforceability (Joshi and Houtzager, 2012). 
This is not necessarily a problem of any particular intervention effort, in which one 
mechanism may be weak or lack teeth, but it typically exists within a wider context in which 
other, stronger enforceability systems also exist. Indeed, this chapter demonstrates that 
social accountability mechanisms frequently act symbiotically with existing vertical and 
horizontal mechanisms. In designing ICT programmes, how other accountability 
mechanisms can be integrated—whether vertically or horizontally—is fundamental to the 
efficacy of the intervention (Fung et al., 2010). 
 
2.4. Social accountability and ICT 
The examples of ICT interventions relevant to social accountability presented here derive 
from a literature review of ICT programming. Their selection was based on the framework 
laid out in the previous section: first, that of three main processes (transparency, 
participation/voice in formulating standards and norms, and holding to account); and 
second, the role of programming from the demand and supply sides and the roles of the 
state and citizens/civil society organizations. Some interventions, however, work with both 
the state and civil society or they foster deliberative democracy by developing both 
transparency and participatory processes and thus do not fit easily within the framework. 
 
The starting point for identifying ICT programmes relevant to social accountability is that of 
e-governance and m-governance. Both involve the use of ICT—the Internet and mobile 
technology, respectively, for “including citizens in democratic processes of public-sector 
management, service design and delivery and towards achieving good governance at the 
local level” (Adera and Waema, 2009). The UNDP programmes in the field of e-governance 
include the use of ICT to improve e-administration by digitizing back-office functions and 
linking government institutions (government to government, or G2G); e-service delivery, 
which involves the use of ICT to link services to the population (government to citizen, or 
G2C); and e-participation, which fosters interventions that build a society’s ability to 
intervene (citizen to government, or C2G) (UNDP, 2010, p. 16).  
 
To these may be added another three areas: access to information through ICT, which 
involves a range of transparency and information tools through mobile telephones or the 
Internet; access and connectivity, which concerns the development of the infrastructure 
necessary to improve accessibility; and the support to governments to develop the policy 
and legal environment to foster the enabling conditions for ICT. Table 1 delineates the 
various types of interventions against the framework of social accountability and ICT.  
 
With the exception of e-participation, all of these interventions start from the supply side, 
looking at how various government functions can be improved by using ICT. In the case of 
access to information and e-service delivery, although they concern how the government 
can reach out to citizens, the starting point is the government. E-service delivery is not social 
accountability because, except insofar as it clarifies processes or provides a complaints 
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mechanisms, it does not allow for any holding to account. It only enables the delivery of pre-
defined services under pre-existing processes. Nonetheless, it can have similar impact. 
 
Table 1: Transparency and voice in social accountability 
 
Another stream of ICT programme design starts from the perspective of citizens and civil 
society organizations and explores how they can use technology to express their opinions. 
Such ‘voice programming’ comes from the demand side. Many of these projects are 
informed by the wider political and institutional context, either supplementing existing 
accountability mechanisms to maximize the impact of citizen engagement in participatory 
processes or filling in gaps by mobilizing publicity through advocacy networks and the 
media or even in the context of a specific organization. 
 
3.  Mapping social accountability applications for ICT 
 
The following section charts the applications of ICT in social accountability using the 
framework just presented. Drawing on the relevant literature, it reviews documented cases 
in which applications of ICT were used to enhance social accountability from the 
perspectives of both supply and demand. Although there is a growing volume of empirical 
case studies on e-governance, the evidence base on the impacts of ICT remains weak, partly 
due to the complexity of the issues and the nascent nature of the field (Greene, 2008, p. 179; 
SDC, 2011, p. 16).  
 
 Transparency Voice in formulating 
standards and norms 
Holding to account 
Supply Demand Supply Demand Supply Demand 
e/m-service 
delivery 
Information is released by the 
government but is also 
controlled by the government 
and linked to specific services  
Ability to participate limited 
to the exercise of choice in 
pre-established services – 
not ‘participation’ 
Online/m-complaints 
mechanisms for citizens as 
clients of services 
e/m- 
participation 
(mobile phones) 
  Create channels for C2G 
participation in decision-
making processes, e.g. 
budgeting 
Participation in holding to 
account through citizen 
reporting mechanisms 
Access to 
information 
Access and 
right to 
information 
processes 
Lobbying and 
dissemination 
of information 
(e.g. Wikileaks) 
Enables citizens to lobby 
government  
Enables citizens to hold 
government to account 
Promoting 
citizen and civil 
society voice 
with ICT 
 Coordination 
and voice 
enables 
citizens to hold 
government to 
account 
 Capacity 
support 
enables 
citizens to 
lobby 
government 
 Capacity support 
enables citizens to 
hold government 
to account 
e-administration Enabling factor: builds G2G links and capacity to enable G2C service delivery 
Access and 
connectivity  
Enabling factor: enables individuals to harness ICT for various social accountability functions 
Policy and legal 
environment 
Enabling factor: appropriate legislation and regulation enables government use of ICT and enabling 
environment 
Note: C2G: citizen to government; G2G: government to government; G2C: government to citizens 
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3.1. Transparency 
Supply 
Joseph Stiglitz believes that “there is a natural asymmetry of information between those who 
govern and those whom they are supposed to serve” (IBRD and The World Bank, 2002). The 
provision of information about the state and its activities is a means to overcome this 
asymmetry and thus empower citizens, to support them in holding their government to 
account, to better prevent corruption and to improve the ability of citizens to access and to 
dictate the shape of services and the responsiveness of government. Working to improve 
access to good information is a necessary component of an accountability mechanism. 
Consequently, transparency and accountability initiatives have proliferated in recent years 
and helped enhance other social accountability mechanisms. As part of the general increase 
in demand for information, the communications potential offered by the Internet and mobile 
telephony has been seized upon as means to disseminate information quickly to citizens.  
 
Making government more transparent entails a choice between providing the right to 
information, which gives citizens a right to access any information held by the government 
(except in specified areas), or making government-led commitment to open government, 
which must then be implemented across departments and services (see TAI, 2010 for 
examples of their application). The critical element relative to the right to information is that 
control is placed at the disposal of the citizen rather than by the fiat of the government. The 
lack of control entailed by open government initiatives raises two problems: “Firstly, they’re 
not necessarily as strong [as the right to information initiatives]; and secondly, they assume 
to some degree that the government knows what the public wants” (Hogge, 2010, p. 19). 
 
The growth of these mechanisms is significant. The number of countries that have adopted 
access-to-information laws increased to 80 in 2012, compared with only 12 in 1990 (Calland, 
2012). ICT clearly have an important role in implementing this right to information or other 
open-government commitments. The open data movement characterized by the Declaration 
of Principles of the Open Government Partnership urges the development of ICT as 
platforms for delivering information and online services.2  
 
Promoting e-governance and the transparency of information through ICT is an important 
plank in the transparency scaffolding but must be understood in terms of the wider social 
environment and the capability and willingness of government to release data. Successful 
implementation of the right to information or open-government initiatives requires several 
elements. In their review of impact assessments of such reforms, Anderson et al (2010, citing 
various research) note that the digitization process has had a transformative impact in some 
contexts but not in others. Implementing commitments requires political, bureaucratic and 
user ‘buy-in’ (Hogge, 2010). Calland (2012) emphasizes the importance of a heavily 
professionalized civil society capable of maximizing the use of right-to-information 
legislation.  
 
At the level of specific government services and institutions, ICT has been used to increase 
the transparency of the delivery of particular services. Simply putting information on a 
website is the first stage of e-governance. At their most basic, they involve the use of 
websites as a ‘billboard’ (Torres et al., 2005). While this offers only one-way communication 
with no interaction, it nevertheless can have significant impact on social accountability. For 
example, in the context of the national budget, several governments dramatically improved 
the transparency of their budget by publishing it online, whereas before it had only been 
available to internal stakeholders (IBP, 2008). ICT also can provide information on the 
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services available to citizens, in the form of citizen’s charters. McGee and Gaventa (2012) 
conclude, however, that there is little evidence from evaluations that link freedom-of-
information programming to improved service delivery.  
 
The provision of information permits civil society and citizens the material to build 
advocacy campaigns (IBP, 2000). Increasingly, e-governance processes have sought to 
provide services online, through ever more integrated websites, to improve the transparency 
and efficiency of transactions, from billing and procurement to the administrative interfaces 
between the state and citizens (Torres et al., 2005, p. 534). These can take a variety of forms, 
notably the digitization of functions and transactions, such as land registry, e-procurement3 
or tax records.  
 
The digitizing of processes allows citizens to track online their official paperwork and the 
status of requests for permits, registration, procurement and other administrative 
requirements. From the social accountability perspective, this transparency allows the 
citizens or service users to better hold the government to account. By removing 
discretionary decisions within bureaucracies, the digitizing of processes can remove 
opportunities for corruption—but only if it is well designed (Grönlund, 2011). Recognizing 
these benefits, leaders in the field are increasingly offering integrated web portals to allow 
for such types of administrative requirements and procedures. For example, the OPEN (On-
line Procedures Enhancement for Civil Applications) system adopted by the Seoul 
Metropolitan Government allows citizens to track the progress of their various applications 
and requests (Cho and Choi, 2004; see Waema, Mitullah and Adera, 2009, for examples in 
Africa).  
 
Until recently, such initiatives still relied on Internet access, but their utility and accessibility 
was limited to the ‘digital haves’. Increasingly, mobile telephone technologies are stepping 
in to fill the gap and acting as the means of disseminating information that can reach the 
rural poor. Susanto and Goodwin (2010) argue that “current SMS-based e-government 
services can deliver most of the typical Internet-based e-governance services”. For example, 
Kenya’s Budget Tracking Tool uses short message service (SMS) for mobile telephones as 
well as the Internet to publish community-level budget allocation information on certain 
services (Fung et al., 2010). Evidence from the Philippines suggests its citizens prefer SMS-
based channels over those of the Internet, at user rates of 87 per cent and 11 per cent, 
respectively (Susanto and Goodwin, 2010).  
 
Other uses include notification of appointments, availability of library items, job 
opportunities or other simple messages. Analyses of the use and success of these techniques 
rests on the perceptions and expectations of users, particularly their perceptions of its ease 
(Susanto and Goodwin, 2010).  
 
Although there is justifiable excitement around the use of mobile technology to provide 
information about government, it does not imply that the older means of communication are 
useless. Radio, for instance, still has a huge role. The Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation review of its own programming in this field argues that the best way for 
information dissemination to many rural populations, particularly in Africa, remains the 
radio, albeit coupled with mobile telephones (SDC, 2011; Greene, 2008). At the same time, 
the provision of information through mobile telephones and ICT is more effective and 
cheaper than most other methods. 
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Demand 
Two issues must be distinguished when reviewing the use of ICT in demanding information 
from government.: The first is the creation of social accountability mechanisms, such as the 
right to information, which, ultimately, will use ICT, while the second relates to civil 
society’s use of ICT to provide or digest information to citizens and to enable them to hold 
the government to account. In many contexts, the former has been dominated by campaigns 
for the right to information. These have been conducted primarily on political terrain, and 
success depended on the national political context (for an overview of five such campaigns, 
see Puddephatt, 2009). It is increasingly clear that achieving success with these ICT efforts in 
development, empowering individuals and enhancing democratic outcomes are quite 
dependent on the unique national context and political landscape of country (Malena et al., 
2004, p. 5; McGee and Gaventa, 2010, p. 7).  
 
It is only possible to address the first issue in overview form because it comes bundled with 
a complex range of social and cultural factors; section 4 explores the conditions for creating 
successful mechanisms. 
 
From their review of examples using technology to enable citizen-to-citizen interactions, 
Anderson et al. (2010) conclude that the use of ICT is “often described in hopeful and 
positive terms, but the actual impacts are currently inadequately evaluated and studied”. 
Nevertheless, Technology for Transparency Network4 has collected case studies that provide 
important examples that deal with both issues.  
 
For example, one set of its case studies feature civil society organizations that inform citizens 
of their rights and the commitments that the government has made. This includes Quein 
Paga Mada in Costa Rica, which publishes information relating to customer services and 
consumer rights; the Mars Group Kenya, which indexes and archives data on corruption for 
use by journalists primarily; and the Accountability Initiative in India, which synthesizes 
information from a range of websites and presents it in fact sheets.  
 
Another set of case studies spotlights programmes that break down government budgets, 
then process the complex raw material and transform the data into information that citizens 
can more easily understand and use.  Budget analysis, for instance, is intrinsically 
complicated, requiring a level of capacity and understanding of public administrative 
processes. Civil society organizations have helped the public to more easily digest that 
information. They have provided more accessible and relevant analyses to citizens. The 
Kenyan NGO Social Development Network (SODNET) provides an online portal and SMS 
inquiry system whereby citizens can access national and ministry-level budget information. 
Elsewhere in Kenya, the Ujima project synthesizes datasets on budgets, drawing on both 
public and donor funding, and presents information on the flow of funds (McNeil and 
Mumvuma, 2006). Another benefit is relevant data targeted to particular audiences’ needs; 
in the Republic of Korea, for example, one NGO reviewed budgeting on the basis of gender 
empowerment (Caddy et al., 2008). 
 
A third set of case studies relates to elections. The Technology for Transparency Network 
provides examples from Bangladesh, Brazil, India, Kenya, Poland and various other 
countries in which civil society organizations have collected information on the candidates 
in elections and packaged it in an accessible format on the Internet.5 Other approaches, such 
as the interactive database and wiki, Dinero y Politica in Argentina, allow citizens to track 
the business of the legislature or question party financing and campaigning.  
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Each of these examples complements existing accountability mechanisms, whether elections, 
budgets or service commitments. All of them collect, digest and repackage information that 
is accessible and useful to citizens or the media for whatever purpose, including holding the 
government to account. Civil society is important as an information intermediary or bridge 
between a government and the citizens, empowering people with the data they need to 
exercise their rights. Rather than creating new feedback or enforcement mechanisms, many 
ICT programmes empower citizens with the information they can use to engage in existing 
processes. These are among the many vital ways ICT programmes support and respond to 
the growing demand for social accountability. 
 
3.2. Participation 
Supply 
While transparency consists of essentially a one-way flow of information, participation 
involves citizens’ engagement with a government. The ability of citizens to contribute their 
opinions (voice) in decision-making processes is therefore central to democratic 
accountability. The use of ICT in giving that voice is denoted by the terms e-participation or 
m-participation, which involve “the extension and transformation of participation in societal 
democratic and consultative processes, mediated by information and communication 
technologies” (Sæbø et al., 2008; Rose and Sanford, 2007). As a method for more dynamic 
two-way communication, ICT offer governments opportunities to provide channels through 
which citizens can articulate their expectations. 
 
Several studies suggest that these opportunities have not been seized. A review by Torres et 
al. (2005) of government websites in the United States, Great Britain and the European 
Union are predominantly non-interactive and non-deliberative. The authors found that 
although there was significant rhetoric concerning the potential of ICT to create feedback 
loops and interactive interfaces between government and citizens, the benefits are still “far 
from being achieved”; most local and national government websites remain “mere 
billboards”. Anderson et al. (2010) conclude from their more recent review that benefits are 
yet to be harnessed. Similarly, Hogge (2010) cites civil society actors who doubt the efficacy 
of the transparency initiatives.  
 
Although considerable potential exists for using mobile technology, it is too early to realize 
that potential. Based on a review of a government-led East Africa e-governance programme, 
Hellstrom (2008) observes, “The mobile applications identified in East Africa will at this 
stage not open up for a deepened democracy and create inclusive public spaces. 
Government institutions are not really sharing information or giving insight into state 
affairs, at least not through mobile applications.” 
 
Exceptions to this trend exist, of course. One important example is participatory budgeting, 
initially an approach fostered by the Workers’ Party in Brazil when in local government in 
Porto Alegre. It has subsequently been adopted in many other contexts across Brazil. The 
process involves a series of meetings through which citizens and their representatives make 
decisions on the allocations of public funds (Baiocchi, 2003). ICT have primarily been used to 
provide the information to base their decision-making (Peixoto, 2008).  
 
The city of Belo Horizonte elsewhere in Brazil created an online participatory budgeting 
process to distribute a specific set of funds, alongside a separate allocation of funds 
distributed through a pre-existing process. ICT allowed the opportunity to increase the 
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inclusivity beyond the limited number of citizen representatives possible in the face-to-face 
consultation meetings (Peixoto, 2008).  
 
As the success of participatory budgeting has spread, so too has its use in other contexts in 
conjunction with ICT. In Bolivia, for example, citizen participation in annual budgeting and 
oversight was encouraged in the context of municipal hospital health boards and correlated 
strongly to reduced corruption (Kaufman et al., 2002; Panos, 2007). 
 
Industrialized countries have a much longer history of ICT use. The REACH portal in 
Singapore both shares information and offers an online space for citizens to post feedback to 
threads initiated by government personnel. Caddy et al. (2008) list several uses of ICT for 
expanding participation in various processes, although they note that engagement activities 
tend not to have a legal basis. They also cite some national initiatives that did not integrate 
citizens into the decision-making process. One of the concerns with e-governance in the field 
of transparency relates to the use of the Internet for many of the reforms, which thus limits 
their accessibility. A recurring lesson that surfaces in the different assessments is that the 
success of these mechanisms depends on the suitability of the ICT to the user and their 
perceptions of its utility and ease of use (UNDP, 2010). 
 
Demand 
Some ICT project designs seek to engage government participatory processes directly. In 
Brazil, for example, e-Democracia engages citizens in law-making processes of the House of 
Representatives through social media. Most of the ICT interventions in this field, however, 
have used technology to mobilize and organize citizens. As many experts argue, winning 
long-term change relies on the creation of advocacy coalitions and networks, integrating 
closely with media organizations and leveraging publicity and public support.  
 
This then shifts the discussion away from ICT and towards political–economic dynamics. 
Civil society harnessing the power of ICT and personal courage is certainly not a new 
phenomenon. More than a decade before the Arab Spring and Tahrir Square in Egypt, 
‘smart mobs’ in 2001 toppled Joseph Estrada, then the President of the Philippines, by 
coordinating through their mobile phones (Panos, 2007). Whether ICT was a necessary 
enabling factor or not to the uprising in Tahrir Square (Anderson, 2011) is in some ways not 
important; clearly, the technology has been used with some effectiveness but dramatically 
managed by the underlying political forces.  
 
Fung et al. (2010) contend that programme design in this field is rarely transformative and 
rarely makes a dramatic change in accountability. Of their examples, only Reclamos in Chile 
had a dramatic and transformative accountability impact—but was unintended: Reclamos 
created a space for citizen lobbying of the private sector and is now reported as “one of the 
biggest user-generated content websites in Chile” (Fung et al., 2010). The original objective, 
however, was to create a robust complaints handling mechanism by creating a space for 
consumer complaints.  
 
More frequently, ICT interventions enable a particular institution to deliver its goals in an 
incremental fashion. Programmes are often independent of a specific accountability 
mechanism; instead, they allow for improved public debate, and through coordination, 
aggregation of opinion and mobilizing, they support civil society and citizens and give them 
a channel for their voice to be heard. ICT interventions typically cut across the various 
aspects of formulation and participation in designing standards and the holding to account.  
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In this light, Zanello and Maasen (2012) identify two main uses of ICT: “tools for 
organizations to work and communicate better … and those that enable citizens to connect 
and act”. Both require different media: Internet-based voice and mobilization systems are 
appropriate for civil society organizations, and political blogs can support the creation of a 
public sphere and debate among the public elite. By using the Internet only, however, this 
discourse will not trickle down to the population by itself. Reaching out to citizens requires 
the use of radio and mobile technology to generate discussion and debate at local levels 
(ibid.). Community radio, for example, has been exploited to give voice to communities and 
to have a dialogue, often engaging local policy makers (Greene, 2008; Onta, 2008). Although 
there are many examples of this, the following illustrates innovative uses of hybrid 
platforms and, in the case of WOUGNET, gender-specific programming: 
 TRAC FM in Tanzania airs popular radio shows that allow radio presenters to conduct 
surveys during their talk programmes, and listeners can react via SMS (free of charge). 
Listeners are presented with a specific question, such as the quality of service provision. 
The radio station then makes sure these comments reach the appropriate official in a 
government institution.6 
 CGNet Swara provides the tribal population of Chhattisgarh, India with a voice-based 
portal through which they can report local issues using a landline or mobile phone and 
listen to other voice reports. This mechanism requires limited literacy. Appropriate 
submissions are published for playback on an audio channel.7 
 The Women of Uganda Network (WOUGNET) conducts a range of activities seeking to 
further ICT policy from a gender perspective. One intervention uses crowdsourcing and 
mobile phone-based information-providing techniques to help people, particularly 
women, engage with local budgeting processes through community-based 
organizations. The organization reaches out to women though online and offline 
channels, including through the Internet and email as well as print media, radio and 
information centres.8  
 
The majority of the participation mechanisms cited in the research involve the use of ICT for 
mobilization, voice and advocacy. The suitability of the medium to the user is an imperative 
(see section 4.1). This supports the theme, arising consistently throughout the literature, that 
any ICT intervention with the intention of supporting social accountability must consider 
the specific social, economic and institutional contexts as well as the nature of the 
organizations and their relationships. 
 
3.3. Holding to account: Answerability and enforceability 
The final component of accountability discussed here is the ability to scrutinize a 
government’s progress, demand justification and—if necessary—enforce sanctions. 
Typically, power remains in the hands of the government. Houtzager and Joshi (2008) argue 
that although civil society organizations can ask for responses from government 
(answerability), they have no ability to impose sanctions. As with participation, holding to 
account requires either engagement with the government processes or the use of publicity 
and popular support. It is closely linked to both transparency and participation. In the case 
of transparency, only with information comes the ability to assess or evaluate; in the case of 
participation, both voice and communication are required for interaction between a 
government and its citizens.  
 
Supply 
Even though the previous sections showed the use of ICT to mobilize citizens to hold their 
government to account through traditional non-ICT channels, there were a few cases of new 
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channels created by governments specifically using ICT for helping citizens to hold them to 
account. These included:  
 The Philippines Civil Service Commission created TXT CSC, a SMS-based service 
whereby citizens can complain directly to an independent commission. Other functions 
include the ability to provide information or opinions on policies (Susanto and Goodwin, 
2008). 
 In Kenya, an anonymous channel was created through which citizens can report 
incidents of corruption while protecting their identity, and the complaints are examined 
by the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (Schuppan, 2009).  
 In Malta, the eCustomer Care System allows citizens to file a complaint, suggestion or 
request for information by phone, email, the Web or face to face; a section within the 
Office of the Prime Minister manages the system and responds with appropriate action.  
 
Each of these mechanisms uses ICT to create a complaints mechanism and appoints a third-
party agency within the government to follow up and propose responses. By creating 
multiple channels of approach, including both SMS and Internet access, they seek to ensure 
accessibility by all.  
 
Another type of complaints mechanism is the telecentre (although it is increasingly being 
supplanted by SMS technology). In India, for example, complaints to the Gyandoot network 
about government services were registered and responded to quickly. In contrast, also in 
India, the experience of users of the Bhoomi kiosk services that handle land registration 
transactions were much more negative, with reports of long waiting times and the need to 
pay intermediaries to push complaints through at the central level (Benjamin et al., 2007). 
 
Demand 
ICT offers the opportunity for two-way dialogue and on an aggregating scale. Although 
many accountability mechanisms are characterized as lacking ‘teeth’, social accountability 
mechanisms overcome this by crowdsourcing—the mobilizing, aggregating and collecting of 
opinions through ICT. Crowdsourcing platforms enable a range of applications. One such 
use is to collect in a single repository any encounters with corruption or bribe-taking 
(examples include Pera Natin ‘to! in the Philippines, RosPil in Russia and Bribespot and I 
Paid a Bribe, which are international). The collated reports are used for advocacy purposes.  
 
A similar application is leveraged in the context of elections. Following the violence in the 
Kenyan elections in 2008, an influential platform known as Ushahidi, initially encouraged 
the reporting and visual depiction of violent incidents using SMS. Aspects of the system 
have been adopted to monitor many other elections since then, particularly with the use of 
SMS through platforms designed by FrontlineSMS. This system also has used the power of 
crowdsourcing in other contexts. Huduma, for example, is a site launched by Ushahidi to 
help monitor government effectiveness in delivering services. Huduma (Swahili for 
‘service’) enables people to submit reports on the performance of services in their district by 
text, e-mail or Twitter. The reports are then mapped on the Huduma site for public viewing. 
Reports on such problems as lack of medicine or teachers, potholes or broken water points 
can be submitted through SMS, online, through radio to designated desks at central offices.  
 
One advantage of ICT is their ability to overcome the coordination and communication 
problems of interacting with many people, drawing content from a broad group of the 
population and then leveraging the scale that it gives for advocacy. One innovative example 
of this is the Indaba platform, which describes itself as “an online tool that helps 
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organizations collect, edit, review and publish information, such as policy scorecards, case 
studies or citizen audits”.9 
 
Many organizations are using ICT to aggregate and publish the outcomes of social 
accountability processes that have been gathered through traditional applications. Penang 
Watch, in Malaysia, illustrates well the power that the mechanism can have for holding to 
account. Penang Watch collates complaints from citizens and then pursues redress on their 
behalf. When responses are not forthcoming, they use a ‘name-and-shame’ approach to push 
for settlement by building profiles of the complaints and sending them to all relevant 
government departments.10  
 
3.4. Enabling factors to ICT programming for social accountability  
Although there has been a great deal of innovative programming around the use of ICT to 
encourage transparency, develop voice and to hold to account, equally important is the use 
of ICT to enable these functions. This section provides an overview of programmes that 
create the appropriate environment to encourage the use of ICT for social accountability. 
One important factor—investing in the infrastructure needed to connect individuals—is, of 
course, a necessary factor for the use of ICT (Spence and Smith, 2010) but is not a matter of 
direct interest for this chapter. Instead, this section considers the legal and policy 
environment and ICT projects that digitize administrative functions and G2G 
communication (which in general falls under the UNDP e-administration category).  
 
Creating the appropriate policy, legal or regulatory environment is vital to the successful use 
of ICT for social accountability. In her analysis of open-government initiatives in the United 
Kingdom and the United States, Hogge (2010) cites Tim Berners-Lee, who identifies three 
levels at which sufficient capabilities and interest must exist for the regulatory environment 
to work: “It has to start at the top, it has to start in the middle and it has to start at the 
bottom.” The top comprises high-level leadership; the middle concerns the implementing 
civil service or bureaucracy required to develop and administer the tools; and the bottom is 
the capacity of civil society organizations or citizens who will access the tool. Civil society 
supplies the bottom-up pressure (Hogge, 2010).  
 
Many countries, however, do not have a civil society with the depth and political muscle to 
achieve this goal. Hogge (2010) relays interviews with civil society activists acknowledging 
the lack of a deep capacity. It is beyond the remit of this chapter to explore which political 
contexts allow for changing policy. Instead, a focus is placed on the arguably more 
important question of how commitments to social accountability and open government may 
be upheld.  
 
According to Toby Mendel in Hogge (2010), “…what you find is that governments in many, 
many countries—I would say most countries outside the highly-developed country zone—
have a great struggle meeting their proactive obligations. I think we need to recognize the 
very important role of capacitating the public sector in this area and not working with civil 
society initiatives: it almost sometimes may even undermine the government ….” 
 
For developing countries, the challenges to providing information and allowing 
participation through ICT are much harder than in industrialized countries. Access to the 
technology is less prevalent, and data in the government is often not digitized and not in 
sharable formats (particularly for access by the rural poor, mobile telephones or the radio 
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are often the only viable formats); and frequently, such countries have states that score badly 
in governance and transparency rankings, reflecting aspects of culture as well as capacity.  
 
Talking of the requirements for implementing India’s Right to Information (RTI) legislation, 
a chief information commissioner noted, “E-governance is never going to be really effective, 
unless it is tied very closely with the right to information. On the other hand, RTI is not 
going to be very successful and in fact, a failure, if it is not tied with the concept of e-
governance” (Jain and Barowalia, 2009). 
 
Recognizing this, the Right to Information law obliges government institutions to 
computerize back-office functions to respond to requests for information.11 This brings focus 
on the ‘medium tier’, the bureaucracy, which is the concern of those designing e-
administration programmes. This involves the digitization of back-office functions, allowing 
for swifter and more efficient communication and management of administrative functions. 
For example, the adoption of an integrated financial management information system 
provides for improved government-to-government transactions and can improve a 
government’s ability to interact with citizens (Mitullah and Waema, 2009). Such systems 
speed up the publication of accounts, enabling the easier provision of monthly reports, 
which can be published. Improving the communication between government agencies and 
the digitization of back-office functions is vital to the provision of prompt and relevant 
information to citizens.  
 
Yet, risks remain. Digitizing processes risk changing the traditional procedures and power 
relationships within governments, with potentially damaging consequences. There are 
ample case studies of this happening at various levels: 
 
 ICT tend to remove hierarchies and decentralize access to information and are seen 
as a threat to many senior staff; thus, they have been blocked (Jackson, 2000, cited in 
Bhuiyan, 2011).  
 ICT remove direct opportunities for ‘negotiation’ between citizens and civil servants, 
which are used as sources of income generation by government staff, creating 
resistance from them (Grönlund, 2010; Schuppan, 2009).  
 The rewards for adoption often do not fall to the people administering the process. 
For example, in the case of Seoul’s OPEN system, the additional workload imposed 
by new ICT requirements on information provision met resistance from the civil 
servants who had to operate it (Kim et al., 2009; Torres et al., 2005).  
 Although Seoul’s OPEN system in the end had significant results in cutting 
corruption, one evaluation of the Bhoomi project in India—which sought, like OPEN, 
to remove opportunities for local-level corruption—suggested that corruption 
opportunities actually increased (Box 2), partly through the shifting of information 
resources from the local level to the central level (Benjamin et al., 2007).  
 
The Bhoomi project actually illustrates the contrasting impacts of such programmes. It 
digitized land records and provided kiosks to facilitate further land transactions while 
cutting out corruption at the local-level by centralizing the system (Panos, 2007).  
 
4.  Lessons for programming 
 
ICT offers great opportunities for successful social accountability programming, whether by 
supporting personal empowerment and democratic governance, reducing corruption or 
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improving the quality of service delivery and the responsiveness of government and thereby 
ultimately reducing poverty. At the same time, there have been many examples of failure to 
win these gains. Heeks (2003) indicates that 35 per cent of e-government programming from 
a group of 40 case studies submitted for academic assessment to the University of 
Manchester were total failures. A further 50 per cent were partial failures. In the case of 
India, for example, the e-governance initiatives have improved public access and 
participation (Monga, 2008) but failed to bring wider results (Haque, 2002). Some actually 
caused harm (Benjamin et al., 2007).  
 
This section reviews the lessons on designing social accountability programmes using ICT. It 
emphasizes the value of appropriateness to context and how a programme must fit with its 
intended users. The first question of a proposed ICT project must be whether it has been 
designed to be appropriate for the capacity and level of access of the proposed users. For 
example, is the communication technology suitable and accessible to the citizens who will be 
using it? The second question concerns the appropriateness of the fit to the institutional or 
organizational contexts involved. The third issue relates to the political terrain—the fit of the 
accountability mechanism to the specific political context—and concerns issues of the 
receptivity of the government, the information available and the opportunities for citizen 
mobilization and advocacy.  
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4.1. Fitting the users: capacity, accessibility, literacy 
ICT has provided real opportunities to develop ground-breaking social accountability 
mechanisms. Harnessing the technology does not guarantee impact, however. Although the 
research reviewed suggests that real opportunities exist to leverage long-term change, the 
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation argues that the assumption that the 
adoption of technological innovation would in itself deliver change is beginning to be 
reconsidered (SDC, 2011). Still, in many cases the assumption remains (Helbig et al., 2009). 
Caddy et al. (2008) observe that, in some cases, reforms remain driven by “a solution looking 
for a problem”. To fulfil their potential, both the technology used and the platforms and 
Box 2: The impact of ICT on corruption 
There is growing evidence that the rise of access to and the use of ICT has had an impact on 
corruption. On the most general level, there is evidence that the increased penetration of ICT and the 
media within a society is correlated with lower levels of corruption (Bandyopadhyay, 2006; Baillard, 
2009). To explain the correlation, Baillard (2009) argues that decentralized information diminishes 
the opportunities for civil servants and bureaucrats to engage in corruption undetected. Similarly, 
Shim and Eom (2009) note that social capital (the strength of positive social relations) and ICT use 
and penetration both affect corruption. 
In the context of e-service delivery programming, ICT certainly can have impact. There is considerable 
evidence to suggest that e-service-delivery mechanisms can reduce corruption by increasing the 
transparency of processes to citizens as clients and reduce the opportunity for civil service bribe-
taking (Cho and Choi, 2004; Schuppan, 2009; Kim et al., 2009; Bhuiyan, 2009). Grönlund (2010, citing 
Bhatnagar, 2003) identifies several ways by which ICTs can reduce corruption: “By automation of 
processes it is possible to significantly reduce opportunities for corruption by removing human 
agents at data collection and service delivery points—when people engage in e-banking there is no 
officer to bribe.”  
Still, much depends on the design of the mechanism, as the two following examples indicate: 
 The Bhoomi project in India is one good example of limiting discretionary options for bribery. It 
sought to digitize land records and provide kiosks to facilitate further land transactions, while 
cutting out corruption at the local level by centralizing the system (UN-ECOSOC, 2003, cited in 
Panos, 2007, p. 20). Evaluations differ, however. Some argue that it has improved service delivery 
and reduced corruption effects (Bhatnagar, 2009). One external evaluation criticized the 
programme for creating in the process of digitizing itself the opportunity for corruption through 
false entries by bureaucrats. Additionally, the remote nature of the system removed opportunities 
for feedback and complaints, which previously had been possible when the administrator worked 
at the local level. By centralizing the process and removing information from the local source, it 
actually created opportunities for corruption (Benjamin et al., 2007).  
 Also a property registration system, the Computer-aided Administration of Registration 
Department (CARD) in India failed in its design to remove the monopoly over processes in the 
registration, with the result that nothing changed for citizens. “The civil servants did not allow 
[CARD’s] functionality to be integrated because of heavy resistance from corrupt officials.” 
(Caseley, 2004, cited in Grönlund, 2011, p. 15).  
 
Technically, neither constitutes a social accountability mechanism because it is not about 
participation or holding to account but rather streamlining and improving service delivery.  
From the wider social accountability perspective, evaluations have revealed varying means by which 
corruption has been reduced. There is some evidence to suggest that social audits (Singh and 
Vutukuru, 2010), complaints mechanisms (Caseley, 2003) and public expenditure tracking surveys 
have had an impact on reducing corruption. Aid transparency initiatives claim they bring about 
reductions in corruption, although the evidence for this remains weak (Christensen et al., 2010). 
Evaluations of many ICT for monitoring the delivery of services or to track budgets indicate some 
influence on corruption (TI and CMI, 2011).  
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programming should be adapted to the needs of the users and accessibility of the 
communication method. Content must be driven by the needs and the capacity of the users.  
 
Analyses of the Map Kibera Project highlight some of the familiar development challenges 
in design (Berdou, 2011). The project involved collaboration between an NGO working in 
the field of ICT and (among others) a local civil society organization grounded in the Kibera 
communities, located outside of Nairobi. The idea was to use the latest open-source 
technology to map resources and disseminate information useful to livelihoods. The project 
ran into local resistance in reaction to the reluctance to share information and the lack of 
short-term payback. The basis of some of the local resistance to the project was characterized 
as a major difference in the perspectives between two parties: the ‘technologists’ who 
“prefer to work quickly, publishing their results to a wide audience to attract interest and 
engage others in the collective effort” and the participatory development practitioners, who 
“usually adopt slower rhythms of work that include crafting and implementing a strategy 
for engaging with communities, which takes into account the particularities of context and 
power dynamics, and is continuously revised and adapted.”(Berdou, 2011)  
 
It is vital, therefore, that programme design with ICT, whether through civil society or 
government bodies and whether the demand or the supply side, starts from the priorities 
and capabilities—technological and otherwise—of the users. This implies a focus on 
participatory design rather than the adoption of technological blueprints. It is clear that e-
governance programmes cannot simply be transferred from industrialized countries to 
developing countries (Schuppan, 2009). The male/female, urban/rural and generational 
divisions in use and access of the Internet are different in every country, and such 
differences have not been adequately addressed in the literature (Helbig et al., 2009). 
Programmes should be developed in a participatory manner and be both inclusive and 
gender-balanced (SDC, 2011; UNDP, 2010). Both the technology and the approach must all 
focus on this.  
 
Programme design should consider both the back-office technical requirements for 
governments as well as those of the users. In the initial phases of e-governance reforms in 
both developing and even industrialized countries (Gauld et al., 2009), reforms in the 
context of citizen engagement have typically focused on digitizing front- and back-office 
functions of government in a way suitable to their existing bureaucratic processes rather 
than addressing the needs of users. Issues about the capacity, accessibility and demand of 
users, however, have become more apparent. Current evidence demonstrates that users’ 
perceptions of utility and ease of use make the difference between m-service delivery 
programmes that are taken up and successful and those that are not (Susanto and Goodwin, 
2010).  
 
The newest solution may not be the most appropriate. Old-fashioned radio remains cheap 
and the most widely accessible vector for providing information, particularly among 
marginalized communities and groups (Greene, 2008; Onta, 2008; SDC, 2011). Adopting 
hybrid solutions, such as coupling radio with SMS, has proven successful in many cases. 
Treating ICT as just one communication tool, albeit a potentially very powerful one, is core 
to their success. 
 
In designing programmes, barriers to accessibility for users must also be addressed. They 
can span from distance to an Internet point to cultural reluctance—often on the part of 
women—to using shared facilities. In designing ICT programmes for social accountability, 
these issues must be responded to beyond the broader question of infrastructure. Where the 
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challenge is awareness or literacy among groups in society, e-governance and education 
policies should target these challenges directly (Schuppan, 2009). Because another barrier is 
the lack of knowledge of the programme’s existence, awareness-raising may be an important 
aspect of the project design. 
 
4.2. Institutional context 
ICT interventions, both those that implement e-administration processes and the enabling 
policies, require a design that is sensitive to the institutional drivers, power dynamics and 
existing relationships. Information is power, and its redistribution will affect power 
structures. Whether programming from the demand or the supply side, those implementing 
the programming—the civil servants and civil society workers—are the instrumental middle 
tier of actors whom Berners-Lee (Hogge, 2010) consider as essential for enforcing open-
government legislation (and service-delivery processes). Those for whom digitization will 
remove control of application processes and the rent-seeking possibilities that they offer 
may be expected to push back. Experiences with the Bhoomi project and CARD in India (see 
Box 2 on corruption) illustrate how challenging this can be.  
 
These strictures apply equally to projects initiated by civil society organizations. Singh and 
Gurumurthy (2011) cite the dynamics of the organizational setting of any open ICT 
(referring to concepts of greater access, participation and collaboration) for development 
intervention as “perhaps the single most important issue” and not the divide between 
technical and political expertise. Researchers emphasize that many civil society-generated 
social accountability tools are developed to implement the specific goals of a particular 
organization. They must therefore be suitable to the institutional dynamics. Support to civil 
society organizations as well as e-governance reform must be suitable to the organization, its 
capabilities and its internal processes. E-governance reform in particular may require 
significant change to institutional processes, with far-reaching consequences for the civil 
servants involved. These range from threats to authority of senior management to threats to 
informal income-generation opportunities to threats of increased workloads for staff.  
 
Last, drawing on the experience in the Map Kibera Project, partnerships and incentives 
within them must be well chosen and carefully designed. Many interventions in the civil 
society context require the partnership between organizations offering technical expertise 
and those involving civil society. Frequently, the funds come from the technical sector and 
local knowledge from the civil society. Unfortunately, as Singh and Gurumurthy (2011) 
point out, it is the technology actors who have the funds and therefore the power and are 
“most keen to do the technology experiment”. Development actors are “likely to see it just as 
an opportunity for some extra funding support for the work they may already be doing”.  
 
Success is possible, provided a long view is taken, the political will remains and the systems 
are well designed (Schuppan, 2009). To drive the reforms through, managers have a 
critically influential role because they set the objectives and parameters of the reform. A 
significant level of resources will be required. Administrators of ICT for social accountability 
systems will in many contexts require management, maintenance and data storage support 
and training. This will require buy-in from managers, regardless of whether they are with 
civil society, public or donor organizations (Bhuiyan, 2009). 
 
4.3. Political environment 
The governance issues that social accountability seeks to resolve and the obstacles to access 
are often rooted in wider socio-economic issues, like lack of education and disparities in 
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income. Any e-governance approach must confront these factors. The question is therefore 
how social accountability mechanisms and the ICT adopted to implement them fit within 
the broader political environment? In their overview of transparency and accountability 
initiatives, McGee and Gaventa (2012) cite factors that the evidence suggests will impact on 
success, including the accessibility of information from citizens, broad mobilization and “the 
degree to which accountability, transparency and participation initiatives are embedded 
throughout all stages of the policy cycle, from how decisions are made to whether and how 
they are implemented”.  
 
There are societal issues that ICT will not transform overnight, even if they have the 
potential to transform in the long term. ICT programmes tend to reinforce existing vertical 
or horizontal accountability systems through the provision of information; the chapter has 
discussed civil society’s use of ICT to collate, synthesize and repackage information, thereby 
enhancing citizens’ ability to take part in existing accountability processes. ICT must thus be 
planned in the light of the vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms. For example, 
in the Brazilian case of Belo Horizonte’s participatory budgeting through online channels, 
the participatory budgeting process had already won currency due to its success in the Porto 
Alegre state government. The role for ICT was to create a supplementary system, which 
increased inclusivity of the process and the buy-in (Peixoto, 2008). The case underscores an 
important lesson in that the planned social accountability mechanism already fit with the 
political context and the only innovation was in the use of ICT. 
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Chapter 2: Social accountability in the context of 
urbanization 
 
The relevance of social accountability mechanisms to address 
challenges created by urbanization 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The main interest of this chapter is on how the urban poor and the organizations in which 
they engage can hold government agencies to account for their policies, investment 
priorities and expenditures. It also looks at how they can influence the infrastructure and 
services they receive, especially those related to the achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals. This includes their influence on the quality and extent of provision and 
on prices charged. It includes their influence on how government decisions are made and 
implemented, how government funding is allocated and how diverging (and often 
conflicting) interests are reconciled in accordance with the rule of law.1 It also considers the 
modalities that governments choose to use to deliver basic services to their citizens. The 
chapter focuses on social accountability in the relationships between urban governments 
and the citizens within their boundaries. The chapter also asks when and how such social 
accountability actually brings change on a scale that reduces the often very large deficits in 
infrastructure and service provision in urban areas. 
 
The increased interest in social accountability, particularly on the part of international 
agencies over the past decade, is driven by the belief that service provision will improve if 
the providers are more accountable to their ‘clients’—or more specifically, to low-income 
dwellers. Accountability can be considered as the institutionalization of ‘voice’, such as in 
Hirschman’s 1970 classic characterization of citizen responses, with a distinction between 
voice and exit.2 The World Development Report 2004, Making Services Work for Poor People, 
suggests that service delivery can be improved “by putting poor people at the centre of 
service provision: by enabling them to monitor and discipline service providers, by 
amplifying their voice in policymaking, and by strengthening the incentives for providers to 
serve the poor.” (The World Bank, 2003) 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the framework suggested in this report—with the demands for 
improvement coming from low-income groups and with the level of improvement 
depending upon the influence that low-income groups can bring to bear on the service 
providers, either directly (‘client power’) or via the state. It distinguishes between two routes 
of accountability: the short route, whereby the poor (and non-poor) exert an influence 
directly on the provider, and the long route, whereby they influence politicians and policy 
makers, who in turn influence the providers. Both involve articulated public demands for 
improvements (voice).  
 
For such accountability channels to be effective, the service provider needs to see low-
income groups as clients (which they often do not); specifically, they need to be responsive 
to the messages articulated by those using or demanding their services. Urban poor groups 
also need mechanisms and channels other than voting through which to hold politicians and 
civil servants to account. As one woman in a female group discussion in one low-income 
ward of Dhaka noted, “Without this vote, we have no importance to them. Only during 
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election times do they come and seek our votes.…” (Banks, 2008). Local government also 
needs some capacity to respond; in many urban centres, local politicians and civil servants 
can do very little to resolve the large deficiencies in infrastructure and service provision 
because they lack the power, funding and revenue-raising capacity.  
 
Figure 1: Key relationships of power and accountability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People, Washington, D.C.  
The World Bank and Oxford University Press, Washington, D.C. 
 
As individuals, there are very limited possibilities for the urban poor to exercise voice. 
Individual voices are unlikely to be listened to, and they may lack the information required. 
The fact that urban poor groups have very little ‘market’ power and often limited 
possibilities as individuals or households in receiving state entitlements makes collective 
organization the only means of increasing their power. 
 
In many locations and settlements, though, it is difficult to obtain the necessary consensus 
for collective organizations because of the diversity among the urban poor in (among other 
things) their priorities, political allegiances and ethnic ties. It is not uncommon for there to 
be language barriers or religious barriers to collective organization. The almost ubiquitous 
use of clientelistic relations by politicians and political parties means that collective political 
organizations that do exist are likely to be neither representative nor accountable to their 
members for their actions.  
 
It is unlikely that pressure for accountability on state providers will be supportive of the 
needs of the lowest-income groups unless these community organizations have systems of 
internal accountability. Even if practices are more democratic, in informal settlements there 
are likely delicate divisions of interest, such as those between landlords and tenants (or 
between absentee and local landlords). There is also the issue of whether social 
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accountability mechanisms that were first developed to help individuals or households 
achieve more accountability from service providers can also support collective demands and 
respond to collective pressures. Additionally, while the suggestion in figure 1 that the poor 
and the non-poor work together in coalitions to acquire more inclusion may be constructive, 
it is not easily borne out in practice; as discussed later on, the demands and pressures 
brought by middle- and upper-income groups and their organizations tend to be anti-poor.  
 
This chapter focuses on the urban poor in low- and middle-income countries. As described 
further on, these countries house most of the world’s urban population. They also have a 
heavy concentration of the urban population’s most marginalized in regard to receiving 
public services and holding government bodies (and individual politicians and civil 
servants) to account.  
 
In terms of urban residents and their organizations, this chapter has a particular focus on 
those who have had the greatest difficulties in realizing social accountability—in urban 
centres, this is mostly those with low incomes (including a large proportion who have an 
income below the poverty line1 and those living in informal settlements and other forms of 
poor-quality housing, with a very large overlap between these two groups).  
 
In terms of government, this chapter focuses mainly on urban local governments (municipal, 
citywide and metropolitan), although with an interest in higher levels of government where 
relevant, especially where they have critical roles in supporting the scaling up for social 
accountability or increasing possibilities for more social accountability. At the core of this 
discussion is concern for when, where and how the one billion or so urban dwellers who live 
in poor-quality and usually overcrowded housing in informal and generally illegal 
settlements, tenements and cheap boarding houses can secure accountability from local 
governments and official providers (including those  are not within government).  
 
Such accountability is primarily required in regards to the infrastructure and services that 
their homes and neighbourhoods need. This includes whether they are served by the rule of 
law, can express their voice and whether their human rights are respected, including 
protection from eviction and other arbitrary actions that harm them, by governments, 
private enterprises and other forces (UNDP, 2010). It includes a particular interest in the 
subgroups within this billion or so people who face the greatest difficulties, such as those 
with the lowest incomes and those whose poverty is intimately linked to the discrimination 
they might experience (on the basis of their age, sex or ethnicity, etc.) and how this 
influences their possibilities of holding the government to account. 
 
This chapter expands the discussion of the accountability of government agencies beyond a 
focus on public services for two reasons. The first is that for a large proportion of the one 
billion urban dwellers, local governments see them as ‘illegal’ because they live in homes 
and settlements that have elements of illegality (such as land occupation or their land use or 
the buildings may contravene regulations). Local government bodies (or other official 
institutions or service providers) may not be allowed to provide those living in informal 
settlements with infrastructure and services.  
 
If local governments can intervene in these settlements, there may be particular difficulties 
imposed on service providers or public works agencies; for example, the lack of maps, street 
names and data on who lives there, including a lack of a legal address, makes it difficult to 
install infrastructure and to charge households for services. So there may be a reluctance to 
provide services to households (such as water piped into their homes) because of anticipated 
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difficulties with payment. Or only poorer-quality services are available because they are 
much cheaper to provide and payment is easier to manage (such as water kiosks rather than 
piped water into each home). For many informal settlements, the geographical layout needs 
adjusting to allow trunk infrastructure to be brought in and obtaining residents’ consensus 
on the needed re-blocking can be difficult for external agencies.  
 
Local governments likely find it convenient to suggest that residents of informal settlements 
have no right to receive or have access to public services. This then means that residents also 
have no right to hold them to account for the lack of provision. It is also common for many 
of those in government to negatively view anyone living in an informal settlement and 
working in the informal economy, even though municipal economies depend on them 
because housing conditions would be much worse without those informal settlements. If 
politicians and civil servants believe that people living in informal settlements not only are 
there illegally but also migrants who should go back to their rural area, there is not much 
basis for the informal settlement dwellers to build social accountability with them.  
 
As discussed in detail later, where grass-roots organizations formed by people living in 
informal settlements have achieved more social accountability from their local government, 
the first step typically was to change the negative and inaccurate stereotypes. Many grass-
roots organizations did this by showing their capacities (such as in building houses or 
upgrading), by producing documentation that questions official beliefs or assumptions (for 
instance, to show the contributions that residents make to the city economy) and, 
increasingly, by preparing maps and detailed censuses of their settlements that provide the 
information needed to install or improve infrastructure and services there.2  
 
The second reason why the discussion of accountability has to go beyond a focus on services 
is that a large proportion of those who live in informal settlements have no official 
documentation or lack the particular official documentation required to access government 
(or private sector) services. For example, a legal address may be required to enrol children 
into a government school, access government health care services, register to vote or to open 
a bank account. Therefore, not only are they not able to demand accountability because of 
where they live, but people living in informal settlements are also not recognized as 
legitimate voices. 
 
For these two reasons, this chapter focuses on the ways in which people living in informal 
settlements have sought to overcome the structural constraints on their ability to exercise 
their voice. The discussion considers how the organized urban poor living in informal 
settlements build relationships with local government (which then provides the possibility 
of greater social accountability) and how they map, profile and enumerate their settlements 
to provide the data needed for achieving or negotiating inclusion in government policies 
and plans. There is a particular interest in the initiatives of residents and grass-roots 
organizations to hold local governments to account as well as an interest in how other civil 
society organizations do so (including those that primarily represent middle- and upper-
income groups).  
 
The experiences of people living in informal settlements in seeking to overcome systemic 
exclusion due to both social and spatial status provide insights into the challenges of 
government accountability and how such challenges might be managed. As this chapter 
describes, over the past decade, there has been a growing number of examples of civil 
society organizations formed by low-income urban residents (including those in informal 
settlements) that have developed partnerships with their local governments that have 
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included far more social accountability to those organizations and have contributed to 
poverty reduction and to the achievement of the MDGs. Some of these have also gone to 
scale, reaching hundreds of thousands of low-income residents with service improvements 
and better relations with city and municipal governments. For example, there are now 
national federations of slum- or shack-dwellers in 15 countries and, as this chapter describes, 
they have formed a transnational network (Shack/Slum Dwellers International) to support 
their own learning and their influence.  
 
In the past decade, there also has been increasing interest in initiatives by city and municipal 
governments (and higher levels) to ensure more social accountability (much of it driven by 
citizen pressure) and, as described further on, there are many significant innovations. There 
is also an interest in the role of local, national and international NGOs in social 
accountability.  
 
These initiatives, whether initiated by governments, NGOs or grass-roots organizations, 
seek broadly similar goals. They want to improve public infrastructure and service delivery 
(both in terms of who can access them and their quality and cost), to monitor government 
performance and foster responsive (and more transparent) governance and to increase the 
possibilities for low-income groups and their organizations to influence government 
programmes and practices. In assessing the challenges and opportunities associated with 
such initiatives, this chapter also discusses the constraints on urban governments (and 
governance structures) to become more responsive and accountable—and the implications 
of scaling up social accountability initiatives related to urban governance structures and the 
achievement of the MDGs. 
 
1.1.  Rapid urbanization 
The world’s urban population has grown from around 260 million in 1900 to more than 3.7 
billion today (Bairoch, 1988; UN, 2012). During this period, the ratio of rural to urban 
dwellers has changed remarkably, from 7:1 in 1900 to 1:1 in 2010. This was underpinned by 
the fact that most new investment, economic value and employment were in industry and 
service enterprises, and most such enterprises chose to locate in urban areas. In almost all 
countries, increases in the level of urbanization tracks the increase in the proportion of gross 
domestic product from industry and services and the increase in the proportion of the 
workforce in industry and services (Satterthwaite et al., 2010). Thus, for the past few 
decades, there has been an economic logic to where rapid urbanization took place; all high-
income and most upper-middle income countries have predominantly urban populations. 
Countries that urbanized most rapidly were generally those with the most successful 
economies (ibid.).  
 
Most large cities are also in the world’s largest economies (ibid; Satterthwaite, 2007). The 
World Bank (1999) suggests that sub-Saharan Africa is an exception, in that during the 1990s 
it continued to urbanize rapidly without economic growth. But this observation was made 
before census data were available to show whether this was the case, and more recent 
census data suggests that increases in urbanization levels have slowed in many African 
countries, especially those with weak economies (Potts, 2009). Projections by the United 
Nations Population Division suggest that almost all the increase in the world’s population in 
the next two to three decades will be in urban areas in low- and middle-income countries 
(UN, 2012), and much of this will be in cities where a third to two thirds of their population 
already live in informal settlements, lacking infrastructure and services. If their local 
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governments have failed so dramatically to keep up with the expansion in their population 
and economy, what does the future hold if they continue to grow rapidly? 
 
1.2.  The MDGs applied to urban areas and social accountability 
Social accountability mechanisms need to be understood as among a number of ways that 
seek to improve the provision of infrastructure and services that fall within the 
responsibilities of governments. They fit well with the MDGs in that most of the targets 
depend directly or indirectly on improved provision for infrastructure and services. Social 
accountability mechanisms focus on improving the performance of governments by 
increasing their interaction with the citizens who are meant to benefit from their activities. 
Ironically, they have been endorsed by international agencies that are not themselves 
subjected to the kinds of accountability and transparency measures that they promote 
within the countries where they work. For instance, social accountability measures may seek 
to hold urban governments to account for the inadequacies in their provision for water, 
sanitation and health care, yet many of the international agencies that support those 
measures choose to give very low priority to funding improved provision for water, 
sanitation and health care in urban areas (Satterthwaite, 2001).  
 
As development assistance agencies make a more explicit commitment to the rights-based 
approach, they do more to encourage those whose entitlements they recognize to hold them 
to account (Eyben and Ferguson, 2005). But they have long been more worried about their 
accountability to those that fund them than to those who are meant to benefit from their 
funding. For instance, bilateral agencies are more concerned with the state that funds and 
manages their work than the citizens to whom the government is accountable. If they were 
committed to more social accountability, then these agencies would be doing more to be 
accountable to the populations that they seek to assist through more transparent statements 
about their intentions and commitments and more detail about what is funded.  
 
In the United Kingdom, the International Development Act of 2002 required that the 
country’s Department for International Development (DFID) prioritize poverty elimination 
rather than other purposes, such as British trade interests. But the ability of agencies, such as 
DFID, to realize their commitment to the poor may be constrained by the orientation of their 
programmes to national governments and by an implicit assumption that such governments 
act in the interests of those most in need of development assistance funds (although this is 
clearly not often the case).  
 
For many of the international agencies, the interest in social accountability was preceded by 
support for privatization. At least in regard to the provision of safe water and sanitation, the 
support did not produce the hoped-for increase in capital investment, efficiency, and 
response to demand in most countries. Improvements and extensions of provision often 
have not correlated with increased private sector involvement (or necessarily with 
continued public sector ownerships and management) (Budds and McGranahan, 2003). It 
was then hoped that attention to social accountability by both public and private service 
providers would improve the provision, based on the assumption that these agencies would 
respond to consumer demands and frustrations. But civil society groups within many 
countries lobbied against such privatization, in part because of the lack of transparency, 
accountability and public participation in the discussions (see Whitfield, 2006).  
 
All the MDGs are relevant for urban populations, but perhaps especially those relating to 
improvements in health outcomes (lower infant, child and maternal mortality and less 
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under-nutrition), living conditions (provision for safe water and sanitation) and incomes.3 
There is also a sub-goal specifically related to urban areas (under the goal of enhancing 
environmental sustainability) that seeks a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 
million slum-dwellers by 2020. This is notable, both in the time set for its achievement (2020 
instead of 2015) and in being much less ambitious (why, for instance, did it not seek to halve 
the number of people living in slums, which is the target for many other goals and sub-
goals). This target of 100 million is such a small proportion of those in need; it represents 
around one tenth of those in need and is an even smaller proportion in relation to the 2015 
or 2020 population because of the growth in the number of slum-dwellers between now and 
then.  
 
2.  Social accountability in urban areas  
 
2.1. How urban dwellers can hold their governments to account 
One difficulty confronting any general discussion of the means by which urban dwellers can 
hold their governments to account is the very large differences in local contexts, especially in 
the extent to which urban dwellers can access public services and of any relationship with 
local government, as detailed in table 2. To state the obvious, a household has to have a 
public service or be served by public infrastructure with legitimate access to be able to 
complain about its quality or price. This household must also be regarded by government 
bodies as having the right to such service or infrastructure if it is to pressure those bodies to 
provide or improve them. It is usually with the local government that residents have the 
greatest need for social accountability (because they are so inadequately served or simply 
ignored by the local government), yet there are usually no social accountability channels. For 
almost all urban residents in high-income countries and many in middle-income countries, 
there is little need to use social accountability mechanisms (either as individuals or 
collectively) to ensure that their homes and neighbourhoods have adequate infrastructure 
and basic services. They also do not have to organize to provide them for themselves 
because the local government or another designated service provider is not delivering.  
 
The means by which urban dwellers seek to hold their government to account can be 
through each individual’s relations with the government, such as direct contact with the 
service providers or with politicians or civil servants. Or the contact with the service 
providers, politicians or civil servants may be through a collective organization of which 
they are a member, such as a resident organization, trade union or business association. 
These organizations may choose to pressure the state, by means which often include the use 
of the media or legal channels (using the courts to influence government policy and practice, 
for example).  
 
Social accountability mechanisms may favour individual engagement (such as those that 
allow individuals a quicker and more effective response to their complaints) or collective 
engagement (public forums). Of course, the means chosen by any individual or group to 
engage with their local government depends on the political and bureaucratic structures and 
the opportunities or constraints they provide for holding government to account. This 
obviously includes how politicians and civil servants view the legitimacy of the claims or 
complaints made by individuals or groups or even the legitimacy of the groups; for instance, 
there likely will be differences in their responses between complaints made by middle-
income groups living in legal settlements and those made by low-income groups living in 
informal settlements. It also includes the power and political contacts of the individuals or 
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groups—low-income and middle-income groups often form larger coalitions or federations 
to give their members more political leverage. 
 
Table 2: The two extremes regarding urban contexts for social accountability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Studies in São Paulo and Mexico City examined the ways in which citizens through various 
associations engage with government (Houtzager, 2007). The researchers concluded that 
many individuals fail to achieve what they see as the best relationship with the state: 
“…direct relations to government officials who treat citizens as legal equals and as carriers 
of rights and entitlements” (ibid., p. 9) Citizens’ relationships with government were more 
likely to be improved by directly engaging political actors and institutions than by 
participation in associations.  
 
Characteristics of 
the urban area 
Characteristics of high-
income districts (and of 
urban populations in 
high-income countries) 
Characteristics of many informal settlements with a large 
concentration of the lowest-income groups 
Housing and other 
buildings 
All housing legal, meeting health 
and safety standards 
All housing illegal and the occupation of the land site considered illegal  
Provision for water Supply of drinking-quality water 
piped into each building 24 hours 
a day 
No official provision for water or very inadequate provision, such as 
standpipes with water of poor quality that is irregular or kiosks at which 
there are often long queues; if there is no official provision, there is no 
official service provider to be held to account 
Provision for sanitation High-quality provision, with each 
household having their own 
toilet connected to a sewer or 
septic tank and with provision for 
washing 
No provision within the home; reliance on shared pit latrines, public toilets 
and open defecation, and often, no official service provider so no possibility 
of them being held to account  
Provision for drainage Comprehensive provision, with 
drains maintained and able to 
cope with heavy rainfall 
No drains 
Provision for solid waste 
collection 
Universal provision, with a 
regular door-to-door collection 
service 
No provision  
Access to government 
schools  
Universal access to pre-school, 
primary and secondary schools 
No access to government schools; often, even low-income groups must use 
cheap, poor-quality private education that they struggle to afford 
Access to safety nets and 
pensions 
Social wage for those who are 
unemployed, pensions for the 
elderly and safety nets 
None of these 
Access to government 
health care and 
emergency services 
Universal provision No government provision 
Political representation Elected politicians from this area 
in national and local government, 
with small enough constituencies 
to make the politicians more 
easily accountable  
Often, no elected politicians or no one in the settlement able to register to 
vote; or if able to vote, dependent on clientelist political structure that has 
little or no accountability to ‘clients’ 
Channels for making 
demands on government  
Politicians accessible and local 
government has clear channels 
for making demands 
None or clientelist systems are of limited effectiveness, with intermediaries 
between individuals and politicians; often, need for corrupt practices to get 
things done 
Channels for complaints  Ombudsmen, courts or other 
means to complain if official 
channels are unsatisfactory 
None 
Rule of law Police force of adequate size in 
each district, with channels of 
accountability and consultation 
No police presence in district 
New private or public 
sector plans 
Details published, subject to 
regulations, often with public 
consultation 
No provision for this 
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It is important to highlight two substantive developments in citizenship during the 
twentieth century: i) the recognition of rights and entitlements with the growth of a state 
administration (and hence the positive potential for civil relations as citizens try to access 
these rights and entitlements) and ii) the expansion of participation and civil rights. 
Research indicates that most people experience high levels of political inequality and are 
either unable to access the state or encounter costs they cannot afford when they do. 
Participating in organizations, at least in the findings of the São Paulo study, did not 
improve relations with the state primarily because such participation was highly stratified. 
In São Paulo, only 6.8 per cent of those with a primary education participated in 
associations, compared with 25.3 per cent of the population with some higher educational 
qualification (Houtzager et al., 2007).  
 
The issue of what non-poor groups are doing in regard to social accountability is important. 
They may be choosing not to engage with government service providers by arranging or 
using private provision. An analysis of how changes in urban governance in New Delhi over 
the past two decades influenced the provision of health care services found little interest 
among residents’ associations (formed primarily by non-poor groups) in government-
provided local primary health care because their members had private health care; as one 
resident commented, “We are not concerned with this dispensary, we don’t use it, only the 
servants go there.”(Lama-Rewal, 2011) 
 
When middle- and upper-income groups press for social accountability, there is the issue of 
how such pressure affects low-income groups. For instance, it may be that a residents’ 
association makes efforts to include representatives from all districts. Or these associations 
may be active in measures that have negative consequences for many low-income groups. In 
Delhi, the increasing frequency of demolitions of long-established informal settlements has 
been associated with the use of public interest litigation by non-poor groups and by 
stereotyping people living in informal settlements as encroachers and criminals taking 
public land for which they do not pay (Bhan, 2009).  
 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, India’s regional high courts and its Supreme Court were 
perceived as institutions that protected the rights of citizens from the executive branch of 
government; in particular, a series of judicial innovations ushered in support for the poor. 
The requirements for filing proceedings in court were made easier, which led to the growth 
in public interest litigation. But this litigation can be used by non-poor groups to remove 
informal settlements (ibid.). Therefore, in India, middle-class groups have been active in 
expanding their political and public space, including developing forms of cooperation with 
local governments that often exclude ‘unwanted people’ (Baud and Nainan, 2008). The role 
of Resident Welfare Associations in Delhi has been studied in this regard (Joshi, 2008).  
 
The Resident Welfare Associations are essentially neighbourhood management committees 
formed by the residents of apartment blocks and legal housing colonies (mostly middle- and 
upper-income groups) to which residents pay regular fees for security and to maintain 
common resources. They have become more organized politically (including forming 
umbrella groups) in making demands on local government and in protesting about 
increased prices charged for electricity (which has been privatized), plans to privatize the 
water utility and changes in guidelines that sought to regularize illegal commercial 
establishments. They also have been active in filing public interest litigation against informal 
settlements (Chakrabarti, 2008).  
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In researching political participation in Delhi, São Paulo and Mexico City, association 
activity and citizen-state relations, Harriss (2006) relied on citizen surveys of 1,400 
respondents in each city and interviews with civil and social organization leaders. The 
questionnaire focused on five needs or sets of needs: access to health care; access to basic 
needs (which may be claimed as an economic and social right); protection from violence and 
crime; access to basic urban services (public goods); and air pollution. At least four of them 
were seen as a major problem by the people interviewed in all three cities. Despite neoliberal 
policies, at least 76 per cent of the respondents said the state was responsible for urban 
public services. Regarding action to resolve problems, 37 per cent of respondents in Delhi 
went directly to the government for assistance and 29 per cent sought out a political party, 
while in São Paulo and Mexico City, 54 and 33 per cent of respondents, respectively, turned 
to the government and four and nine per cent, respectively, went to a political party. Self-
help as a solution to problems was particularly high, at 42 per cent in Mexico City. The 
research triggered the question, why are political parties used more frequently by the poor 
in Delhi than elsewhere? Harriss suggests that this is because of caste and class prejudice 
from government officials and the efficacy of using an intermediary. Parties, he adds, are 
oriented to these groups in Delhi, mobilizing them as an electoral base and operating 
through local influential people (pradhans) (see also Lama-Rewal, 2011).  
 
Ethnographic research in Chennai and Bangalore led Harriss (2006, p. 455) to suggest that 
there is a division between associations for professional, well-funded groups that use a 
language of citizenship but do not have a popular base and those within the informal 
working class, which are oriented to the rights of livelihood and shelter. While the former 
use the language of public–private partnership, the latter follow strategies of protest. Harriss 
uses the term ‘denizens’ (or inhabitants) to differentiate the discourse of the latter from that 
of the former (referred to as ‘citizens’). In South Chennai, citizen associations are primarily 
concerned with middle-class interests (including slum clearance), and Harriss classifies 
these associations and their members as ‘consumer citizens’ to differentiate them from those 
concerned with issues of public services rather than consumption.  
 
In North Chennai, there are overlaps across civil and social organizations through women’s 
groups (including Mahila Milan, a federation of savings groups formed by women slum-
dwellers). Harriss concludes by emphasizing that associations in India are dominated by the 
middle class, quoting one of his interviewees, who explains that “the rich operate while the 
poor agitate” (Harriss, 2006, p. 461). In Harriss’s study, one group of associations addresses 
the needs of consumer citizens, while another group seeks to serve the people with a greater 
emphasis on the language of rights (often with vertical relations towards the poor 
themselves). There is an interest in a new politics built around local associations, but Harriss 
argues that there are few membership organizations to be found. Within the informal 
working class, problems are solved through links to political parties rather than through 
mass mobilization. Meanwhile, civil society, Harriss (ibid.) suggests, manages the needs of 
the middle class rather than the working poor.  
 
As elaborated in Harriss’s work in India, an important distinction is which channels are 
used by different income groups. There is considerable literature discussing this that focuses 
on patron–client relationships between low-income groups and politicians and civil servants 
and the intermediaries that benefit. These relationships typically emerge because people 
living in informal settlements cannot use conventional channels. But in many urban 
contexts, local capacities are usually insufficient to expand public service provision so that 
everyone is serviced; in a context of resource scarcity, clientelism can flourish. Such systems 
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certainly do not promote accountability and transparency and may involve corrupt practices 
(such as illegal payments) and other illegal practices (such as violence).  
 
Clientelism may be the only channel available to people living in informal settlements, 
however. The state may be using clientelism to pre-empt the potential of community 
organizations or larger collective organizations or social movements to negotiate changes in 
public policies. This can be achieved by politicians developing relations with community 
leaders that allow these leaders to ‘deliver’ something to their organization or movement (or 
simply co-opt community leaders by, perhaps, bringing them onto the government payroll). 
See, for example, the mastaans in low-income settlements in Dhaka who have a role that is 
somewhere between that of a local strongman and a leader, an intermediary between local 
government and the population and a vote mobilizer (Banks, 2008). Another example are the 
community members paid regularly by municipal governments in Argentina at the end of 
each month but who do no work; they are termed noquis because of a tradition of eating 
noquis (gnocchi) at the end of the month when money is running out (Hardoy et al., 1991).  
 
In many countries, as in India, different social classes use different strategies to approach the 
state. The urban poor may rely on these political channels, while middle- and upper-income 
groups use bureaucratic and legal channels and the media to pressure the government 
(Harriss, 2005; Chakrabarti, 2008). As discussed in more detail further on, many examples of 
urban poor groups organizing in larger networks and federations and using bureaucratic 
and legal channels and the media have emerged in recent years.  
 
2.2. Social accountability efforts to achieve the MDGs in urban areas 
If social accountability mechanisms were to include all the mechanisms by which urban 
residents and the organizations in which they engage can hold a government to account and 
influence what infrastructure and services they can access and how they are governed, it is 
likely to include a very large number that are not documented. In any city with deficiencies 
in the delivery of infrastructure and services, there are many mechanisms used or tried by 
individuals, households, neighbourhood organizations, NGOs and professional groups that 
seek the provision (or improved provision) of infrastructure and services. These generally 
involve contact or negotiation with specific government agencies or private sector 
enterprises that provide such needs as water, sanitation or electricity.  
 
A large proportion of people who live in informal settlements are also seeking to avoid 
eviction and perhaps (if it is politically feasible to do so) to secure tenure of the land they 
occupy. At its most basic, this effort includes individuals who are making demands or 
complaints, such as in response to poor-quality services or over-charging. It often includes 
groups of individuals who have chosen to work together in making their demands. For 
example, parents with children at a school may be meeting and pressing collectively for 
improvements in the teaching or in the facilities (including sanitation).  
 
Community organizations that are not formed for social accountability, such as sports clubs, 
youth organizations or social and religious organizations, may include among their activities 
collective demands or pressure on government agencies (see Thieme, 2010). Then there are 
the measures and organizations that are explicitly aimed at social accountability, such as 
groups seeking to scrutinize funding allocations (and the processes by which they were 
decided) and how public money is actually spent or groups wanting to evaluate the quality 
of service provision.  
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Social accountability measures in urban areas that have been documented and that have 
relevance for meeting the MDGs can be divided into those that are government-led and 
those led by civil society. Within the civil society-led initiatives, a further distinction can be 
drawn between those led by NGOs and those led by grass-roots organizations. Of course, 
the boundaries between them are blurred in that the government-led social accountability 
mechanisms are often in response to citizen pressure (such as with participatory budgeting, 
as described further on), while many of the civil society-led initiatives are responding to a 
more open government and may indeed be supported by the government. In addition, 
many social accountability measures involve grass-roots organizations and NGOs working 
together. 
 
Government-led social accountability measures 
In many middle-income countries, perhaps most especially in Latin America, there have 
been some fundamental changes in the framework for urban governments and governance 
that has had large implications for social accountability. These include returns to democratic 
governments in many countries and such national reforms as more authority, funding and 
revenue-raising capacities decentralized to city and municipal governments and stronger 
local democracies as mayors and city councillors came to be elected (rather than appointed). 
In many countries, changes in the national constitution ushered in these changes (Fernandes, 
2007; Melo et al., 2001; Campbell, 2003). In Brazil, this was backed by the setting up of a new 
ministry of cities (Fernandes, 2007).  
 
These changes help explain why the proportion of the urban population with good-quality 
provision for water (piped into people’s homes) and connection to sewers and drains 
increased from the 1970s or 1980s to the present; it is now common for Latin American cities 
to have universal provision or close to universal provision for such utilities (WHO and 
UNICEF, 2011). This also helps explain the wave of innovation in city governments in Latin 
America in more participatory and accountable governance, including participatory 
budgeting and provision for including representatives from urban poor groups on 
government committees. It also helps explain why city and municipal governments in that 
region now give far more attention to upgrading slum and squatter areas. This is a profound 
change in the relations between the residents of these settlements and governments—the 
residents of these ‘illegal’ settlements are seen as having the right to government-funded 
infrastructure and services. 
 
It is also more common to have what might be termed ‘comprehensive upgrading’. 
Upgrading programmes range from those that have very basic improvements in provision, 
such as some standpipes for water (usually located at the edge of the settlement to reduce 
costs), paved roads and street lighting, to far more comprehensive provision, with piped 
water and sanitation improvements for each house, better health care and school access and 
legal tenure. Comprehensive upgrading implies a stronger relationship between 
government bodies and residents and much more possibility of residents using social 
accountability mechanisms as they become registered property owners with legal addresses 
and official (and conventional) connection to piped water supplies, sewers, electricity, health 
care and schools. This stands in strong contrast to what was evident during the 1970s and 
1980s when illegal settlements were seen as contravening the law and bulldozed or, at best, 
ignored (see Hardoy et al., 1989).  
 
Previously in Latin America, there was little or no basis for social accountability regarding 
infrastructure and services. Although the eviction of residents from informal settlements still 
occurs, they are much less common, and the scale and scope of upgrading within the region 
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has increased dramatically. Upgrading of informal settlements is now considered a 
conventional function of what city or municipal governments do. Strong citizen pressure 
and the influence of grass-roots organizations and federations had a hand in this. Here too, 
the changes can be ascribed both to votes and to social accountability measures.  
 
Participatory budgeting is an important example of more participatory governance, and it 
includes measures for increased social accountability. First developed in Brazil, it has been 
applied in more than 250 urban centres around the world (see Cabannes, 2004; Menegat, 
2002; Souza, 2001). Most are in Brazil, but participatory budgeting initiatives are also 
flourishing in urban centres elsewhere in Latin America and in some European countries.  
 
Participatory budgeting gives more scope for citizen groups and community-based 
representatives in setting priorities for local government expenditures; it also implies a local 
government budgeting system that is more transparent and available to public scrutiny 
(Cabannes, 2004). At its core are citizen assemblies in each district of a city that can influence 
priorities for the use of a portion of the city’s revenues and a city government that makes 
information widely available about its budget. In effect, community participation has more 
influence at the expense of bureaucrats, the local executives and councillors, and this, 
combined with a more open process, helps better link city government investments to local 
priorities and helps limit clientelism and corruption (Souza, 2001).  
 
There are many differences between cities in the form of participation (for example, 
everyone is entitled to participate and vote in assemblies or delegates and leaders from 
social movements, neighbourhood associations and trade unions do the participating and 
voting). There are also differences in terms of which body is in charge. In Brazil, it is usually 
a council of the participatory budget; in many non-Brazilian cases, it is within the existing 
political frameworks. The extent of control over how public funding is spent varies 
considerably, from an influence on the whole investment budget to a small proportion of it 
(Cabannes, 2004).  
 
Some cities make special provisions within the participatory budgeting for groups that have 
particular difficulties in having their priorities heard (such as committees for women or 
children and youth). Some have delegates elected for particular groups, such as the elderly, 
adolescents, indigenous groups and the disabled. Participatory budgeting generally means 
more funding goes to the poorer areas of a city and an increase in expenditure in social 
provision (education and health care, for instance). In some cities, the contribution of the 
population through collective works has significantly increased the value of the work. The 
process also provides possibilities for low-income groups to value themselves as citizens 
and thus an important step in building democratic institutions (Souza, 2001).  
 
The systems used within arrangements for participatory budgeting for monitoring 
expenditures (to see if the commitments influenced by this process are fulfilled), the projects 
that are developed and the performance of the agencies that are commissioned to undertake 
them have obvious relevance for social accountability. Effective participatory budgeting is 
not easily carried out, however. Martin Pumar, a former mayor of Villa El Salvador (a 
municipality in Lima, Peru) who introduced participatory budgeting, recalls it as difficult:  
 
“The municipal structure and bureaucracy were not yet capable of dealing with the changes. 
First of all, participatory budgeting of course implies relinquishing power, also the everyday 
power of councillors, municipal workers. Personal favours, clientelistic relations are part 
and parcel of our municipal culture. So there was quite some resistance in the municipal 
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apparatus. Yet even for those who understand and support the change, it was not easy. All 
of a sudden, urban development received tens of project proposals to be implemented, where 
the municipality had to develop all the technical plans to prepare the construction.”4 
 
The introduction and expansion of participatory budgeting in Brazil needs to be understood 
within the many political changes taking place there in the late 1970s and 1980s, with the 
return to democracy, decentralization and the strengthening of local democracy (re-
democratization was not limited to national institutions) and the new constitution. It was 
also part of an agenda for rebuilding democratic institutions to fight corruption, improve 
access to government and strengthen government accountability.46  
 
Brazil’s new Constitution in 1988 gave more powers to the legislature (reducing the 
dominance of the executive system) and mandated more revenue and more responsibilities 
to municipalities (including social assistance). Municipalities’ capacity to intervene in land 
use in favour of the urban poor was also strengthened through an array of new urban 
planning instruments introduced by the new Constitution (Melo et al., 2001). Some 
municipalities (notably Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte) could do more because they 
improved tax collection and thus increased their budgets. Participatory budgeting was also 
served by the growing citizen support for the Workers’ Party, reflected in the increasing 
number of mayors from the party (although participatory budgeting was also supported by 
some mayors who were not Workers’ Party members). In some cities, participatory 
budgeting helped sustain the party in power—as in Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte, and 
this meant greater impact. For instance, as experienced in Porto Alegre, it takes time for civic 
organizations with a history of confrontation or dominated by clientelist practices to change 
(Souza, 2001).  
 
Although participatory budgeting was introduced by governments, its introduction was 
influenced by the larger processes and by pressure from social movements, especially 
neighbourhood-based social movements linked to the Catholic Church and the new trade 
unionism (Melo et al., 2001). There were also innovations in participation by mayors and city 
governments that preceded participatory budgeting that helped to influence its reception 
(ibid.; Souza, 2001). Such contextual issues may affect the degree to which participatory 
budgeting catalyses changes in relations between citizens and the state. For example, 
although participatory budgeting has resulted in the redistribution of resources in Porto 
Alegre because of the strength of social organizations, it is not clear that political benefits 
will emerge within those groups (Avritzer, 2006).  
 
The analysis of the processes in Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte against a number of 
dimensions of political inequality suggests that the lowest-income citizens are less likely to 
participate, with the greatest participation from those with average incomes (ibid.); in Porto 
Alegre, the lowest-income participants did not speak or spoke infrequently in the regional 
and thematic assemblies to debate priorities (ibid.). Drawing on data on participatory 
budgeting in 138 urban centres, Avritzer (2006) argues that there is evidence to support the 
redistributional impact of participatory budgeting with increasing capital investment in low-
income neighbourhoods and that clientelist politics may be reduced. Without a strong 
association movement, the evidence suggests that the gains in democratization do not take 
place and practices of clientelism do not change (ibid.).  
 
Thus, in many Latin American countries, changes in local governments to which citizen and 
social movement pressure contributed have also helped in the achievement of many of the 
MDG targets. They increased the proportion of the urban population with better provision 
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for water, sanitation, health care and schools—and thus also helped to lower infant, child 
and maternal mortality. Yet, they may not have changed bottom-up accountability. 
 
One government initiative that has great relevance to social accountability and to meeting 
the MDGs is the Baan Mankong (secure housing) programme in Thailand (Boonyabancha, 
2005 and 2009). It is implemented by a government agency, the Community Organizations 
Development Institute (CODI). The agency channels government funds in the form of 
infrastructure subsidies and housing loans directly to community organizations formed by 
low-income inhabitants in informal settlements. It is these community organizations that 
plan and carry out improvements to their housing or develop new housing and work with 
local governments and utilities to provide or improve infrastructure and services.  
 
By 2010, the total number of households reached by the programme had grown to more than 
25 per cent of the number that Baan Mankong had targeted, but they still represented only 
about 13 per cent of the 600,000 families in need within several towns and cities in Thailand. 
At that time, grants for infrastructure upgrading exceeded $46 million, and loans for land 
and housing exceeded $52 million. More than 82 per cent of households are now living in 
settlements that have also achieved tenure security, via long-term leases or collective land 
ownership. 
 
In terms of social accountability, the programme makes government funding directly 
available to community organizations and supports their engagement with their local 
government. Support is also provided to networks of community organizations formed by 
the urban poor to allow them to work with municipal authorities and other local actors and 
with national agencies on urban centre-upgrading programmes. Those living in illegal 
settlements can access legal land tenure through a variety of means; for instance, by the 
inhabitants can purchase the land from the landowner (supported by a government loan), 
negotiating a community lease, agree to move to another location provided by the 
government agency on whose land they are squatting or agree to move to another part of 
the site they are occupying in return for tenure of that site (land sharing).  
 
CODI also provides loans to community organizations to on-lend to their members to help 
build or improve their homes. Prior to CODI, the Urban Community Development Office 
(UCDO) was active in the same area of work. UCDO had community leaders on its board, 
and these leaders were instrumental in setting interests rates for housing loans at 3 per cent. 
The nature of such engagement changed relations between the board members, and helped 
the community leaders feel that the organization was accountable to the urban poor for its 
interventions (Boonyabancha, 2005 and 2009). 
 
The Bhagidari programme in New Delhi is another example of a government programme 
that sought to provide a collective forum for government agencies and citizen groups to 
address problems (Chakrabarti, 2008). It sought to institutionalize citizen participation in 
governance by organizing workshops that brought neighbourhood Resident Welfare 
Associations together with officials and political representatives. It also provided these 
associations with more direct access to senior bureaucrats and thus an option to bypass local 
politicians. In Delhi, slum-dwellers tend to use political representatives to make their voices 
heard. By contrast, the middle class are more likely to use bureaucratic and judicial channels 
and the media rather than formal electoral politics (Harriss, 2005; Chakrabarti, 2008). The 
middle class knows the law and their housing is legal and they work within the formal 
economy.  
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Initially, the programme was restricted to planned parts of the city because the government 
wanted to avoid negotiation with slum-dwellers, which would raise land tenure issues. In 
time, Bhagidari shifted away from the Resident Welfare Associations to improving 
provision for health care and education and extending programmes to informal settlements 
where land title was not disputed. 
 
A review of how changes in urban governance in Delhi influenced health care provision 
suggests that the opening by the state government of new spaces for Resident Welfare 
Associations meant that local elected politicians were bypassed (both the members of the 
legislative assembly and the municipal government). NGOs were drawn in as health care 
service providers, so their advocacy role lessened, especially as they came to rely on 
government contracts (Lama-Rewal, 2011). These two examples illustrate the complex and 
often changing relations between a range of citizen groups that have different priorities and 
bureaucrats and politicians, which in Delhi are further complicated by the presence of the 
political and bureaucratic systems of the municipal and state governments.  
 
In discussing social accountability measures developed by government or particular service 
providers, there is always the issue of who is enabled to hold government to account and 
over what. Service providers see themselves as providing a service to individual customers 
and being accountable to these customers—not to collective groups or to underserved 
groups demanding services.  
 
There are various examples of government or utility measures that provide individuals with 
more accountability. An e-governance initiative in India, for instance, set up what are called 
eSeva Centres in several cities; these are kiosks with computers and Internet connections 
managed by women that provide more than 100 services, ranging from providing birth 
certificates to accepting payment for school examination fees, taxes and utility and service 
bills to reserving water tankers and bus tickets, making cash withdrawals from bank 
accounts and buying tickets to railways and cultural events. The kiosks allow users to avoid 
going through a government employee (who may demand ‘speed money’ for the service). 
They are also meant to cut down on paper work and waiting time and lessen the workload 
of government employees. Surveys in 2000 and 2003 in Delhi, Hyderabad, Kolkata, Chennai 
and Mumbai suggest a big drop in corruption due to the advent of the eSeva Centres 
(Sasanet, undated).  
 
One example of an initiative taken by a public utility to extend service provision to informal 
settlements is the work of the Social Development Unit of the Bangalore Water Supply and 
Sewerage Board (Connors, 2005). The unit was set up after pilot projects funded by 
international agencies found that water could be piped to slums legally and that residents 
were willing to pay for household connections. For the first time now, slums are serviced as 
a distinct category by the water utility, and new working relationships are being forged 
between the utility, NGOs and residents as they learn to cooperate and bargain with one 
another. About 10,000 households in Bangalore’s slums have water piped to their premises. 
Among the innovations are acceptance of alternative proof of residence for a connection 
(other than land tenure documents, which most slum households do not have), such as a 
ration card, a voter ID card or an identity documentation issued by the Karnataka Slum 
Clearance Board, reduced connection fees (that can also be paid in instalments) and a 
cheaper tariff for households that consume little water.5  
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Civil society-led social accountability measures 
There is considerable diversity in the civil society-led social accountability measures in 
terms of what they involve and what they target. Among them, an important element has 
been the emergence of NGOs that sought to hold governments to account, especially over 
the allocation and use of funding and over the quality of service provision. The social 
accountability mechanisms included a focus on funding priorities, on the actual provision of 
infrastructure and services, on the processes by which public money was spent (sometimes 
including the tendering and contracting process) and on the actions and decisions of 
particular politicians. Most examples funded by international agencies, but that could be 
because that type of funding is typically documented.  
 
Civil society-led measures that are funded by international agencies usually means a focus 
on NGOs that can meet the institutional requirements for receiving support from those 
agencies, with consequently little or no support for grass-roots organizations. There are 
issues here around the social accountability of NGOs to citizens, however, in particular to 
urban poor groups. Even where NGOs claim to speak on behalf of the poor, they may 
provide little or no scope for the poor themselves to speak. In addition, many social 
accountability mechanisms do not increase the power of poorer groups.  
 
A stocktaking report of social accountability initiatives applied to budget management in 
Anglophone Africa (McNeil and Mumvuma, 2006) describes four stages of the process: the 
formation of the budget (such as participatory budgeting, as discussed already, although 
this is usually government led), budget review and analysis, expenditure tracking and 
performance monitoring.  
 
Budget review and analysis includes research, advocacy and the dissemination of 
information on issues related to official budgets by civil society or other groups independent 
of government. The goals are to analyse the implications of government budgets for 
different groups, particularly poor and underprivileged groups, raise the overall level of 
budget literacy among the public and inform a legislature and policy makers so they can 
engage in more informed debate. The process demystifies what is usually a highly technical 
and inaccessible financial document (ibid.).  
 
Expenditure tracking focuses on how the public sector spends the money allocated to it. 
What can make this so powerful is that actual users of services collect data on inputs and 
expenditures.  
 
Performance monitoring assembles citizen and community assessments of infrastructure 
and service provision in terms of quality and satisfaction. It can function as a surrogate for 
competition for services that are monopolies where the service provider lacks the incentive 
to be responsive. Community scorecards can include meetings with service providers that 
provide them with immediate feedback.  
 
The diverse examples of monitoring include the Public Record of Operations and Finance 
(PROOF) campaign in Bangalore, India, which subjects the city corporation and 
municipality to regular monitoring and auditing. The Centre for Budget and Policy Studies 
in Bangalore carefully analyses the budgets. According to the centre’s director, “The poor 
are not involved. We have tried to include slum-dwellers associations, but this has not been 
successful. We work with locally elected representatives, and because of reservations in the 
Indian system, many of them are poor. We are trying to build their capacity in this regard” 
(Sasanet, undated). 
 
 
Reflections on Social Accountability 53 
 
 
Another Indian NGO, Parivartan, organized public hearings in two resettlement colonies to 
assess whether contracts awarded had actually been provided. Of 68 contracts read out, 64 
were found to have irregular appropriations. This initiative helped mobilize the residents of 
these camps and led to more open reporting of public works and their progress. Local area 
committees were formed in the settlements, with residents monitoring civil works and 
demanding redress. Local contractors and some local officials opposed it, but the public 
hearing resulted in contractors more carefully completing works (ibid.). In the Philippines, 
Procurement Watch, Inc., a non-profit, civil society organization, monitored the 
procurement process and worked with local government to train staff in the procurement 
process.  
 
In urban areas, performance monitoring through citizen report cards are among the most 
widely documented mechanisms for improving social accountability. These were initiated in 
Bangalore by the Public Affairs Centre, and through surveys they provide quantitative 
feedback on user perceptions of the quality, adequacy and efficiency of public services. They 
go beyond the collection of data and operate as an instrument to extract public 
accountability through responding media coverage and civil society advocacy. The first 
survey was conducted in Bangalore in 1993, and after its publication generated heavy media 
coverage, the survey became one of the core functions of a new non-profit society that took 
root in 1994 (Connors, 2005). 
 
In 1999, the survey was repeated, but before the findings were published, a summary was 
presented to the providers of telephone, water and electricity services and to the 
municipality officials. After the findings were published, a workshop was organized 
involving senior officials from the municipality agencies and community members. Over the 
six years between the two report card initiatives, there had been partial improvements, such 
as with telephone and hospital services. But overall citizen satisfaction remained low, even 
for the better-performing services.  
 
The survey findings suggested that the scale of corruption had grown both in how often 
bribes (including ‘voluntary speed payments’, or bribes) had to be paid and in the amount 
that had to be paid. Some of the service providers responded to the findings by participating 
in the public forums and reviewing their systems for service provision and complaints. For 
instance, the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board made a concerted effort to 
improve services to consumers, including a new telephone and online complaint-report 
mechanism, with heavy penalties for engineers if problems were not resolved and monthly 
water forums to help spotlight maintenance needs. Most informal settlements, however, are 
not served by this utility (ibid.). In addition, highlighting public dissatisfaction and the level 
of corruption does not of itself generate the needed governance changes (The World Bank, 
undated).  
 
The utility of citizen report cards for urban poor groups depends on their orientation and 
coverage. Of course, there are issues of representation to be considered; for instance, is the 
survey interview a large enough sample for the data collected to report on public service 
provision in small areas or is the sample size only large enough to provide aggregate figures 
for the city? If the sample size is large enough to provide relevant data on service provision 
in particular wards or neighbourhoods, does it serve to inform policies and investments to 
address problems in those wards or neighbourhoods? In addition, do the government or 
private sector service providers recognize that everyone within their jurisdiction has a right 
to infrastructure and services? If these initiatives report only on user perceptions of the 
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quality of provision for services, then it may not record citizen dissatisfaction for those that 
have no service, including those living in informal settlements deemed to have no right to 
services.  
 
These are issues that can be managed through collaboration with urban poor groups and 
their organizations. For example, in Ahmedabad, India, the Self-Employed Women’s 
Association (SEWA) collaborated in a citizens’ report card survey, with members advising 
on the questions and helping conduct the survey (Sasanet, undated). The survey also 
focused on districts (wards) with poor services. The findings indicated that only 33 per cent 
of the women surveyed were satisfied with the supply of water; the main complaints were 
irregular supply, distance of water source from home, long queues and poor quality. Fewer 
than half of the respondents were satisfied with the sewerage facilities; the major reasons for 
dissatisfaction were poor maintenance and the continuous overflow of gutters. Garbage 
disposal services were available to only 65 per cent of the respondents, of whom only 40 per 
cent were satisfied with the service. The survey also found that only six per cent of 
respondents had contacted the municipal corporation to complain, discouraged otherwise 
by the poor behaviour among the staff and the lengthy response time. A quarter of 
respondents reported paying speed money (bribes) to solve problems related to their public 
services (ibid.).  
 
A report card survey on public services in Hyderabad, India, in 2000 included a focus on 
slum-dwellers; a third of its sample of 1,000 interviewees lived in slums. Satisfaction ratings 
for solid waste disposal, stormwater drains, roads, the water supply, sewerage, electricity 
and telephones were below 25 per cent. Only two out of five slum-dwellers had their own 
water connection. The most commonly cited problems by the respondents living in a slum 
were the absence of street lights, choked drains and gutters, clogged and leaking sewerage, 
inadequate telephone connections, contaminated water and irregular unscheduled power 
cuts. Also among the slum-dwelling respondents, 42 per cent reported paying speed money 
for their water service; and 85 per cent of them with complaints did not do anything because 
they lacked faith in the system.  
 
An interesting and detailed assessment of citizens’ report cards on the provision of water, 
sanitation and solid waste collection in Kenya’s three largest cities found a tremendous 
proportion of the populations did not receive any public services (KARA, 2007). The most 
common complaints among people living in informal settlements centred on water (the time 
spent in fetching water from sources outside the home, especially in times of scarcity, the 
long queues and the queue jumping) and sanitation (a large proportion relied on a 
neighbour’s pit toilet, a public or community toilet or defecation on open ground) (ibid.).  
 
It is not clear whether publicizing the survey findings has helped to change the situation, 
although it is more likely to pressure providers into better-quality service, at least for current 
receivers. The initiative, however, suffers the limitation of all surveys based on 
representative samples—it does not provide the data needed for action. It doesn’t indicate 
which streets and neighbourhoods are worst served (unlike the surveys conducted by 
resident organizations in informal settlements discussed in the next section). Additionally, 
there is the worry that any professionally managed survey may undersample the residents 
of informal settlements because they perceive the areas as dangerous and difficult to work in 
(especially if there are no maps and street names).  
 
Two other initiatives in urban areas in Kenya deserve mention. The first is the growth of 
residents’ associations in Nairobi, which began as protests against the inadequacies of the 
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government by small-sized residents’ associations in specific (mostly middle class) areas that 
then developed into a Nairobi-wide and then Kenya-wide grouping of residents’ 
associations, which thus gained greater force through their unified strength in numbers.6  
 
The second is the research of the African Population and Health Research Centre in the 
informal settlements that house half of Nairobi’s population. Its work has highlighted the 
serious health problems, including high levels of infant and child mortality, that urban poor 
populations experience. The research has generated statistics on these and other health 
issues for each large informal settlement (APHRC, 2002). This might not be considered as a 
social accountability measure, yet detailed data on the large (and mostly preventable) health 
burdens suffered by low-income urban populations has long been one of the more effective 
measures to trigger government attention.  
 
Another example of research for social accountability is the work of the Urban Health 
Resource Centre in New Delhi, which has demonstrated how the poorest quartile of the 
urban population in many states in India have much worse health and health care services 
than the rest of the urban population (Agarwal, 2011).  
 
Yet another organization that seeks to hold government to account is the Jesuit Centre for 
Theological Reflection in Zambia. Although its focus is on the national level, its work has 
importance for urban areas because it includes surveys of living costs in Lusaka and other 
Zambian towns. The Jesuit Centre has been collecting data on living costs since the early 
1990s, which has illustrated the deficiencies in the official definition of poverty and in the 
monetary amounts set as poverty lines. This includes a significant under-provision in the 
allowance for non-food needs (Chibuye, 2011). The data suggest that the poverty line for 
Lusaka should be around $2.22 per person per day and not the widely used $1 per person 
per day. In other urban centres in Zambia, the costs of non-food needs also meant that 
setting a poverty line at a dollar a day is unrealistic. 
 
One of the most innovative civil society institutions that seeks more government 
accountability across all sectors is Pakistan’s Urban Resource Centre, first set up in Karachi 
and then in other urban centres (Hasan, 2007). Its work is also more rooted in the needs and 
priorities of people living in informal settlements. Urban planning professionals and 
teachers, along with NGOs and community organization staff opened the first centre in 1989 
to provide research, information and discussions for all civil society groups within the city. 
They review all proposed major urban development projects from the point of view of low-
income communities and interest groups and make their assessments widely available, 
through quarterly reports, monographs and a monthly publication called Facts and Figures.  
 
The centre organizes forums that allow interest groups to discuss issues relevant to Karachi, 
which has helped develop more interaction between low-income, informal communities, 
NGOs, private (formal and informal) sector interest groups, academic institutions and 
government agencies. Research and forums, for instance, have examined the various 
problems of apartment owners, scavengers, theatre groups, commuters, residents of historic 
districts, working women, wholesale market traders and transport company operators. The 
centre also arranges discussions and negotiations between civil society groups and political 
parties and government representatives. 
 
The Urban Resource Centre and the network of NGOs of which it is part helped to stop the 
construction of an expressway that would have uprooted 100,000 people and caused 
immense environmental damage to the city; it was replaced with a more acceptable bypass 
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road. The centre’s proposal for the extension of the Karachi circular railway into Orangi and 
other areas of Karachi was accepted. It has supported many other initiatives that changed 
government policies or the way government agencies work (ibid.).7  
 
Also in Pakistan, the Orangi Pilot Project-Research and Training Institute is perhaps best 
known for developing an approach to supporting the residents of a street or lane to work 
together installing sewers and drains and doing so in ways that keep down expenses and 
allow full cost-recovery from the users. This approach has provided much improved 
sanitation and drainage for hundreds of thousands of low-income residents in Karachi and 
other urban centres (Hasan, 2006). But there are two other aspects of its work that have 
particular interest for social accountability. The first is its careful mapping of each 
neighbourhood in Karachi to show where and how the larger system of sanitation and 
drainage could be improved and then supporting the local government water utility to 
install ‘big pipes’, into which community installation of ‘small pipes’ integrates. The second 
is the preparation of handbooks for local politicians on the problems in their constituencies 
and what could be done to improve the provision of services using the funds in their control 
(ibid.).  
 
The stocktaking of social accountability initiatives by civil society in Anglophone Africa 
previously discussed found a preponderance of effort on greater social accountability in 
national or provincial policies, such as reviewing funding allocations in poverty reduction 
strategies or in national budgets for education or for children, or analysing whether gender 
perspectives were incorporated into national budgets for education and health (McNeil and 
Mumvuma, 2006). Almost all the initiatives described in that stocktaking were by 
professional NGOs—not grass-roots organizations (although some consulted with such 
organizations). Where the focus was below the national or provincial levels, it was mostly 
for districts or rural areas. There was much less focus on monitoring public services, 
however, and very few of the initiatives looked at urban public services.  
 
The reasons for this lack of attention to urban areas are not clear, especially because urban 
governments are important for service delivery in urban areas. Perhaps it reflects the lack of 
interest in urban issues on the part of international agencies that fund social accountability 
initiatives. Or perhaps it is in part the political and institutional constraints that most 
international agencies face in engaging in local processes (ibid.). 
  
3. Alternative paths to building responsive government 
institutions 
 
This section looks largely at how grass-roots organizations among low-income urban 
dwellers are seeking to hold local governments to account. This entails the ways in which 
such organizations and federations formed by those living in slums or informal settlements 
are developing better relations with their local government and applying a range of methods 
to do so, including ones they have developed. It also includes an important international 
dimension, as these federations formed their own transnational network to allow them to 
exchange ideas, learn from and, where possible, support one another.8  
 
Surprisingly, although these approaches have been applied in many countries, they had 
little or no coverage in the stocktaking of social accountability initiatives in Africa and Asia. 
There is certainly little coverage in the growing volume of literature on transnational social 
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movements. Yet, at least in regard to urban areas, they rank among the most important, 
effective and widely used social accountability mechanisms. 
 
When considering the billion or so urban dwellers who live in homes and neighbourhoods 
with inadequate or no infrastructure and services, two concerns need emphasizing. The first 
is for those who live in urban centres with governments that have little capacity to meet 
their responsibilities. There is not much point in a residents’ association in an informal 
settlement lobbying a government agency to extend piped water supplies, sewers or drains 
to them if the agency has no funds to invest and no possibility of having the funds. Social 
accountability initiatives need a capacity to respond by whatever organization they seek to 
hold to account. The second concern is where local governments do not accept that people 
living in informal settlements have any right to public provision of infrastructure and 
services (or where they are prevented by law from doing so). As mentioned, if informal 
settlements are regarded as illegal and thus their inhabitants as having no rights or 
entitlements, it is difficult to use conventional social accountability mechanisms to attain 
better government responses.  
 
If a local government is uninterested in informal settlements or actively hostile to them, even 
when a third or more of the city population lives in them, what chance does any social 
accountability mechanism have? This can be the case even in long-standing democracies in 
which conventional citizen pressure has not produced solutions. India, for example, has had 
a democracy for more than 60 years, yet a large proportion of its urban population lives in 
informal settlements, overcrowded tenements or on the streets. Democracy has not provided 
them decent conditions nor has it stopped massive evictions.9 One important characteristic 
of urban government is how much it can help create or exacerbate poverty and social 
exclusion through the imposition of inappropriate regulations and policies.  
 
Negative attitudes towards informal settlements do not mean an impossible situation, 
however. There are a range of mechanisms widely used in Africa and Asia and some in 
Latin America through which the organizations formed by residents of informal settlements 
have achieved social accountability from a local government known to be uninterested in 
their plight. The first step for them was changing the negative attitudes towards informal 
settlements and their residents among the local (and possibly the national) government. This 
included recognition of the importance of these settlements for housing a portion of the 
city’s population and the importance of those residents for the city economy and labour 
force. From this came recognition of their needs (and rights) to infrastructure and services.  
 
That a third to two-thirds of a city’s population (and workforce) live in settlements 
considered illegal suggests that it is not these settlements that are at fault but the laws and 
regulations that deem them illegal (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1989). Most national 
slum/shack-dweller organizations have gone beyond this conclusion to show local 
governments their capacity to contribute to solutions, such as by building new houses, 
upgrading their settlements, mapping and enumerating informal settlements. These often 
lead to local governments recognizing the value of working with and developing 
partnerships with settlement groups. Such partnerships have improved housing conditions 
and infrastructure and service provision. There are also examples of where these 
slum/shack-dwellers organizations have provoked important changes in regulatory 
frameworks and even in national policies.10 
 
One reason why there is a range of social accountability mechanisms that are widely used in 
many countries is the cross-fertilizing that has taken place; people with grass-roots 
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organizations and federations have visited each other and learned from each other and have 
even set up their own umbrella organizations, such as the Shack/Slum Dwellers 
International.11  
 
The slum/shack-dwellers organizations are interesting to study. Many of the social 
accountability mechanisms were first developed by such groups in India. The National Slum 
Dwellers Federation was formed in the 1970s to support city-level slum-dweller federations 
to fight against evictions. In the mid-1980s, a new federation of women slum- and 
pavement-dweller savings groups, called Mahila Milan (Women Together), was formed and 
supported by a Mumbai-based organization, the Society for the Promotion of Area Resource 
Centres (SPARC). Mahila Milan, the National Slum Dwellers Federation and SPARC have 
since worked in close alliance. The federations do not pursue their members’ priorities by 
protest and lobbying politicians but by seeking to show local (and other) governments their 
capacities, such as building or upgrading housing; designing, building and managing 
community toilets; and supporting the formation of community–police partnerships to serve 
those living in informal settlements.87  
 
These federations also developed a capacity to map and enumerate informal settlements—in 
effect to do a census of households in informal settlements—and to undertake city-wide 
surveys that cover all informal settlements (Karanja, 2010; Livengood and Kunte, 2011). 
They added to this the production of digital maps and GIS systems applications, with data 
on all informal settlements. This data gathering has particular importance in addressing two 
concerns noted at the beginning of this chapter. First, it presents local governments with the 
data and maps that help them see the informal settlements and their inhabitants as part of 
the city. For example, when Mahila Milan and SPARC carried out a census of pavement-
dwellers in 1986 (SPARC, 1985), it surprised government officials to learn that most were 
fully employed and that many had lived in this condition for years (they were not 
unemployed recent migrants, which is how government officials had previously viewed 
them). The maps, profiles of informal settlements and data on all households and their plots 
that the Indian federations gathered also provided the information base for designing, 
upgrading and, where politically possible, providing secure tenure.  
 
The second concern addressed is that residents attain ‘official’ documentation that has 
importance for establishing their legitimacy. The community-managed enumerations that 
Mahila Milan and SPARC conducted involved numbering each house structure and taking a 
photo of the household members standing in front of their structure; each receives a photo 
card with a summary of the data collected on them. Although this photo card is not official 
in the sense that it is issued by the government, the federations have found that this and the 
mapping can insinuate an official address, which then facilitates some needed entitlements.  
 
For instance, after the pavement-dwellers’ census, the respondents could obtain ration cards 
through which they then could access low-priced food and fuel. A ration card is usually the 
first official document that people living in informal settlements obtain—and in India and 
elsewhere, to have a document with a date and proof of residence in a particular structure 
has importance for supporting the negotiation of tenure or of resettlement if evicted. In 
effect, the photo card is what legitimizes that household’s right to be there and to make 
demands.  
 
Mahila Milan and the National Slum Dwellers Federation with the support of SPARC have 
also long supported and promoted daily-savings groups. These have importance for social 
accountability. They are informal savings groups mostly formed by women and managed by 
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women. They are daily savings because the savings group manager visits each saver or 
potential saver every day to collect savings or repayment on a loan or to provide a loan. The 
members of these savings groups learn how to manage their collective finances and to 
negotiate with government agencies. As each group grows in numbers, their capacity to 
negotiate increases, especially as they form city-wide Mahila Milan federations.  
 
These same tools and methods have been adopted by federations of slum/shack-dwellers in 
many other countries after they have visited each other. There are now national federations 
or networks of urban poor/slum/shack-dwellers in at least 13 countries, with city 
federations in six others, and grass-roots groups developing or with the potential to develop 
into federations in many more countries. All have savings groups at their foundation. Many 
have savings groups that are engaged in negotiating land tenure and building houses, 
upgrading their settlement and building community toilets. All are surveying, mapping and 
enumerating to gather information and evidence to better negotiate for inclusion.12 The 
federations formed an umbrella organization, Shack/Slum Dwellers International, which 
helps them visit, support and learn from one another and helps new city or national 
federations develop.13  
 
The savings groups formed by residents of informal settlements serve and are accountable to 
their members, who save and who can draw from the group’s funds when needed. Learning 
the skills needed to save and manage loans also develops trust within the group and the 
capacity to work collectively, and this unity can extend to start saving for improved housing 
and taking on initiatives, such as designing, building and managing community toilets or 
negotiating for land on which to organize the construction of their houses. The members 
also develop the capacity to review financial records and account for all their funds. As these 
groups begin to work more actively with the state and become engaged in state 
programmes, they use their savings group skills to monitor these funds. 
 
One of the most common ways in which the federations demonstrate their capacities to 
government agencies and politicians is through precedent-setting projects. When federation 
members take politicians and civil servants to see the 200 or 300 houses they have built (as in 
Zimbabwe and Malawi) or the community toilets that they designed, built and are 
managing (as in India) and then show them the detailed costings, the reaction is quite 
different from more conventional lobbying, such as several hundred women seeking a 
meeting with a senior civil servant or politician to demand housing. The precedent-setting 
projects help change the relationship between the federation groups and politicians and civil 
servants to one that opens up channels of social accountability. In effect, for the first time 
many citizens are building a productive relationship with local government (and, in many 
instances, with national government).  
 
These types of federations tend to develop paths not to hold government to account for its 
failings but to find solutions that work for their members and gain the approval and, where 
possible, the support of local governments to allow them to act on a larger scale. The 
censuses and surveys of informal settlements they undertake then produce the data and 
maps needed for planning and installing infrastructure and developing upgrading plans. 
Mapping risk and vulnerability for the whole city helps identify communities most at risk 
(Livengood and Kunte, 2012).  
 
In many countries, the information-gathering projects have led to co-production between the 
federations and local governments, in which they work together to improve housing, 
infrastructure and services (Mitlin, 2008). This forms a strong partnership, with the 
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federations having influence in decision-making as well as direct involvement in 
implementation of state policy. It often encompasses local governments providing financial 
support to development strategies that the federations have defined and undertaken. 
Although what they implement might be considered second-rate compared with state 
provision, it is likely more appropriate than formal strategies to the informality of everyday 
life, and it stretches the limited state funding. As well, alternatives that the residents in 
informal settlements propose to a state that has limited capacity and funding ultimately 
works better for them.  
 
One other example of federation–government partnerships in co-production is the ‘police 
panchayats’ (units) in informal settlements in Pune and Mumbai. In most informal 
settlements, there is little or no police presence and no police station. Discussions with those 
who live in informal settlements highlight how the police are often reluctant to act on any 
complaint brought to them by a resident of an informal settlement and often reluctant to go 
into informal settlements. The police in Pune and Mumbai have a partnership with the 
National Slum Dwellers Federation and Mahila Milan to provide police services in the 
informal settlements (Roy et al., 2004; SPARC et al., 2010). Each police panchayat consists of 
10 representatives from the settlement (seven women, three men) and a local police officer.  
 
The community makes available a room in each settlement for the police officer to establish 
the police presence. The members of the police panchayats help patrol the settlement to 
maintain law and order. They aim to resolve disputes before they escalate into violence or 
other crimes. There are more than 60 police panchayats in Mumbai, but their expansion to 
cover all informal settlements needs the support of the police in each area, and not all police 
force personnel are in favour of this model. Police officers and representatives of grass-roots 
federations from Kenya, Tanzania and Zimbabwe have visited the police panchayats in 
Mumbai. Tanzania has begun to adopt the model in Dar es Salaam.  
 
There are many other organizations and federations formed by urban poor groups that have 
engaged with local government around demonstrating their capacities and contributions to 
city economies, such as organizations of recyclers and waste pickers (see Fergutz, et al., 
2011). Their experiences demonstrate the effectiveness of engagement with local government 
(Racelis, 2008).  
 
In Naga City in the Philippines, for example, a community micro-drainage project enabled 
the forging of a dynamic relationship between the Naga City Urban Poor Federations, Inc., 
the city government and the World Bank. Three low-income barangays (communities) 
benefitted from the rehabilitation and de-clogging of existing canals and the construction of 
micro-drainage systems. The community organizations argued that the local government 
should pay the user fees because they would benefit from the increased land values and 
high tax revenues. The community members were willing to make a contribution to the 
waste management costs. The project reinforced that through joint participation in activities, 
community groups, government officials and politicians can agree on common goals and 
work out how to realize them. 
 
Responses by governments to the urban poor can be characterized as bureaucratic (urban 
poor groups having to use formalized channels and procedures), clientelistic, authoritarian 
or participatory. State responses are often a combination of these, such as part bureaucratic 
and part clientelist. Co-production can be seen as an extension of participatory governance. 
Table 3 outlines the types of interaction that take place between local governments and 
community organizations formed by low-income groups. 
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Table 3: Types of interaction between local governments and community organizations 
formed by low-income groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.  Scaling up 
 
In many Latin American countries, as noted earlier, the provision of infrastructure and 
services and the support for upgrading informal settlements has ‘gone to scale’ through 
changes in government policies and practices. Another route for going to scale is one in 
which national and city governments work with and support organizations and federations 
of the urban poor, as illustrated by the CODI programme in Thailand and by the state 
support in India for community toilets and police panchayats. In these examples, most or all 
the scaling up was done without international support. Many of the slum/shack-dweller 
federations have set up national and city urban poor funds that provide financial 
frameworks to support scaling up and can draw support from local, regional or national 
governments or international agencies (Mitlin, 2008).  
 
In scaling up, the international network of slum/shack-dweller federations and its 
secretariat (SDI Alliance) helped national federations expand and extend the range of their 
initiatives and helped new groups develop and learn from the more established federations. 
Type of community 
engagement with local 
government 
Purpose of interaction Examples Strengths 
Provisions by local government 
for political inclusion of grass-
roots organizations in the form 
of decentralized decision-
making 
Local governments engage low-
income residents and 
community leaders in political 
institutions that augment 
representative democracy (and 
accountability) 
 Participatory budgeting 
 Participation of slum-dweller 
organizations in local 
government committees, 
such as in the Philippines 
Systemic and transparent 
engagement. Repeated events 
improve outcomes. 
Accountability arises as results 
from one year are reported on 
to form the basis for the next 
year’s choices. 
Community organizations seek 
to influence government policy 
so that it is more effective in 
meeting their needs 
Community/grass-roots 
organizations and federations 
seek to influence local 
government policies and the 
rules and regulations that affect 
their livelihoods and access to 
housing, infrastructure and 
services 
 Reduction in minimum plot 
size across urban southern 
Africa 
 Less expensive infrastructure 
allowed 
 Permission for community 
toilets for settlements where 
individual toilets are not 
possible or too expensive 
Enables regulatory and policy 
reforms, based on the 
experiences of the urban poor in 
house construction or 
improvement. But government 
may ignore these perspectives. 
Community organizations 
establish accountability 
conditions on local government 
actions 
Community organizations 
establish monitoring activities 
to review local government 
practices (such as in 
procurement) and use or 
disburse public funding 
 Communities in Pakistan 
linked with the Orangi Pilot 
Project monitored investment 
practices and challenged the 
high cost of development 
models 
 Organized community groups 
in Cuttack, India improved the 
‘slum lists’ of residents to 
ensure inclusion 
Helps prevent local government 
being captured by elite or 
middle-class self-interest groups. 
Helps improve supervision of 
local government officials. 
Co-production and community 
implementation; as groups 
build up experience, they can 
collaborate more effectively 
Community organizations and 
local government jointly 
implement agreed programmes 
of work generally to improve 
basic services and install or 
improve infrastructure 
 Condominium sanitation in 
Brazil 
 Police panchayats in India 
 State-financed community 
housing construction in South 
Africa 
 Upgrading supported by CODI 
in Thailand 
Joint implementation facilities 
and the development of new 
models and approaches adjusted 
to the realities and capacities of 
government and low-income 
settlements. 
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They have helped federation leaders visit many countries with local groups that had an 
interest in the methodologies but had not yet begun organizing.  
 
In some of those visits, federation leaders took along senior civil servants or politicians to 
illustrate how their group had developed successful partnerships with the government. 
These visits enable the federations’ voice and a visibility within their country and also with 
international agencies. This networking is an example of the kind of cross-border 
relationship that Keck and Sikkink (1998) cite as influencing local and international politics, 
although it may be unusual due to the influence stemming from grass-roots organizations 
rather than NGOs or other professionals. The international networking is an outgrowth of 
the older federations’ experience with city-wide and national networking.  
 
There are two international initiatives to help organizations scale up their activities; one is 
the Urban Poor Fund International, which supports the work of the slum/shack-dweller 
federations and is managed by the SDI Alliance, and the other is the Asian Coalition for 
Community Action (ACCA).  
 
The Urban Poor Fund International has operated since 2001 and has channelled nearly $7 
million to more than 100 grass-roots initiatives and activities in 17 countries (ACHR, 2010). It 
produced a new way of financing community-led development: federations brought 
proposals for funding to it. For the first time, an international fund was not only accountable 
to the organizations of the urban poor but its funding priorities were set by them. The fund 
also demonstrated the possibilities of its assistance being used to encourage and leverage 
support from local and national governments.  
 
The second international initiative, ACCA, was established in 2009 by the Asian Coalition 
for Housing Rights (ibid.) to catalyse and support community-initiatives and city-wide 
upgrading as well as partnerships between community organizations and local 
governments. By January 2012, it had helped fund initiatives in 708 settlements in 153 cities 
in 19 Asian countries. In each city, small grants and loans support a range of community-led 
initiatives, such as road, walkway, drain, community centre, park, playground, toilet, water 
supply and waste management improvements or construction. ACCA encourage city-wide 
networks to form where members share skills with each other and learn to negotiate with 
their local government. Further support is available as local governments engage with the 
groups, including the formation of jointly managed community development funds 
(Boonyabancha and Mitlin, 2012).  
 
The ACCA initiatives work with government on a city-wide scale. The ACCA philosophy is 
that a few communities living in informal settlements that start saving, conducting surveys, 
networking and initiating small improvement projects may not bring about much change. 
But when such activities are conceived and carried out by communities across a city, the 
local authorities start noticing and often begin accepting them and then collaborating in 
small ways. Joint city development committees, set up as part of an ACCA intervention, are 
becoming important new structural platforms that allow poor communities to work as 
equals with their local government and other urban partners and thus provide a new basis 
for social accountability.  
 
The process of jointly planning and implementing projects is one of the most immediate 
ways to begin changing power relations in a city. Most cities in which ACCA operates have 
some kind of committee that formalizes this city-community partnership. National 
collaborative mechanisms are also operating in eight countries (Cambodia, Fiji, Lao PDR, 
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Mongolia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Viet Nam). Also in several cities in Cambodia, 
Fiji, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Nepal, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Viet Nam, local 
governments have provided some infrastructure (such as paved access roads, drains, 
sewers, electric and water connections) in the big ACCA projects, and many have provided 
communities with technical help, building materials and the loan of heavy construction 
equipment. Local governments have contributed to 21 of the 70 city-based development 
funds.  
 
The ACCA programme was designed to spread opportunities to as many community 
groups in as many cities as possible and thus to generate more possibilities, build more 
partnerships, unlock more local resources and create a much larger field of learning as well 
as new strategies. This challenges the prevailing culture of isolated pilot projects that are so 
common in Asia—so-called ‘best practices’—that are never replicated, while the needs of 
thousands of poor communities are bypassed. What ACCA has built is a horizontal 
assessment process for comparing, assessing, learning from and refining projects in many 
countries.  
 
5.  Useful lessons 
 
Social accountability, whether initiated by governments, NGOs or grass-roots organizations, 
is one among many measures that have improved the delivery of services in urban areas and 
the accountability to citizens of service providers. It also has importance with the long-term 
pressure it generates for more efficient, accountable and transparent government. Many 
social accountability mechanisms applied in urban areas focus on improving the quality and 
efficiency of service provision but not on extending provision to those who are underserved. 
Although valuable, they may not contribute to the MDG targets for decreasing the number 
of those without services.14  
 
The main exception to this is when underserved groups develop a relationship with local 
authorities or other service providers and results in the delivery of the services they need 
(which then opens the possibility of social accountability). This paper has provided 
examples of such exceptions, including those undertaken by federations or networks of 
slum/shack-dwellers. Their work has certainly contributed to extending public provision for 
water supply, sanitation, health care and schools as well as support for more secure and 
better-quality housing for slum-dwellers, thus contributing directly or indirectly to various 
MDG targets.  
 
Unfortunately, much of what urban poor organizations and federations are doing falls 
below the radar of international agencies. Most international agencies lack the staff and 
structure to engage with grass-roots organizations—or even the ability to talk with them due 
to language barriers. Grass-roots organizations usually lack the formal structure for financial 
management that international funders require for any support and the capacity to develop 
proposals that international funders require (and in a language that grass-roots 
organizations likely do not speak). The critical issue here is how the social accountability of 
international agencies to the urban poor and their organizations can be developed.  
 
Because most international agencies do not actually implement initiatives—their staff do not 
install piped water supplies or build and staff health care centres, for example—they are 
only as effective as the intermediary agencies they fund. If improving service provision that 
reaches the poorest groups is served by the precedent-setting initiatives of grass-roots 
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organizations and federations and their willingness to work with government, then 
international agencies need to consider ways to support them. This, of course, is easier when 
there are representative organizations of the urban poor with whom international agencies 
can work. Otherwise, international support may simply reinforce patron–client structures.  
 
Most federations or networks of slum/shack-dwellers have set up national or city ‘urban 
poor funds’ to which international agencies can contribute and that provide these agencies 
with the accountability they require (and, critically, are accountable to the federations or 
networks also). Some bilateral and international funding agencies have developed ways to 
fund these federations, either directly through their urban poor funds or through Urban 
Poor Fund International, managed by Shack/Slum Dwellers International (Satterthwaite 
and Mitlin, 2011). But what is needed is more systematic, long-term and flexible 
international support for representative organizations of the urban poor. This support 
should be based on what those organizations prioritize and should assist what they judge to 
be the most effective ways of achieving social accountability from their government and the 
service providers. It should work with them to develop the local maps and data needed for 
initiatives to provide infrastructure and service provision at scale and from which these 
same international agencies can learn. 
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Chapter 3: Social accountability in conflict-
affected countries 
 
Practising participatory peace building  
 
1.  Introduction 
 
In 2012, 32 armed conflicts were active in 26 locations worldwide, nearly all of which 
unfolded in countries engulfed in intra-state or mostly internal societal strife (Themnér and 
Wallensteen, 2013).1 Volumes of evidence speak of the societies traumatized by war-time 
violence and crime, political institutions that are contested and corrupt, and the persistent, 
chronic poverty and acute deprivation that armed conflicts leave behind. According to the 
World Bank’s World Development Report 2011, nearly one third of the countries in the world 
suffer from debilitating cycles of conflict and underdevelopment; more than 1.5 billion 
people live in fragile and conflict-affected states. The report soberly points out that “no 
fragile or conflict-affected country has achieved a single Millennium Development Goal” 
(The World Bank, 2011).2  
 
In these countries, poor or weak governance has been an underlying root cause of the 
conflict; state weakness provides space and opportunities for insurgent or criminal 
challenges or for government repression and ineffectiveness that fuels social grievances, 
which give rise to revolution and insurrection (see Arnson and Zartman, 2005). These 
conditions of state capture and social frailty may be exacerbated by strong drivers of 
disruption, such as environmental degradation, energy scarcity and food insecurity or 
conflicts generated from corruption in the exploitation and trade of natural resources and 
the unequal distribution of primary commodity rents (see UNEP, 2009). In many countries 
that have experienced conflict, there is patterned economic and social discrimination and 
exclusion along identity lines, with such ‘horizontal inequalities’ leading to economic, social 
and political grievances among identity-based social groups (Stewart, 2008).  
 
As a consequence, there is now effort to define more clearly state capacity development as a 
central feature of peace building and state-building goals in the wake of conflict, as reflected 
in the New Deal between donors and countries experiencing fragility that was carved out 
during the 2011 High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, Republic of Korea.3 
Central to the peace building and state-building goals pledged at Busan is the development 
of new methods and approaches for making the state more accountable to its citizens and 
that facilitate social accountability in a technological age. A critical aim of peace-building 
and, in turn, the achievement of development targets, such as the MDGs, is to prevent the 
recurrence of conflict and to begin the process of transforming humanitarian responses into 
local capacities for maintaining peace and for fostering development that includes 
rebuilding the authority, capacity and legitimacy of the state.4  
 
This chapter argues that social accountability is critical to the success of building a 
responsive, inclusive, resilient state; accountability is a concern that transcends each of the 
dimensions of post-conflict governance. Voice, participation and empowerment are central 
to both conflict management and inclusion and to mechanisms for citizens to set the 
responsiveness agenda (and thus monitor the international humanitarian and national state 
delivery of services). It is at the frontier of new practice of social accountability that gains in 
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mitigating fragility and increasing the capacity of the post-conflict state to govern may be 
found; contemporary states must be responsive to citizens’ needs for their legitimacy as 
much as having the right to rule through such traditional accountability mechanisms as 
electoral processes (OECD-DAC, 2010).  
 
Section 2 presents some findings from the available literature on social accountability in 
conflict-affected countries and the ways in which conflict affects social cohesion, state 
authority, legitimacy and capacity and the nature and roles of civil society. The second 
section explores how development partners have approached the conceptualization, design 
and implementation of social accountability programmes and projects, drawing on a range 
of literature and cases. The section ends with a framework for analysis of social 
accountability approaches as a way to systematically derive useful lessons. Using that 
framework, the third section explores five case studies of social accountability in UNDP 
programmes in Afghanistan, Guatemala, Kosovo, Liberia and Pakistan.  
 
The concluding section of the chapter presents the principal findings and recommendations 
for UNDP that flow from this analysis. Among the conclusions is the need for UNDP and its 
partners to consider ways to integrate social accountability approaches across a range of 
programming aimed at crisis prevention and recovery, democratic governance and efforts to 
reduce chronic poverty. Specific recommendations include the need to more directly tie 
social accountability programming and projects to localized conflict vulnerability 
assessments, to further design and pilot innovative approaches in transitional and 
transformational processes, to develop a broader range of specific tools and to further refine 
capacity-development approaches for creating a network of local, national, regional and 
global institutions.  
 
2.  Accountability in times of transition: Post-conflict, fragile 
states 
 
In countries transitioning away from conflict and armed violence, new institutions and 
forms of social accountability may arise in the transitional processes from conflict to peace. 
In conflict-affected countries, greater citizen participation is a critical step towards recreating 
the social contract after a war, given the urgent need for an inclusive political settlement that 
explicitly focuses on building social cohesion, strengthening peace and security for the 
whole of society and restoring the core governance and service-delivery functions of the 
state. Elite settlements are not enough (see Jarstad and Sisk, 2008).  
 
Progress towards consolidating peace in such countries as El Salvador or Mozambique in 
the 1990s or Liberia in the 2000s illustrates how international assistance and a capacity focus 
can provide dramatic opportunities for rebuilding the state, reforming public 
administration, creating new forms of social empowerment and citizen participation and 
fostering participatory policy-making.5 Thus, at the heart of peace building is the aspiration 
to build back better states that are more participatory and accountable to their citizens and 
that can deliver on security, health, education and livelihoods. UNDP (2012a) has learned 
that a strategic, long-term approach to peace building involves supporting democratic 
governance and advancing development in post-conflict countries that is particularly biased 
towards inclusive, responsive and resilient states and societies.  
 
Social accountability in post-conflict countries entails efforts to increase direct civil society 
and citizen participation in monitoring the implementation of peace agreements, increasing 
 
 
Reflections on Social Accountability 67 
 
participation by formerly excluded or disadvantaged sectors in a society (such as displaced 
persons or war victims) and engagement in reforming public administration. Precisely 
because war is typically driven by exclusion and unaccountable governance, peace building 
processes should favour approaches that place a premium on information, consultation, 
representation through civil society and direct involvement of citizens in monitoring the 
recovery process. Consequently, social accountability also means the social empowerment of 
women and new ways to make the state more accountable to women’s needs and interests.6 
Social accountability goes hand in hand with social empowerment or specific efforts to 
facilitate the participation and influence of discriminated and disadvantaged groups, 
typically including religious or cultural minorities, the displaced or disabled or vulnerable 
migrants.  
 
2.1.  Why social accountability matters in transitions from conflict 
 
In the post-conflict period, societies experience war-related social problems that undermine 
the accountability of the state and likely undermine or destroy governance at the local level. 
Common conflict-related legacies are weapons in the hands of civilians and mobilized 
militia or ‘self-protection groups’, fragmented political systems and deep social differences 
along ethnic, religious or other identity lines, armed political groups that wield power and 
control over territory and a large proportion of the population that is displaced. Following 
war, new social tensions typically emerge, such as increased criminality, organized crime, 
human trafficking and gender-based violence (see Ward and Marsh, 2006).  
 
The state in post-conflict countries is usually weak, contested or captured, such that post-
conflict countries experience mutually reinforcing patterns of fragility. Stewart and Brown 
(2009) argue that fragile countries are characterized by interrelated dimensions of authority 
failures (such as organized political violence or ungoverned regions), service-entitlement 
failures (such as not providing access to water and sanitation) and legitimacy failures (such 
as a militarized government and discrimination and exclusion (Stewart et al., 2009).  
 
Although conditions of fragility vary highly in such situations, research has found that rapid 
political transitions, economic crises, external shocks from the global or regional context and 
troubled electoral processes are all commonly associated as pivotal factors that affect 
vulnerability to conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2008). Common conditions in countries 
emerging from conflict are on-going violence and instability, lack of full control of territory, 
periodic communal violence, inadequate delivery of services (health, education, water and 
sanitation) and unequal distribution of state resources along identity lines.7 Moreover, 
governments are likely aid dependent, with consequences such as in Afghanistan where 
some observers have seen links between state incapacities and the volume and state-based 
delivery of aid flows (Suhrke, 2009). These conditions make social accountability desirable 
but deeply challenging in the volatile environment found in the wake of war. 
 
Those post-conflict conditions mean that social accountability may be drastically more 
difficult to extend when compared with other development environments. Citizens may be 
powerless against a militarized state or violent insurgent groups; aid flows and government 
processes may be opaque and complicated, blurring the lines of accountability between 
domestic and international; and the common representative or institutionalized forms of 
social accountability, such as the parliament, electoral process, anti-corruption commission, 
or judicial process, fail to function (OECD-DAC, 2009). The state may be far removed from 
actual citizen interaction with the government at the local level and in the areas of service 
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delivery that matter most to their daily lives: jobs, education and health care for their 
children, community security and access to justice. As the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee notes (2008b), elites may 
not have incentive to deliver services and respond to citizen demands: “The incentives for 
delivery may be impaired by lack of government capacity, lack of government willingness, 
or the breakdown of social order through conflict.”  
 
Patterned discrimination and exclusion are common drivers of conflict in many contexts. 
Thus in these countries, social accountability is closely related to deeper social 
transformation and the inclusion of marginalized and disadvantaged groups, which are 
often defined locally along identity lines (Stewart, undated). From Guatemala, where social 
inequalities persisted long after the 1996 peace agreement, to Nepal today, the problem of 
social ‘ranking’ has given rise to conflict, grievance, rebellion and difficult processes of post-
conflict social transformation, making the need for social accountability and social 
empowerment nearly synonymous. Consistent with United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1325 on women in peace building and reflected in MDG 3 (gender equality) and 
MDG 5 (maternal health) is the realization that women’s participation is critical to MDG 
achievement, especially in conflict-affected countries where violence against women and 
girls is an enduring humanitarian and security concern.8  
 
Although each post-conflict context is different, there are commonalities that in turn inform 
approaches to social accountability: low social trust across communities and between 
citizens and governing elites, gender inequality and marginalization of women, weak state 
capacity or the ‘capture’ of the state at central or local levels, low and sometimes non-
existent state capacities (especially at the local level) and the inability of formal 
accountability mechanisms through rule-of-law institutions to function effectively. Post-
conflict transitions bring new actors into the political, social and administrative arenas that 
face an uphill battle in gaining trust from people traumatized by the war and social violence. 
Even where a party enjoys considerable legitimacy in the immediate wake of conflict and 
transition, as the Sudan People's Liberation Army and the Sudan People's Liberation 
Movement support in the January 2011 referendum on independence in Sudan revealed, the 
long-term legitimacy of post-conflict regimes will be an outcome of their ability to deliver 
security and development. 
 
2.2. State–society relations and accountability politics 
Countries emerging from conflict are on the pathway of emerging from self-reinforcing 
patterns of poor governance, conflict and underdevelopment. Poverty in them has become 
endemic or chronic, and development stagnated; or in the most affected countries, such as 
Somalia or Zimbabwe, it is reversing as a consequence of governance failures and conflict.9 
The varying combinations of root causes, patterns of conflict within war and processes of 
transition from conflict make generalizations difficult. In some cases, such as Kosovo or 
Palestine, the emergent state has uncertain personhood in international law. Indeed, the 
variety of contexts in conflict and into the post-conflict peace building period suggests that 
initial analysis of the environment is critical to developing the conceptual approaches that 
inform social accountability principles and programme design. Improved state authority, 
legitimacy and capacity are critical first steps in launching broader post-conflict economic 
recovery programmes.10  
 
State capacities and new approaches to ‘accountability politics’ are critical in post-conflict 
countries for two reasons: First, states are obliged to provide for and protect citizens through 
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a neutral, trustworthy, accountable security sector;11 second, states provide public goods and 
delivery of services that are the foundation of socio-economic development (Call and Wyeth, 
2008).  
 
The focus on governance by international development partners has been described in terms 
of state-building as a strategic approach to broader efforts by the United Nations and others 
for peace building to reflect both the security aspects of post-conflict consolidation (creating 
an authoritative state) and the development and human rights aspects (creating a 
developmental state). Research by the Berghof Foundation (Dudouet et al., 2012) on post-
war security transitions found that broad participation in the design, implementation and 
monitoring of security sector reform, including erstwhile rebels in new security force 
structures, leads to more sustainable outcomes; they concluded that “peace building 
strategies that place a strong emphasis on the empowerment of local stakeholders.. [and] 
driven by local needs, interests and practices have a much better chance of sustaining 
themselves”.  
 
State capacities to govern and to deliver services are a direct outcome of state–society 
relations. Countries emerging from conflict are beginning from a starting point of broken 
state–society relations, in which legitimacy is undermined by insecurities, delivery failures 
and continued exclusion and marginalization (OECD-DAC, 2010). International 
interventions to build state capacity may well mean, then, enabling disadvantaged social 
groups the opportunity to influence the recovery and development agendas and avenues for 
monitoring the performance of the state at the national, provincial and local levels. Building 
back better means rethinking the ways in which the performance of the state can be 
monitored through social accountability approaches. For donors, however, engaging to 
support social accountability can be inherently problematic. 
 
Some observers argue that direct support to civil society can legitimize and strengthen 
informal structures at the expense of the state, which ultimately has legal and practical 
responsibility for service delivery and in authoritatively adjudicating the law (see Unsworth, 
2010). Thus, outsiders often face a dilemma between supporting the state directly to bolster 
its capacity or investing more in civil society and community approaches as an alternative, 
or counter-balance, to state power. Support to civil society and informal institutions, such as 
traditional or religious institutions, through aid flows in post-conflict countries likely results 
from a perspective that they are the principal institutions on the ground with the capability 
of delivering services or, perhaps, the only remaining institutions.  
 
In a post-conflict situation, many donors and international NGOs prefer to work directly 
with civil society organizations, bypassing possibly corrupt institutions of the state, 
particularly at the local level where government capacity is often weakest. Yet, the 
international community tends to lack a good understanding of the nature of civil society, 
and the extent to which any particular organization can make a valid claim of local access, 
legitimacy and authenticity.  
 
From a social accountability perspective, civil society is expected to cut across identity 
divisions or other cleavages caused by conflict. Research in India indicates that 
intercommunal violence is less likely in situations in which civil society cross-cuts identity 
lines (see Varshney, 2001). Although civil society organizations have impressively 
documented human rights abuses by the state, in conflict-affected regions, there is concern 
about the extent to which organizations can carry out the research on service delivery 
failures or problems (such as corruption) and in aspects of social accountability (such as 
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participatory election monitoring) when calling the state to account.  
 
One reason for caution is that civil society itself may be divided along conflict lines, and 
there is very little cross-cutting that it is in a position to perform. A common characteristic of 
post-conflict countries is parallel civil society organizations that may or may not be 
conducive to peace. Belloni (2009) reviews experiences from cases in Africa, Sri Lanka and 
Northern Ireland in which civil society organizations were driven primarily to strengthen 
their bonding ties along identity and kinship lines, which in turn exacerbated the conflict 
dynamics.  
 
Paffenholz and Spurk (2006) found in their study for the World Bank that although civil 
society has an important role in peace building, civil society support is no panacea. There is 
some evidence that efficient service delivery adds to the legitimacy of certain civil society 
actors, but there is also evidence that service delivery does not necessarily enhance civic 
engagement. In addition, some cases show that fostering representative civil society need 
not be accompanied by service delivery. There are also concerns that advocacy work is de-
emphasized when civil society organizations are driven into service delivery and thus 
drawn away from other important functions, or that service delivery is weakened or at least 
discredited when it is not linked to advocacy.  
 
This means that in working with civil society, what is needed is a case-by-case analysis of 
the capacity of these organizations to actually deliver services in areas that international 
organizations or the state cannot reach.  
 
These dilemmas resonate in new approaches to using crowdsourcing, especially interactive 
mapping, in fragile states. Recent research on how social media, digital imaging (photos and 
videos) and mobile ICT can be used to improve information sharing, accountability and 
governance in fragile states has found that there are rewards and risks in such approaches.12 
Among the instruments that are rapidly being developed for application are electronic 
mapping platforms. Particularly interesting are those that are primarily bottom-up and do 
not require government buy-in or a major dedication of resources.  
 
While there is much enthusiasm for the direct participation that is inherent in 
crowdsourcing—that there is no filtering of information provided to communication hubs—
there are risks that in conflict-affected countries their use may be limited or misused. Such 
risks include potential drawbacks stemming from the divisions within society (potential 
biased reporting), the digital divide, manipulation, misinformation, risks to crowdsource 
participants concerning confidentiality and, especially, lack of social trust related to the 
quality of information produced or its interpretation.13  
 
The use of crowdsourcing data during conflicts, such as in Libya’s civil war, has 
demonstrated the potential to provide for the dissemination of critical information for 
humanitarian relief delivery and for conflict tracking and mapping. The conditions required 
to facilitate crowdsourcing (human capital, infrastructure, social capital and a favourable 
regulatory environment) often do not prevail in conditions of conflict. For example, UNDP 
enabled the use of SMS information sharing as a conflict-prevention tool in response to 
potential crisis in the highly charged 2010 Kenyan constitutional referendum as a way to 
gain real-time data related to monitoring tensions and providing early warning of potential 
conflict.14 Although there are tremendous opportunities to be gained from using new 
technologies for conflict monitoring that aids in warning, prediction and building 
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infrastructure for peace (structures for participation), there are still many questions about 
the risks that may arise (Box 3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Fostering social accountability in post-conflict countries 
 
The challenges of context suggest that donor-funded social accountability approaches in 
conflict-affected countries must be more closely aligned with the peace building and state-
building objectives. A critical concern for donors is how to foster social accountability in the 
context of democratic governance that brings a human rights-based approach and that 
enables civil society to more fully participate in electoral and parliamentary processes, such 
as the development of poverty reduction strategies (see Tommasoli, 2010). As well, how can 
social accountability concepts, approaches and methods be designed and supported in 
countries emerging from conflict and vulnerability when there is an absence of deep trust 
and social cohesion? And what are the implications of understanding the dilemmas and 
challenges of promoting social accountability institutions and processes in these countries 
for improving donor responses more generally and the UNDP approach and methods more 
specifically? 
 
Box 3: Questions for analyzing the pathways to accountability in post-conflict 
situations 
Leaders and elites: Who should be held accountable? 
Leadership in post-conflict countries tends to derive from those with the ‘capacity to spoil’ or 
from those who have the ability to wield violence and undermine the tenuous process of 
transition. Political agreements, such as power-sharing pacts, may be anti-democratic. Moreover, 
much post-conflict recovery assistance is delivered through partnerships of international donors, 
national governments, civil society or private contractors or in public–private partnerships. 
Understanding who is accountable to whom is inherently challenging in the fractious institutional 
environment and complex partnerships seen in post-conflict countries. 
 
Security and services: For what should state authorities be held accountable? 
When fragile states are unable or unwilling to deliver services, often because they are unable to 
match the financial and human capacities needed to deliver (in health, education, water and 
sanitation), those services are provided and/or implemented by a range of international agencies, 
NGOs, civil society groups, private contractors or informal service providers (such as religious 
groups). Thus, when security or service delivery is fragmented in their delivery, where do lines of 
accountability run? There are likely no institutional or procedural avenues for monitoring 
multiple service providers. 
 
Political power relations: Who performs accountability across polarized divides? 
Conflict polarizes society and typically erodes the authority of the state; traditional approaches, 
such as judicial sanctioning of corruption or parliamentary oversight of budgeting and spending, 
are likely non-existent. As well, individuals and agencies may be beholden to powerful, 
militarized political interests with little opportunity for them to monitor accountability or to 
penetrate the tightly controlled reins of political power. 
 
Political economy analysis: Can the incentives for accountability be mapped? 
In countries dependent on critical primary commodities for state revenue, accountability is often 
frustrated by the opacity of resource capture and the management of national and local resource 
accounts. Elite incentives may work against state strengthening. A critical need is the mapping of 
the incentives among public officials to seek public legitimacy and to participate genuinely in 
accountability initiatives. 
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3.1. Building accountable states 
Donors have learned through nearly two decades of work in post-conflict countries that a 
critical, long-term objective of peace building is strengthening governance institutions and 
processes to be responsive to the needs of citizens. In countries suffering conflict and chronic 
poverty, there is broad agreement that building a sustainable and lasting peace through 
enhancement of national ownership and state capacities, so that institutions and processes of 
governance can lay the needed internal foundations for peace and development (OECD-
DAC, 2008a).  
 
Accountability cross-cuts each of the state capacity development dimensions, much like the 
integrating of gender considerations. Through approaches to strengthen its responsiveness, 
the state can be held accountable to provide for citizen security and to create the conditions 
for recovery and development. Through such efforts as local peace committees to promote 
resilience, the legacies of conflict can be overcome to create new opportunities and 
frameworks for generating social capital that transcend traditional lines of conflict. And 
through expansion of inclusive politics, post-conflict countries can discover new sources of 
legitimacy and develop new avenues for social cohesion by war-weary populations 
(Papagianni, 2009).  
 
UNDP has been extensively involved in post-conflict countries and in supporting traditional 
forms of accountability in both ‘horizontal’ ways (electoral processes, parliamentary 
oversight, central–local intergovernmental relations and judicial strengthening) and in 
‘vertical’ dimensions (through citizen voice and participation, media and civil society and 
through direct participation in policy-making at the central and local levels).15  
 
Another way to view differences among social accountability mechanisms is based on 
involvement: are mechanisms primarily representative (for example, an anti-corruption 
agency or an electoral process) or are they more direct (involving civil society or individual 
participation)? Horizontal and vertical lines of accountability intersect in many places; so 
looking at how accountability works in terms of being representative or direct offers a 
sharper focus on the role of civil society and direct citizen participation. 
 
In post-conflict transitions, social accountability can be further supported by directing civil 
society and citizens to the core functions of the state: providing for basic citizen security, 
delivery of essential services and monitoring the exercise of human rights.16 Accountability 
in recovery from conflict is usually linked directly to social empowerment for those who 
have borne the brunt of the strife, such as women, the displaced or the marginalized. 
Therefore, state capacity development must be inclusive in terms of linking improvement of 
delivery systems to participation and empowerment of those in the population suffering 
from disadvantage or discrimination. The state-building agenda must directly link to the 
challenges of high public expectations, lack of public trust, social fragmentation and patterns 
of exclusion common in post-conflict countries (von Kaltenborn-Stachau, 2008). 
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Table 4: Dimensions of social accountability in conflict-affected countries 
 
3.2. Challenges of sequencing and delivery 
In the initial phases of recovery from conflict, international aid often undermines the 
accountability of the state to provide essential services when local capacity is bypassed or 
substituted for quick results and a reliance on international expertise.17 Over time, as the 
post-conflict political settlement consolidates, it becomes increasingly possible to broaden 
and deepen the scope of both formal and informal accountability mechanisms. Formal 
representation mechanisms include the creation or renewal of institutions, such as 
parliament, the judiciary, the electoral management body, an anti-corruption commission or 
the government ombudsman’s office. Direct accountability occurs through participation and 
transparency of civil society and citizens’ groups, an active and free media and the 
expansion of participatory policy-making with principal stakeholders included in both 
national development planning and local delivery.  
 
Early recovery and quick restoration of governance in the immediate period of emergence 
from a conflict are thus critical. Choices and decisions made in peace agreements and during 
  Responsive institutions Inclusive politics Resilient societies 
Representative 
and  
state-based 
approaches 
 
 
 Parliamentary 
strengthening for 
monitoring and oversight 
of post-conflict 
development planning and 
prioritization and 
management of 
development aid 
 Effective anti-corruption 
agencies  
 Judicial capacities for 
investigation and sanction 
for abuses 
 Independent institutions 
for investigation, 
monitoring and oversight 
 Parliamentary and 
independent oversight, 
internal investigation and 
monitoring of the police 
and other security services 
 Conflict-mitigating electoral 
processes through which 
there is the possibility of 
change in public office 
 Institutional mechanisms that 
ensure broad social 
representation across all 
major governing institutions; 
proportionality of 
representation in public 
administration and in the 
security sector 
 Proportionality in electoral 
process outcomes and in 
public administration reform 
processes 
 Proliferation of community-level 
institutions and processes that 
bring government, other 
authorities, civil society, NGOs and 
informal leaders into decision-
making and crisis-management 
bodies (such as peace committees) 
 Direct measurement of delivery 
outcomes by local citizens 
 
Direct or society-
based 
approaches 
 
 
 Citizen involvement in 
tracking, monitoring and 
mapping of conflict 
incidents and dynamics 
 Citizen monitoring of 
development programmes 
and monitoring of recovery 
aid 
 Civil society engagement in 
legislative processes 
 An enabling environment 
and legislative framework 
for civil society to operate 
across lines of conflict 
 Dialogue and consultation 
processes that explicitly 
encourage voice and 
participation of the poor and 
marginalized 
 Direct measurement and 
solicitation of citizens’ 
attitudes through tools 
designed to elicit public 
opinion 
 
 Inclusion of all groups in policy 
formulation and implementation; 
enabling the capacity of 
marginalized and excluded groups 
to participate 
 Strengthening of state agency 
capacities to engage in 
participatory policy-making and 
open, transparent processes of 
resource allocation, spending 
priorities and delivery mechanisms 
 Formalizing dialogue processes and 
linking them with formal legislative 
and policy-making processes  
 Formal mechanisms for expressing 
demands and complaints and 
authoritative adjudication 
processes 
 Facilitating access to justice 
through traditional and alternative 
dispute resolution processes 
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initial transitional phases can set a positive pathway for the long-term sustainability of 
peace. International organizations and external partners need local counterparts with 
legitimacy and capacity, although the reality in many settings is a disabled set of institutions 
and processes for governance, with poor capacity to provide security, protect citizens and 
perform the core functions of a state (UNDP, 2008).18 Accountability may be overlooked in 
pursuit of higher priorities, such as ensuring humanitarian aid delivery, balancing a delicate 
peace process or pursuing social inclusion. War economies persist into the post-war period, 
and societies are likely sustained through informal (and frequently predatory) service 
delivery networks that have supplanted the functions of the state in providing for basic or 
essential needs (Cramer, 2009).  
 
Therefore, social accountability in the immediate post-conflict period is critical in peace 
building for two reasons. First, as critical security sector reform unfolds and demobilization, 
disarmament and reintegration take place, citizen monitoring, engagement and participation 
are critical for the legitimacy of the reform process (Bryden and Hängii, 2005). Second, 
service delivery in education, health, water and sanitation and in employment creation can 
offer ways to develop politically neutral ground to facilitate social inclusion and to create 
new institutions and processes of oversight on allocation and delivery of development 
services. At the same time, the risks and dilemmas for donors are extensive as they choose 
among service delivery providers, international NGOs, co-production models and 
community action and market-based solutions, each of which has their distinct advantages 
and disadvantages (OECD, 2008a, p. 25).  
 
3.3. Dilemmas of engagement 
In conflict-affected countries, social accountability is closely tied to the transformation of 
underlying social relationships and structures of discrimination and marginalization. What 
links the accountability and empowerment agendas is an enduring focus on avenues and 
methods for voice, participation and influence of citizens over the extension of state 
authority in post-conflict periods. Such efforts to enable community participation can be 
hamstrung by on-going violence and insecurity, informal patronage networks, clientelistic 
rule and the paucity of civil society or associational groups that can organize the poor. 
Among the dilemmas of engagement confronting donors in fostering social accountability in 
post-conflict countries are the following: 
 
First, donors must balance the horizontal/formal with the vertical/informal approaches. 
Some evidence suggests that the relationship between political elites and contracted service 
providers is so significant that it calls into question whether the state can perform its 
accountability functions. As seen in Iraq or Lebanon, lines of authority may be divided into 
power-sharing arrangements in which various factions may control specific ministries; 
regimes may favour particular political blocs or regions or may seek to control the rents 
from natural resource concessions and trade in specific sectors. As well, approaches to using 
informal institutions, such as traditional authorities, in social accountability efforts are 
confounded by the ways in which aid can legitimize and strengthen the informal structures 
as an extension of the state, which ultimately has legal and practical responsibility for 
service delivery (see Unsworth, 2010).  
 
Second, donors face a dilemma between supporting the state as a top-down approach to 
bolster its capacity to govern or to invest more directly in civil society and bottom-up, 
community approaches to delivering critical public goods. Parallel or civil society 
approaches to delivery where governments are weak, for example through NGOs, tends to 
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take the government out of the accountability process and may undermine public 
administrators’ ability to show results. Traditional state-centred approaches, such as 
strengthening the parliament (or its equivalent), have been especially difficult in conflict-
affected countries when parliaments are fractious and weak and representatives may have 
little direct decision-making role in either security or development policy.  
 
Electoral processes are typically fraught with violence and mismanagement, and their lack 
of credibility undermines their more traditional role as mechanisms for holding leaders to 
account. Additionally, in conflict contexts that are highly factionalized along identity lines, 
electoral processes may well be an ‘ethnic census’ and serve very little as an accountability 
tool.  
 
To improve parliamentary roles and electoral processes as a pathway to accountability, it is 
essential to ensure open flows of information between government partners at the national 
and local levels and civil society. It is also important to support efforts for participatory 
policy-making and enforcement in a way that brings a multiparty stakeholder perspective to 
balancing the various horizontal/formal approaches and vertical or citizen-based initiatives.  
 
Finally, it is likely difficult to correctly identify or to support informal or traditional 
accountability systems. International donors encounter conundrums when assessing the 
appropriateness of partners, especially those involving informal authorities, rebel groups or 
traditional authorities. Community initiatives require close and careful understanding of 
conflict contexts, typically in areas where there is little security and where non-state actors 
tend to deliver the lion’s share of security and services. Donors need to especially 
understand the local landscaper: the contexts, the actors and the agents. In turn, the 
interventions will relate to the mix of support from international NGOs, community 
organizations, civil society or identity-based traditional institutions. Programmes that link 
local public administrators to local organizations and civil society can help create a culture 
of participatory policy-making and dialogue on service delivery-oriented project planning, 
budgets, implementation and monitoring (UNDESA, 2007).  
 
3.4. A framework for analysis 
This section presents the framework for analysis used to analyse the social accountability 
programmes and projects presented in section 4. The framework encompasses questions 
around the links between the social accountability approach and conflict dynamics, the way 
in which it relates to peace building and state-building objectives, how the effort addresses 
prioritization and sequencing dilemmas, its design and lessons learned (Box 4). The 
framework provided an organized inquiry that allowed for the structured and focused 
comparison of the many dimensions. 
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4.  Case studies 
 
Based on the framework to analyse various interventions, the following case studies 
highlight lessons from UNDP programmes and projects for integrating social accountability 
initiatives into post-conflict recovery and rebuilding processes. The cases were chosen from 
a broader inventory of UNDP social accountability programmes; the selection criteria 
included the extent to which the particular approach, tool or scope of intervention was 
specifically designed to address on-going or underlying drivers of fragility. The case studies 
are based on UNDP practitioners’ reflections on lessons gained in their experiences.  
 
4.1. Afghanistan: Community monitoring of reconstruction 
Following the international intervention in late 2001, Afghanistan has over time become the 
largest single recipient country for development aid. Despite the influx of outside assistance, 
state failure, civil war and on-going instability have contributed to insecurity and poor 
development progress. The consequences of conflict have been both political and social in 
terms of low social trust, but they also have been economic in terms of the inability of people 
to secure livelihoods or in the effects of conflict on the infrastructure, such as roads, schools 
and bridges. Bringing development, and particularly visible reconstruction dividends, to the 
people is focused on remediating the concerns about corruption, ineptness and substandard 
results from local infrastructure projects.  
 
In the context of a deteriorating security situation, programmes such as those conducted by 
Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA) sought to develop a community-monitoring 
methodology to conduct social audits for physical infrastructure projects.19 Launched in 
2007, the Community Monitoring Project confronted the problems that had emerged from 
poor coordination between donors, central state authorities and local authorities, fraudulent 
contracting practices and poor construction. The project empowered citizens to monitor 
Box 4: Questions for analyzing social accountability interventions 
This framework offers an organized inquiry for case studies that allow for the structured and 
focused comparison of the many dimensions of social accountability programming, from the design 
to the impacts to lessons from the experiences. 
 How does the approach to accountability relate to findings of any conflict analysis and 
assessment and to the overall strategic approach of post-conflict peacebuilding? 
 What is the overall concept of social accountability reflected in the intervention as it relates to 
improving the interface between states and societies? How did the intervention contribute to 
generating social capital, inclusion or advancing social networks? 
 At what level of analysis is the intervention targeted, and does it represent vertical or horizontal 
approaches to accountability at the national or local levels or a blend of both (so-called diagonal 
accountability)? 
 What were the principal tools used, and how did the selection of the tools relate to conflict-
sensitive approaches? 
 What issues or challenges arose in the intervention? 
 What was the impact of the intervention in terms of fostering social cohesion and strengthening 
state capacity? 
 What lessons were learned that are specific to social accountability programming in conflict-
affected countries? 
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reconstruction work and, in particular, gave them the knowledge and skills to monitor the 
quality of construction through basic training in engineering. 
 
The principal approach targeted those communities that had been recipients of large 
amounts of aid per capita and also had relative security to allow participation without fear 
of intimidation from opponents of the regime and reconstruction efforts (such as the 
Taliban) and to ensure that community monitoring was voluntary (unpaid). The process of 
community monitoring involved the selection of a reconstruction project by the community 
and two local monitors to be trained in engineering and good governance. The two monitors 
conducted regular inspections and worked with IWA engineers to engage construction 
companies, local authorities, the Government and donors to troubleshoot problems when 
they arose.  
 
Initially, IWA found that communities were sceptical of the initiative. Communities 
perceived they were powerless in relation to the companies managing the reconstruction 
work, donors and the Government; over time, however, IWA expanded acceptance through 
demonstration effects, and now more than 200 communities are participating in the 
community-based monitoring programme. The process of monitoring and holding to 
account involves monitors who first report concerns to the local council, who then work 
with the companies to remediate problems. This in turn helps balance the relative roles of 
direct community-based monitoring with the statutory (or representative) role of local 
authorities. 
 
Implementers of the IWA programme report that community-based monitoring has been 
transformative; citizens and subnational governments are increasingly active in the 
reconstruction process, and there has been a distinct shift in attitudes through which 
communities and local councils see themselves as active participants in the reconstruction 
process and not passive recipients of donor and government priorities. 
 
The Afghanistan IWA programme has reinforced that active citizenship is critical to the 
sustainability of reconstruction efforts and that community involvement is instrumental in 
developing more accountable mechanisms for reconstruction efforts. Pivotal interventions in 
the programme include the importance of training for subnational officials to ensure there is 
space for community engagement. A final lesson learned is the importance of ensuring that 
monitors are selected by the entire community—and not just village elders—to ensure the 
broadest acceptance of their integrity and competence. 
 
As part of the larger Afghanistan Subnational Governance Programme, UNDP has been 
involved in developing stronger relations between the State and the society through the 
creation and expansion of a Public Grievance Handling System at the local level. 
Implemented with the Independent Directorate for Local Governance and independently 
elected provincial councils, the programme aims to develop citizen awareness and trust 
around the work of local authorities by creating spaces for participation in local governance 
and by promoting social accountability of local institutions. 
 
The approach was informed by the understanding that a driver of conflict in the country is 
the historical weakness of the State and the need to build public confidence. A key element 
in reconstituting the legitimacy of public authority is to re-establish security and to create 
the conditions through which local government can deliver essential services. The overall 
Afghanistan Subnational Governance Programme is a widespread, multi-donor initiative 
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that prioritizes accountability of administrative structures and capacity development of local 
public administrators.  
 
The Public Grievance Handling System was piloted in four districts in Helmund; these areas 
are especially affected by the on-going insurgency and continued violence since the 
transition in the country that began in late 2001. The approach involved strengthening the 
capacity of local governments to resolve grievances emanating from service delivery in a 
timely manner and to provide a mechanism for citizens to express concerns and suggestions 
for improved service delivery anonymously, due to the deep mistrust that characterizes the 
social context. To address the need for local ownership of the new complaints system, the 
governance programme helped the provincial governor’s office set up a multiparty task 
force involving various local actors and sector agencies to coordinate their response to the 
public grievances and improve service delivery. 
 
The tools employed were complaint boxes placed in public markets, together with an 
information campaign on television and radio to inform the public on how the system 
works. Citizens were encouraged to file complaints; more than 100 complaints per week 
were received in the initial weeks of the launch, suggesting that there was indeed 
widespread eagerness in the community for improvements to service delivery and for 
improvements in the rule of law. Citizens complained about alleged corruption in 
education, electricity supply and the performance of their local government. Citizens also 
raised community security concerns and provided anonymous security tips regarding 
insurgent activity. With a strong citizen response, the programme was expanded to 
encourage the media to create television and radio programmes in which citizens could 
publicly voice their grievances. 
 
The impact was significant. The ability to directly express grievances on the local situation 
was new for many Afghans. In turn, this expression of citizen demand led to improvements 
in the effectiveness of the provincial governor’s office responses and its coordination with 
other local governments in addressing citizens’ concerns. The programme’s successes 
include the curtailing of theft of nutritional supplements from schools and a more equitable 
delivery system for electricity throughout the province. The apparent success of the Public 
Grievance Handling System has led others to adapt it at the provincial level. 
 
The messages from this UNDP governance programme are threefold: first is the overall 
importance of helping subnational authorities to understand the nature of public problems 
when historically citizens have had little voice or opportunity of being heard. Second, these 
efforts have helped motivate local authorities to redress citizens’ complaints and to improve 
the responsiveness of the local authorities to citizens’ needs and demands. Finally, the 
efforts have helped to develop checklists of the services provided by each department in 
government and to help local authorities understand the scope and nature of their service 
delivery responsibilities. 
 
4.2. Guatemala: Democratic dialogue and education reform 
In war-torn Guatemala, furthering education is both an MDG targets and an important 
plank in peace building, given the 1996 peace agreement’s prioritization of reform of the 
education system to improve services to historically disadvantaged communities. Initial 
attempts at education reform, however, ran aground because of the deep mistrust and 
confrontation among various stakeholders involved in delivering education services. With 
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the Ministry of Education, UNDP launched a one-year project, Visión Educación, to set up a 
stakeholder dialogue process to create a new approach to reforming education. 
 
The approach featured the formation of a small group of highly influential Guatemalans 
who reflected the diversity of the country and various schools of thought on reform. They 
convened a broader national discussion using a democratic dialogue approach. The 
influential Guatemalans came together with stakeholders in an extended, participatory and 
inclusive process through which interaction offered them the opportunity for voice and 
input on the policy process (Pruitt and Thomas, 2007). The education initiative built on a 
prior experience with dialogue in Guatemala, facilitated in part by UNDP, which had 
involved a national ‘visioning’ exercise and included the participation of parts of the 
population (particularly indigenous peoples) who had been historically marginalized.  
 
A core team called the Constructor Group steered the work in four strategic areas of the 
education system: bilingual intercultural education, management, science and technology, 
and financing. The dialogue was complemented by additional workshops for the group, 
study tours, working committees and scenario planning.  
 
The impact of the dialogue approach to social accountability was both direct and indirect. 
Directly, the dialogue resulted in guidelines for education policy for 2005–2008 and a second 
report that presented a Vision for Education 2025.20 The outcome of the process was also a 
new management model for the education sector that placed value on consensus-based 
policy-making and on the views and needs of youth. Likewise, the process created new 
support for inter-culturalism as a state policy in education and a culture of dialogue, equity 
in education coverage and new institutions to sustain education reform. 
 
Implementers of the programme suggest that the dialogue on education offered benefits at 
several levels—beyond the national policy formulation and institution-building, particularly 
in the inclusion of poorer and marginalized people to influence policy and wider ownership 
of the education process. In particular, furthering the inter-culturalism agenda is seen as 
critical to reducing fragility in the country’s social cohesion. 
 
The lessons from this experience with education reform reaffirm the use of dialogue in 
deeply divided societies as a participatory and inclusive way to overcome historical 
divisions, to identify points of common interests, to develop common vision and to promote 
a culture of participatory democracy. Most importantly, the inclusivity of the dialogue 
fostered participation by the country’s most vulnerable groups of the population, reinforcing 
the view that peaceful resolution of conflict and collaboration across historical lines of 
division is possible and even constructive. At the same time, dialogue cannot be forced. 
Preliminary work to prepare for the dialogue processes involves careful selection of the right 
national facilitators who are widely regarded for their integrity and reputation, who can 
create formal and informal spaces for discussion, who can articulate awareness about the 
essence of dialogue and who can manage expectations about what dialogue processes can 
achieve. 
 
4.3. Kosovo: Public opinion polling in a divided society 
UNDP in Kosovo with national NGO partners Reinvest Institute, UBO Consulting, the 
Encompass Institute, the Kosovo Provisional Institutions of Self-Government and the United 
Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) engaged in a strategic public opinion polling in the 
deeply divided society to directly tap citizen opinion as inputs to development of the 
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Kosovo Early Warning System (KEWS) for detecting brewing conflict. Funded the by United 
States Agency for International Development, UNDP established KEWS in 2002, which uses 
survey and other opinion analysis techniques to develop a systematic, rigorous conflict 
monitoring system that purposefully seeks impartial information on the attitudes of all 
residents, including Kosovo Albanians, Kosovo Serbs and other minorities, on the complex 
governing processes of the territory through the provisional institutions.21  
 
The KEWS methodology involves specific sampling methods (known as cluster sampling) to 
ensure that the polling data reflects the views of different social groups, through which 
perceptions can be tracked, priorities determined and satisfaction level with government 
institutions and services assessed. Polls are conducted on a quarterly basis, and the data has 
proven to be an important feedback mechanism on the attitudes of all Kosovars on the 
transitional process and the performance and approach of the international administration. 
The KEWS questionnaires were developed through consultation with local experts, 
academics and policy specialists and in consideration of the data needs of governing 
institutions and of UNMIK. Since 2002, some 28 rounds of polling have occurred and the 
methodology has been revised several times.  
 
An important approach of the project was to build the capacity over time of local institutions 
to conduct the polls and to feed the data into governing processes. This approach has been 
critical to the legitimacy of the reporting and to the development of a coordinated 
dissemination and communications strategy. Programme evaluations found that this 
approach was beneficial, particularly because the KEWS opinion data was highly useful to 
the work of government ministries, NGOs and the media. A second phase of the work 
(2006–2010) involved further strengthening of local capacity to use the KEWS data and to 
disseminate the raw findings through a short publication known as Fast Facts, which is made 
available through email dissemination and published on the UNMIK website. The data is 
also provided to local experts, representatives of marginalized groups and other 
stakeholders in roundtable settings and in focus group discussions with advisors from 
government, security institutions and journalists help interpret the findings and shape 
actionable recommendations. 
 
KEWS has been a valuable tool to build public trust in post-conflict Kosovo through the 
transmission of the voice of all Kosovars in the governance process. It has emerged as an 
authoritative, objective assessment of the perceptions, concerns, fears and attitudes across 
the social spectrum. Particularly, it has yielded important information on attitudes towards 
security institutions, such as the police and the courts, and in turn has contributed to 
perceptions of their impartiality and accessibility. By ensuring that the voices of minorities 
are heard and that representatives of vulnerable groups were involved in the drafting 
process, KEWS reports have attained a high degree of public confidence. 
 
Importantly, the public opinion polling approach has lent a degree of objectivity to the 
discussion of social, political and economic issues and has helped prevent polarization of 
issues along identity lines by political parties and interest groups. For example, KEWS data 
was an impetus for the development of an anti-corruption strategy, and in 2007, it was 
expanded to the polling of both citizens and members of the Kosovo Police Service to foster 
better relations with communities. Flowing from the success of KEWS, a variety of public 
and non-government organizations have requested capacity development for survey 
research, such as the Kosovo Democratic Institute, which now conducts extensive research 
specific to the electoral process. 
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Lessons from the KEWS experience relate directly to developing tools that can bring public 
opinion directly into policy and governance processes and can conduct attitudinal research 
that can help in understanding the drivers of conflict. Through approaches that present 
impartial data and that tap the views of minority and vulnerable groups’ voices, public 
opinion polling has proven a valuable way to increase lines of communication between 
citizens and the state. The links between the findings and recommendations for conflict 
prevention sometimes, however, have not been clear due to various users having differing 
interpretations of the results.22 Over time, the involvement of the media in interpreting and 
disseminating KEWS results has fostered wider public discussion on the quality of state 
service delivery. Critical to this function has been the presentation of findings in user-
friendly ways and the development of data-based indicators on trends in conflict-related 
perceptions. Most importantly, the opinion polling has been seen as a way to foster 
evidence-based debate on social, political and economic issues that has mitigated the 
sometimes conflict-exacerbating rhetoric of political parties. 
 
4.4. Liberia: The poverty reduction strategy tracking network 
Poverty, social exclusion and poor governance have been drivers of the conflict in Liberia, 
both during the civil war that ended in 2003 and previously. Nearly two decades of conflict 
destroyed livelihoods, eviscerated governance institutions at the national and local levels 
and created further division and distrust in the society. With the election of its first post-
conflict government in late 2005, which has committed to confronting the deep drivers of 
conflict in the country, a three-year poverty reduction strategy (PRS) was adopted in 2008 to 
guide the process of reconstruction and to reverse the voicelessness and marginalization that 
many Liberians experience. The adoption of the PRS was based on widespread participation, 
and following its adoption, there was a recognized need to foster citizen and civil society 
involvement in its implementation. 
 
A PRS tracking network was designed to improve social accountability through the 
monitoring of the PRS implementation and to generate independent data on its progress 
through the creation and monitoring of specific indicators. UNDP, together with the Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the United Nations Mission in 
Liberia (UNMIL), piloted a novel approach to PRS tracking in three counties (Gbapaolu, 
Lofa and Bong) in 2009 and 2010 using a community scorecard. Assuming a human rights 
perspective that underscores the importance of participation, non-discrimination and 
accountability, UNDP and its partners supported the development of both government and 
civil society actors to track PRS progress and to expand citizen engagement in delivery 
though an aptly named Follow the Money Project. 
 
The social accountability tools used included civic education programmes on radio and the 
community scorecards. The tools both informed citizen engagement and yielded 
independent data on public perceptions of the infrastructure and the basic services pillar of 
the PRS. The PRS tracking network developed and broadcasted information on community 
and national radio to raise citizens’ awareness of the PRS goals and their rights and 
responsibilities in measuring the impact. The scorecards specifically targeted women, youth 
and the elderly to encourage their participation and to identify and develop local indicators 
for measuring PRS projects. Indicators were developed in a question format, and citizens 
scored whether the service was available or not and whether they were satisfied with its 
quality.  
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From the scorecards, PRS tracking network researchers compiled the information and 
organized community meetings to discuss the results that involved representatives of local 
government (particularly, the County Development Committees) and service providers. 
Outcomes of the meetings were then disseminated through radio broadcasts on the 
community stations. 
 
The PRS tracking network has brought government closer to the people in post-conflict 
Liberia, especially at the local level. It has demonstrated to Liberians that their voice and 
opinion matter. The scorecard meetings offered a venue for frank discussion between 
communities and local officials in a way that helped service providers better understand a 
community’s needs and to allow officials to inform citizens about the limitations of and pace 
of PRS implementation. Additionally, the qualitative and quantitative data generated from 
the scorecards were used to further develop approaches and methods in PRS 
implementation. Finally, the process helped to establish civil society as partners and 
stakeholders in the PRS process. Nonetheless, there may be limits to the community 
scorecard approach if most of the decisions that affect achievement of the PRS goals—the 
fiscal, monetary and financial policies—are not open for discussion with civil society or are 
not amenable to direct citizen rating via the scorecard tool. 
 
The most instructive lesson from Liberia’s PRS tracking and scorecard experience is the 
importance of civil society as an intermediary institution in contexts in which government 
institutions (especially local government) are weak and unable to directly engage with 
citizens. Second, sustaining community-level involvement requires evidence that their 
participation has resulted in better impact or, at a minimum, that their views are taken into 
account. Finally, reflections on the PRS tracking network underscore that capacity 
development is critical for both civil society and for local administrators and that, over time, 
public administration reform must include the allocation of sufficient resources to local 
administrators, given the demands of citizens for them to deliver. This suggests that efforts 
to support the state’s capacity at the local level are central to creating the conditions through 
which society can contribute to their accountability. 
 
4.5. Pakistan: Devolution Trust for Community Empowerment 
The absence of police presence and the low trust between communities and the police are 
both factors in the level of mistrust between the society and the State in areas of Pakistan. A 
2002 survey revealed that only 22 per cent of the respondents would contact the police in the 
event of a problem with personal safety. A year earlier, the Government enacted legislation 
that provides a framework for the devolution of power to the local level and for increasing 
local representation and responsive public administration and expanding community 
participation throughout the country, particularly in those areas affected by conflict, where 
there is little history of social accountability. 
  
As part of the local government empowerment effort, the Devolution Trust for Community 
Empowerment was established as an NGO in 2003 that would then set up Citizen 
Community Boards and Local Monitoring Committees. These community groups manage 
information sharing, advocacy and dialogue and participate in public safety delivery 
through a newly created Police–Community Relations Programme (PCRP).23 The Devolution 
Trust is operational in 45 districts and some 2,230 Union Councils (the lowest tier of 
administration). The PCRP is engaged in 15 of those districts, which are the most conflict-
affected. Many of them are located in the Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provinces, 
along the borders with Iran and Afghanistan, and where weak rule of law and poor relations 
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between the communities and the police have hindered social cohesion and contributed to 
conflict. UNDP is a partner organization with the Devolution Trust (and with donors). 
 
The community relations programme provides social accountability through the monitoring 
of police performance. Through an integrated community empowerment model, it works to 
bridge the gap between citizens and government by gathering information from 
communities on issues related to public safety. The programme has mobilized communities 
and improved their ability to monitor the police. And it has organized sensitization 
workshops for the police on the concept of ‘responsiveness’. Union Public Safety 
Committees monitor police performance in providing basic public safety through a police 
station monitoring system.  
 
The police workshops focused on improving transparency by maintaining case logs and 
keeping communities informed on active cases. The Devolution Trust also organized 
community workshops to encourage better relations between the safety committees and the 
local police and regular public forums (known as khulli katcheries) in which outstanding 
cases are discussed. The forums were designed to motivate community policing practices 
and community involvement in resolving cases. Separate consultations were conducted with 
women to provide them with a mechanism to report grievances and specific crimes. Some 
141 safety committees have been established in the 15 provinces. 
 
Specific tools involved include methods for communities to monitor complaints and cases 
and their rate of resolution. The safety committees produce monthly monitoring reports and 
award points for cases solved by the police. Through the police station monitoring system, 
the scores are publicly displayed in police stations and progress towards the resolution of 
cases are recorded and presented. Programme managers report considerable successes in 
transforming the police–community relationship from that of an ‘oppressor–victim’ to one 
that is more mutually respectful.  
 
Challenged highlighted by the Devolution Trust experience include the difficulty of working 
in environments of natural disaster or continued conflict, the absence of local elections (and 
elected local governments) in most parts of the country, the lack of implementation of 
provincial local administration in certain districts and the continued denial of women’s 
economic, social and political rights (UNDP, 2011). 
 
5.  Findings and recommendations 
 
The case studies emphasize how realizing the promise of social accountability programmes 
depends much on the overall security context—in areas of insecurity, people withdraw into 
the private sphere and adopt resiliency and survival mechanisms. Support to community 
security has been possible, even during the peace-making period, and focuses on human 
security (protection of the most vulnerable), citizen security (safety from crime, predation 
and trafficking) and community safety (social, environmental or criminal factors) (UNDP, 
2009). The principal findings from the comparative analysis of the case studies are 
summarized in table 5.  
 
In addition to the lessons learned from the case studies, this chapter argues that social 
accountability initiatives in post-conflict countries first require a close assessment of the 
underlying drivers of conflict and the ways in which the effects of conflict on civil society 
can be overcome, avoided or redirected. This often involves flexible and innovative 
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programming that addresses the drivers of fragility through a variety of tools that span the 
spectrum, from information gathering to transparency initiatives and in creating spaces for 
direct citizen participation. At the same time, a close assessment of the bridging 
contributions of civil society across lines of conflict is critical in finding partners for 
implementation; cross-cutting civil society organizations may be weak, but for sustainable 
peace it is critical in the long-term to have economic integration and social ties that cross 
identity lines.  
 
The following weaves together additional findings and recommendations for consideration 
in strengthening social accountability programming: 
 Assessments can improve the ways in which social accountability initiatives are 
targeted; country-wide and localized analysis of the causes of fragility and sector-specific 
or localized indicators can help contribute to ways in which the level of intervention can 
be better calibrated and choices made on the types of social accountability tools that best 
relate to, and may mitigate, underlying drivers of conflict. 
 
 Social accountability in post-conflict countries often means social empowerment; 
facilitating the participation of marginalized or historically disadvantaged groups 
requires an explicit commitment and special efforts to ensure their willingness and 
capacity to participate. Thus, UNDP must continue to be proactive with targeted 
interventions that enable the expression of voice by historically disadvantaged or 
marginalized groups. A critical element of empowerment is access to information and 
forums through which such information can be contextually interpreted. 
 
 The role of informal institutions, such as indigenous, non-state or traditional leaders, is 
critical in engaging communities in a state that is weak or historically perceived as 
illegitimate. Engaging informal institutions allows for local or historical accountability 
mechanisms to work. Social accountability initiatives should build in participation and 
engagement of such leaders. But at the same time, it is important that the selection of 
monitors or participants goes beyond informal leaders and directly engages the 
community as participants and/or in the selection of those involved in monitoring and 
measuring state performance.  
 
 UNDP has a critical role in integrating social accountability approaches in post-conflict 
reconstruction programmes through its facilitating of interaction among international 
service providers, national and subnational governments, civil society and affected 
communities. This, in turn, requires working across central government institutions, 
such as line ministries, local governments, civil society and communities. Capacity 
development approaches must be complementary to ensure the success of social 
accountability initiatives. 
 
 Interventions at the local level require capacity development not just for communities 
and individuals engaged in the monitoring but also with subnational officials who must 
be willing and incentivized to create space for enhanced participation by the community. 
At this level, it is important to analyse the incentives that local officials may have for 
accountability and to understand the lines of accountability that may run upwards to 
central governments but also outwards to communities. Local officials must have the 
resources and capacities to respond to community demands if they are to be held 
accountable for delivery. 
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 Social media and new information and communication technology has proven to be 
especially useful in providing new ways to allow for direct (and discrete) community 
monitoring, reporting and sharing of grievances. New approaches, such as the use of 
mobile phones to allow for crowdsourcing receipt of citizen inputs, can provide 
individuals a direct sense of participation; however, the results may be unreliable, and 
there are concerns regarding how confidentially citizens’ inputs are handled. 
Confidentiality, thus trust, is necessary to reduce people’s very real fears of retribution 
or punishment for expressing their views.  
 
 Linking social accountability efforts to broader public debates in the media is critical. At 
the national level, engaging the media is essential to engendering a culture in which 
citizens’ views influence policy processes; at the local level, media reporting on social 
accountability can impress upon communities that their voice is important and being 
heard more broadly. 
 
 Programmes, once developed, need constant review and adjustment in the context of 
what are often rapid changes in social conditions (such as continued conflict) or in 
political transitions. Short-term interventions must be paired with long-term objectives 
of building state capacity while at the same time being flexible enough to be recalibrated 
in light of changing conditions. Programmes will be sustainable when they have 
achieved a point at which national or local officials have strong incentives to be 
accountable, either through their interaction with the citizens or through monetary-
based inducements. 
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Table 5: Summary of principal findings from the comparative analysis of the case studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relationship 
to 
conflict causes 
 
 
Overall 
concept and 
approach 
 
Level of 
intervention 
and tools 
used 
 
Issues and 
challenges 
 
Impact 
 
Lessons learned 
 
Afghanistan 
 
Corruption as a 
barrier to 
reconstruction 
and a driver of 
public support 
for insurgency; 
new approaches 
needed to 
respond to 
public 
grievances 
 
Develop the 
capacity of local 
monitors to 
assess the 
quality of 
construction 
and ways to 
report back by 
enabling 
communities to 
express 
grievances 
Local 
intervention in 
provinces that 
have been most 
affected by 
conflict; social 
audit tools 
Initial community 
scepticism about 
the project; 
communities felt 
powerless in the 
reconstruction 
process 
Citizens see 
themselves more 
as participants in 
development 
rather than 
passive recipients 
of aid 
Local monitors 
need to be 
selected by the 
entire community, 
not just village 
elders; training of 
subnational 
officials need to 
‘create space’ for 
monitoring 
 
Guatemala 
 
Education as a 
primary 
grievance of 
disadvantaged 
groups 
 
Develop social 
cohesion and 
build social 
capital around 
the critical 
education issue 
At the national 
level to 
engender social 
consensus on 
education 
reform; 
dialogue tools 
Choosing the right 
people with the 
right profiles, 
identifying entry 
points and creating 
formal and 
informal spaces 
Led to a 
consensus-based 
charter on 
education reform 
that provides 
commitment to 
multiculturalism 
Dialogues require 
decision makers to 
be present; 
progress in the 
process can’t be 
rushed or forced 
 
Kosovo 
 
 
Concerns of the 
minority 
communities 
and lack of 
contact among 
identity-based 
communities 
 
Identify 
priorities, assess 
perceptions and 
measure levels 
of satisfaction 
with 
government 
across the lines 
of deep social 
division 
At the national 
level with 
specific 
methods for 
ensuring 
minority 
community 
views in the 
sample; 
public opinion 
polling 
The link between 
the data and the 
recommendations 
for conflict 
prevention have 
been tenuous; 
presentation of 
findings to policy 
makers needed 
improvement 
Built up trust by 
ensuring all 
voices are heard; 
increased the 
accessibility and 
accountability of 
the police and 
courts 
Provide the raw 
findings of public 
opinion data, but 
also allow for 
discussion and 
analysis through 
focus groups and 
dialogues 
 
Liberia 
 
Poverty as a root 
cause of conflict; 
need to link 
recovery to 
community 
needs 
 
Reduce 
exclusion of 
sections of the 
population 
through 
monitoring of 
poverty-
reduction aid 
Programme 
piloted in 20 
districts in 
three provinces 
using 
community 
monitoring; 
community 
scorecards 
Lack of clarity on 
the role and 
responsibility of 
local governments 
in implementing 
the poverty 
reduction strategy; 
passive approach 
to citizen 
engagement 
Helped local 
service providers 
understand 
communities’ 
needs and 
allowed citizens 
to become 
stakeholders in 
the poverty 
reduction 
strategy 
implementation 
Use local media to 
broadcast results 
and to further 
engender 
community 
empowerment 
 
Pakistan 
 
Lack of trust 
between 
communities 
and the state’s 
rule of law 
apparatus 
 
Develop closer 
ties between 
the state, 
especially the 
police, and 
communities in 
conflict-affected 
provinces 
In conflict-
affected 
provinces 
where the 
state’s role has 
been 
historically 
weak and trust 
has been low; 
local 
communities 
monitor and 
report 
Ongoing crisis from 
natural disaster 
and conflict; 
inclusion of 
women; lack of 
local elections and 
implementation of 
provincial 
government laws 
Increased 
transparency and 
citizen 
monitoring of the 
police and justice 
sectors; more 
effective 
resolution of 
cases 
Open local forums 
to provide an 
incentive for the 
police to be more 
accountable; 
sustainability relies 
on incentives of 
state officials for 
accountability 
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Chapter 4: Social accountability, social inclusion 
and the Millennium Development Goals 
 
Assessing the evidence 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In low-income countries, effective public services are necessary for poverty reduction. With 
many countries falling behind on the Millennium Development Goals, there is an urgent 
need for finding ways in which progress can be accelerated. In particular, there is a need to 
ensure that the poorest and most vulnerable groups are served and are not left behind. 
Existing perspectives that examine the progress towards the MDGs unfortunately use macro 
statistics that tend to suffer from the ‘tyranny of averages’ and hide pockets of exclusion that 
are buried within the gross indicators. For inclusive progress on the MDGs, analysis must go 
beyond the macro to the micro and look at the lack of services for the most marginalized. 
 
In the past few years, two analytically distinct but empirically related approaches have 
attempted to address these issues: social accountability and social inclusion. Both leverage 
participatory approaches and representative methodologies to nuance the macro 
generalizations and provide opportunities for those who have been silenced or marginalized 
to have their voice heard. This chapter discusses how these two approaches are linked and 
assesses the theory and evidence on the contribution of social accountability to social 
inclusion and vice versa.  
 
A number of scholars have focused on issues of accountability in service delivery. Although 
lack of funds is an issue in some contexts, in many others a lack of funding is only a part of 
the problem; the other major part is due to prevailing accountability gaps (The World Bank, 
2004; Devarajan and Widlund, 2006).1 Consequently, many contemporary efforts seek to 
improve service performance either through strengthening existing accountability 
mechanisms or creating new channels of accountability. While attempts to strengthen 
accountability in basic services are not new, what is new about the current reforms is that 
many emphasize citizen-led accountability—termed ‘social accountability’—to enhance 
downward accountability to users of services (Ackerman, 2005; Peruzzotti and Smulovitz, 
2006; UN, 2007).  
 
The term ‘social accountability’ is interpreted in various ways. This chapter starts with the 
definition—the on-going efforts by collective actors to demand accountability from public 
officials and providers for existing state obligations. The core strategy in social 
accountability efforts is to make public the failures in meeting obligations, which then lead 
to political and reputation costs and ultimately social and political sanctions (Houtzager and 
Joshi, 2008). Implicitly, social accountability approaches are driven by a need to include 
services to the excluded. 
 
Social inclusion takes on the issue of participation and the voice of the most marginalized. 
There is considerable evidence that failures in public services due to the accountability gaps 
outlined earlier hurt the most vulnerable the hardest, and yet they are the most powerless in 
exercising their voice. For example, education, which is one of the most promising routes for 
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exiting poverty, is typically characterized by discrimination against girls, the differently 
abled, age and ethnic and religious minorities in developing countries.  
 
Access to health care (ill health is one of the main reasons why people fall into poverty) is 
often denied to the weakest and most vulnerable groups. In many countries, access to 
drinking water is regulated by social norms that can be exclusionary, such as wells accessed 
only by members of a certain caste group in India. Social exclusion thus exacerbates the 
impacts of poor services on the marginalized (Marc, 2008). To counter this process, social 
inclusion initiatives target those groups that are at the bottom on different hierarchies (caste, 
religion, gender, sexual orientation, power, income, socio-cultural discrimination, etc.). 
 
Although the two approaches overlap in many cases, for analytical purposes they are 
treated separately in this chapter to highlight the routes through which, at least in theory, 
social accountability can contribute to social inclusion and vice versa. Obviously, on 
normative grounds, social inclusion ought to be a primary principle informing social 
accountability practice. Conversely, social inclusion efforts need to consider accountability 
demands as important indicators of empowerment. As a result, there is a strong argument to 
consider the links between development initiatives that stress social inclusion with those 
that attempt to strengthen social accountability, which this chapter does.  
 
Thus, the focus of this chapter is on two important and related questions that explore the 
links between social accountability and social inclusion: 
 Given the published literature, what can be said about whether social accountability 
initiatives lead to social inclusion? 
 What is the evidence on whether social inclusion initiatives lead to social 
accountability demands? 
 
The exploration then entails further questioning: What are the intersections between the 
agendas of social inclusion and social accountability? How can they be brought together in a 
synergistic manner? Where does the greatest potential for mutual gains lie? What are the 
factors that enable reinforcing effects between them? Are there constraints that prevent the 
successes of one approach benefitting the other? Answers to these are of importance for 
addressing issues of social and economic inequality and achieving the MDGs for all.  
 
This chapter finds that while similar motivations for inclusion and accountability drive the 
different kinds of efforts, there is a need to be explicit about the links between the two. 
Indeed, one of the common elements is their underpinning to a rights-based perspective. 
Most transparency and accountability work is couched in the language of rights, such as the 
right to information or the right to carry out social audits on the use of public funds. 
Simultaneously, many inclusion movements are also framed in the language of rights, such 
as children’s rights or the rights of indigenous people.  
 
Yet, how is it that although rights approaches aim at the marginalized, rights-based 
accountability efforts have not bridged inclusion efforts? Particularly when countries are 
increasingly accepting responsibility for socio-economic rights (to education, health, etc., 
areas that are specifically the focus of the MDGs), what difference does a rights-based 
framing make to the achievement of inclusion and accountability? This chapter concludes 
that the empirical evidence to make a judgement about this issue is quite thin, and further 
research needs to explicitly focus on this gap. A rights-based framing has several 
implications: 
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First, it means that to build the evidence base, the tracking of outcomes of social 
accountability efforts in a disaggregated manner needs to be built into projects from the 
outset. This is particularly important because accountability structures and initiatives are 
only as good as the degree of inclusive participation they elicit. Yet, participation and 
advocacy are only one of a broader set of functions that organizations working to empower 
the marginalized undertake; others include budget analysis, research, media analysis and 
monitoring. In other words, social inclusion is one part of the politics that informs the 
technique of social accountability practices.  
 
Second, as the evidence suggests, to have positive impacts on the marginalized, social 
accountability work needs to be targeted to such groups not just in its outcomes but more 
critically also in its processes. To do this, it would be useful to unbundle social 
accountability into its separate components, such as information demands and aggregation, 
negotiation, grievance procedures, and to trace and locate strategies for social inclusion in 
each of these components. Joshi and Houtzager (2012) make a similar case for the 
disaggregation of social accountability components to better understand the conditions 
under which social groups are likely to undertake specific social accountability actions and 
their likelihood of success.  
 
Third, it seems from the cases described in this chapter that social accountability and social 
inclusion work requires engagement with governments as well as with social groups. So far, 
efforts have been targeted towards mobilizing communities and marginalized groups. But 
without public officials able and motivated to respond, accountability work might end up 
stuck in a vicious cycle of demands, insufficient response, frustration, backlash and 
potentially worse services.  
 
Before proceeding, some caveats are in order. Foremost, it is only recently that scholars have 
started looking systematically at evidence of impact in development programmes. The 
existing evidence appears to be of varied robustness, from anecdotal claims of impact to 
rigorously designed, randomized controlled trials of specific, often narrowly defined 
interventions. There are very few independent ex post facto studies of accountability 
initiatives and particularly on impacts in the service delivery arena, let alone impacts on 
inclusion (McGee and Gaventa, 2010; Joshi, 2010a).  
 
The available literature has tended to examine social accountability initiatives in a ‘snapshot’ 
fashion—often limiting the analysis to the intervention itself and its subsequent unfolding of 
outcomes through quasi-experimental research, such as randomized control trials (Banerjee 
et al., 2010; Nguyen and Lassibille, 2008). For example, Reinikka and Svensson (2005) show 
how the dissemination of information through public expenditure tracking surveys has had 
an impact: Schools in communities that had better access to information received more of the 
funding that was due to them. Yet, later research has questioned this simplistic conclusion 
and shown that other reforms within the education system have contributed to 
improvements in the transmission of funds (Hubbard, 2007).  
 
Most studies do not examine a longer trajectory of citizen–state relationships or civil society 
networks that underpin specific social accountability initiatives; nor do they examine the 
influence of activities outside the narrow scope of the initiative (whether citizen- or state-
led) that can influence outcomes (Joshi and Houtzager, 2012). Given the limitations of the 
social accountability literature in general, analysis of links with social inclusion is necessarily 
tentative. 
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Keeping these issues in mind, the second section of this chapter explores the conceptual 
difficulties and potential pathways through which social accountability and social inclusion 
are linked. The third and fourth sections focus on the empirical evidence—the impact of 
social accountability initiatives on social inclusion and the impact of social inclusion 
initiatives on social accountability. In the fifth section, broader lessons from the literature 
and the implications for UNDP are discussed.  
 
2.  Social accountability and social inclusion: Pathways to impact 
 
2.1. Social accountability 
Despite the high level of interest in social accountability initiatives, there is no consensus on 
a common definition of what it is. In fact, some might characterize it as a set of practices in 
search of a definition. Some scholars take a very wide definition that encompasses almost all 
citizen-engagement activity, particularly including both participation in deliberative 
decision-making and participation in accountability (Malena et al., 2004; Arroyo, 2005).  
 
Others take a more narrow definition, focusing on monitoring the use of public resources 
and related accountability demands, such as “the on-going and collective effort to hold 
public officials to account for the provision of public goods which are existing state 
obligations” (Joshi, 2008; Houtzager and Joshi, 2008). The emphasis then is more on 
collective efforts at accountability demands as rights. The work of the Affiliated Network for 
Social Accountability, East Asia and the Pacific, captures this element of rights by noting, 
“the goal of social accountability action brings us back to the vision of a good society—
meeting people’s basic needs through improved public service delivery, building a caring 
community that enhances people’s welfare and promoting equality and justice by 
strengthening people’s rights” (ANSA-EAP, 2010). 
 
What are the expected outcomes of social accountability initiatives? Three types of outcomes 
are usually cited. The broadest set of claims relates to citizen empowerment of poor people, 
including increased awareness of rights and the potential construction of citizenship 
through engagement in civic life. Another set of claims made is that social accountability 
will lead to increased responsiveness and subsequently improved public services. The final, 
and often the strongest set of claims in relation to service delivery, is that such initiatives 
improve governance and particularly reduce corruption. Here it is quite important to point 
out that while anti-corruption and social accountability initiatives overlap, they are not the 
same—there are many anti-corruption accountability measures that do not involve social 
accountability mechanisms, and many social accountability efforts that are not addressing 
corruption. 
 
Given the diversity of potential social accountability mechanisms (with much on-going 
experimentation) described in this chapter, the focus is on those with the most common 
social accountability experiences—those that have been widely implemented.  
 
Since the early 2000s, the number of publications attempting to conceptualize, describe and 
assess social accountability initiatives intended to improve public services has steadily 
increased. Several papers have focused on conceptualizing social accountability and why it 
matters (Ackerman, 2005; Malena et al., 2004; O’Neil et al., 2007; Peruzzotti and Smulovitz, 
2006). Other scholars have invested in a number of stocktaking exercises of social 
accountability initiatives in various regions of the world. Recent reviews of experience with 
social accountability initiatives have identified more than 50 cases across Asia, Latin 
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America, Eastern Europe and Africa (Arroyo, 2005; Claasen and Alpin-Lardies, 2010; 
Novikova, 2007; McNeil and Mumvuma, 2006; Sirker and Cosik, 2007).  
 
Further studies through various international initiatives include projects started under the 
DFID-funded Global Transparency Fund and Global Integrity (ComGap, 2007; Global 
Integrity, 2010). The documentation of such experiences is rapidly growing. And even more 
recently, although still very limited in number, there have been several attempts to assess 
the impact of social accountability initiatives on various outcomes, including service 
delivery, aid transparency, governance and extractive industries, budgets and freedom of 
information (Rocha Menocal and Sharma, 2008; O’Neil et al., 2007; Gaventa and McGee, 
2010; McGee and Gaventa, 2010; Gaventa and Barrett, 2010; Joshi, 2010a). 
 
Despite this growing body of evidence, most of the studies do not explicitly examine the 
impact of such initiatives in service delivery on social inclusion. Of course, many social 
accountability practices owe their origins to concerns about social exclusion. Exceptions are 
when the initiative itself is targeted to specific marginalized groups (either geographically, 
such as social accountability initiatives in indigenous communities, or by vulnerability, such 
as gender budgeting), where the impact of the initiative coincides with social inclusion 
objectives. Given the objective of this chapter to link social accountability with social 
inclusion, it is useful to identify, at least in theory, the routes through which social 
accountability can contribute to social inclusion. 
 
Social accountability initiatives can contribute to social inclusion of marginalized groups in 
three ways. First, as already mentioned, the initiative can target demand accountability for 
an outcome that benefits a particular group. For example, gender budget analysis can show 
how public expenditure is skewed against women. The resulting public pressure can then 
lead to reforms that increase spending on women or ring-fence funds for women. This is the 
most common category of examples from the literature. Second, the processes through 
which the accountability initiative works could have special mechanisms to reach out to 
marginalized groups. Their participation in the accountability demands could result in both 
including them in wider socio-political processes as well as empowering them within their 
communities. The literature on social accountability initiatives is rather thin on this issue, 
however. Third, the outcomes of the accountability demands could end up benefitting 
particular groups more than others; for example, changes in the timings at which health 
services are offered could lead to better access for day labourers. Unfortunately, few social 
accountability initiatives track impacts in such a disaggregated fashion.  
 
This chapter reviews four mechanisms for gathering evidence of impact, which are expected 
to work in the following ways:2 Budget analysis involves obtaining information on budgets 
(either planned or expenditures), analysing them for their impact on particular groups or 
sectors (such as females or education) and basing advocacy on publicizing the resulting 
analysis (Robinson, 2006). Community monitoring involves informing communities of the 
standards of service that they ought to expect (such as the quality of public works), 
mobilizing them to monitor the on-going activities of a provider and reporting to authorities 
any gaps in expected standards.  
 
The presumption is that because communities are close to the actual delivery of services and 
have interests in seeing services meet set norms, they are in a better position to identify 
shortcomings and use accountability mechanisms to demand improvements (Khemani, 
2008). Social audits collect information on the implementation of particular public services 
in relation to expected standards, usually by an independent organization. The information 
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is then made public and discussed in a public hearing in which all stakeholders are present. 
Poor performers are called to account in front of their peers and other officials. The 
expectation is that by confronting poor performance and corruption in a public gathering, 
guilty officials will be shamed into amending their ways and making reparations for 
damage done (Aiyer et al., 2010; Swain and Sen, 2009).  
 
Community scorecards are a variation on both social audits and citizen report cards (citizen 
perception surveys). They involve surveys of both citizens and service providers on their 
perceptions of the quality of services provided, using indicators that have been agreed by all 
stakeholders. The differences between these perceptions are then discussed in a public 
gathering (facilitated by an independent organization) in which ways of improving services 
are proposed and agreed (Murty et al., 2007; Misra, 2007). In this mechanism, the expectation 
is that by highlighting differences in perceptions, providers are brought to face the problems 
users experience in accessing services and through a deliberative process, innovative 
solutions to improve services can be sought. Most social accountability initiatives involve 
information collection and analysis, the mobilization of groups, publicity and accountability 
demands. 
 
2.2. Social inclusion 
Social inclusion (and related exclusion) as a concept has been used since the mid-1990s to 
highlight the different ways in which groups might be disadvantaged from fully 
participating in economic and social life. The analytical value-added of the concept of social 
inclusion/exclusion is its focus on active processes and dynamics—on the production and 
reproduction of advantage or disadvantage. Kabeer (2000, citing Fraser, 1997) differentiates 
two ends of the spectrum of exclusion—economic exclusion (including exploitation, 
marginalization and deprivation) and cultural exclusion (including negative representations, 
devaluation and exclusion from social networks). For some groups, these two ends are 
intertwined, and they are doubly excluded, with economic exclusion reinforced by cultural 
exclusion.  
 
An important aspect that Kabeer (2000) underscores is that “when we talk about social 
exclusion we are distinguishing those who belong to groups which enjoy access to resources 
and respect and those who do not” (emphasis added). The experience of being excluded as 
well as the process of excluding thus occurs as a collective experience (although the impacts 
are both individually and collectively felt). Therefore, what this analysis has in common 
with the social accountability approach outlined previously is the emphasis on collective 
action—if groups are excluded, then the process of inclusion has to have collective actors at 
their core. The social inclusion approach thus reinforces the social accountability approach 
in a particularly relevant manner. 
 
Despite this relative conceptual clarity, the definition poses problems for its relative 
expansiveness. If a broad formulation of what constitutes social inclusion projects is 
accepted, an enormously wide range of development projects need to be examined for their 
impact on social accountability demands (a significant proportion of all developmental 
initiatives are targeted to some marginalized group or the other—the poor, women, the old, 
the disabled, children, ethnic or religious minorities or a combination of these categories).  
 
A scan of the literature reveals few robust studies of impact, however; for the most part, 
studies on social inclusion initiatives tend to report on the immediate outcomes of social 
inclusion rather than down-the-road outcomes in terms of increased accountability 
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demands. A fully comprehensive review of social inclusion projects would be beyond the 
scope of this chapter. Instead, what is attempted here is to examine an illustrative range of 
social inclusion projects to highlight some of the challenges and lessons for social 
accountability work.  
 
Why might social inclusion initiatives lead to social accountability demands? Social 
inclusion projects seek to empower those excluded economically, politically or socially 
through specific projects. There are at least four potential routes through which they could 
lead to social accountability. First, broad participatory governance initiatives that are 
intended to improve direct access of all groups to decision-making could benefit excluded 
groups more than others because historically they have had less voice. Second, civil society 
organization-led initiatives aimed at inclusive governance could either lead directly to social 
accountability demands or through an intermediate step of empowerment while aiming at 
other objectives, such as recognition. Once empowered, previously marginalized groups 
could take on social accountability activities and demand improvements in public services.3  
 
Third, state-led initiatives that aim to reach particular minority groups could lead to greater 
accountability through processes of increased interaction. Finally, inclusion initiatives that 
aim to improve services, livelihoods or access to resources could enable groups to demand 
improved responsiveness in those services. Thus, while some inclusion projects are directly 
oriented to such governance-related empowerment (improving the participation of 
indigenous groups in policy processes, for example), others are a step removed (such as 
women’s microcredit groups seeking to increase income).  
 
In sum, both social accountability and social inclusion projects can overlap by aspiring to 
achieve better accountability and inclusion simultaneously.  
 
Table 6 categorizes the potential universe of development initiatives, based on their social 
accountability and social inclusion dimensions. What is reviewed in the next two sections 
are largely experiences from the lower two quadrants—those that score high on social 
accountability and perhaps on social inclusion.  
 
Table 6: Categorization of development initiatives, based on their social accountability and social 
inclusion dimensions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social 
accountability 
 
Social inclusion 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
Low 
 Food for work 
programmes 
 Conditional cash transfer 
programmes 
 Targeted livelihood 
programmes 
 Health and education 
projects for marginalized 
groups 
 Cultural identity and 
recognition projects 
High  Community scorecards
4
 
 Social audits 
 Gender budgeting 
 Rights-based approaches 
for marginalized groups 
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3.  Social accountability initiatives and social inclusion  
 
Most of the evidence on social accountability does not directly address questions of social 
inclusion. Usually, social accountability initiatives are targeted to improve services for ‘the 
poor’, as a generic overarching category, without making distinctions about how initiatives 
may impact different groups within that community.5 For this reason, the evidence provided 
here on the extent to which social accountability initiatives lead to social inclusion is limited, 
and it is difficult to make generalizations about the factors that lead to successful inclusion 
through social accountability.6 Social accountability projects can be analysed through their 
impacts on social inclusion, however, and in three ways—initiatives with i) targeted and 
inclusive social accountability demands, ii) inclusive processes and iii) inclusive outcomes, 
as the following sections discuss. 
 
3.1. Targeted and inclusive social accountability demands 
Of the interventions targeted to particular groups and focused on accountability demands, 
budget-related work is the most advanced—including budget transparency, budget 
analysis, expenditure tracking, participatory budging, budget literacy and awareness raising 
(Sundet, 2004; Reinikka and Svensson, 2005; Renzio et al., 2006; Folscher, 2002; Gauthier and 
Montreal, 2006).  
 
In particular, gender budget analysis has been used quite successfully as a tool to highlight 
the low level of resources allocated for women’s needs. Examples of experiences with 
gender budgeting are plentiful (Budlender and Hewitt, 2003; also see www.gender-
budgets.org). One of the most well-known is the work of FORO and Fundar in Mexico (Box 
5), which achieved a ten-fold funding increase in a programme to combat maternal mortality 
due to its gender budget analysis and related lobbying. Although successful in efforts to 
increase allocations to maternal mortality programmes, the programme was less successful 
in tracking utilization of the funds for impact due to difficulties in accessing data (Robinson, 
2006).  
 
In Indonesia, the Indonesian Women’s Coalition for Justice and Democracy (Koalisi 
Perempuan Indonesia, or KPI) has been working on participatory gender budgeting by 
expanding women’s political involvement through education and political literacy efforts, 
encouraging participation in budget drafting, gender budget analysis and training on 
budgets (Sirker and Cosic, 2007). It has had much policy influence related to gender issues 
and has led to the empowerment of women to undertake gender budgeting at the grass-
roots level. Despite its ambitious programme, however, KPI has been limited by the fact that 
it is largely a volunteer-based organization.  
 
Some general lessons are emerging from the experiences with gender budgets. First, gender 
budget analysis and advocacy is technical and requires building budget literacy among civil 
society organizations. Second, groups have experienced difficulties in obtaining gender-
disaggregated information. To overcome such hurdles, finding appropriate allies in public 
agencies has been essential to most successes.7 Finally, sustainability of gender budget work 
requires institutionalization within government agencies, a process that is complex and 
requires commitment from different stakeholders. 
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Disaggregated budget analysis has been used to focus attention on resource allocation to 
other vulnerable groups as well. For example, McNeil and Mumvuma (2006) note that 
Zimbabwe’s National Association of Non-Governmental Organizations introduced the 
Child-Friendly Budget Initiative aimed at highlighting whether resources are allocated and 
used in meeting children’s basic needs. Similar children’s budget analysis was used by 
South Africa’s Alliance for Children’s Entitlement to Social Security to draw attention to the 
challenges in service delivery for children. This resulted in a significant increase in funding 
for child support grants (Robinson, 2006). DISHA, an NGO in Gujarat, India, found that the 
state government was failing to spend the budget share allocated for tribal groups (15 per 
cent of the budget) and what was spent was ineffectively used. Combined with advocacy 
and protest, DISHA managed to increase the allocations and better use them (Robinson, 
2006). 
 
Another set of initiatives have used social accountability tools to analyse the effectiveness of 
targeted programmes. For example, social audits in the Indian states of Andhra Pradesh and 
Orissa by the Integrated Child Development Services found that supplementary nutrition 
frequently ran out, malnourished children were not detected and treated in a timely fashion, 
the sites of the facilities were distant from homes, the programme did not reach those with 
the greatest need and had low participation from communities (Swain and Sen, 2009). 
Despite the unearthing of these problems, however, the authors point out that the social 
audits did not lead to any obvious and immediate improvements.  
 
The Wada Na Todo Abhiyan campaign in India is a good example of an accountability 
initiative targeted to social inclusion. It aims to hold the government explicitly accountable 
for its promises to end poverty, social exclusion and discrimination (www.wadanatodo.net) 
by focusing on the UN Millennium Declaration (2000), the National Development Goals and 
the National Common Minimum Programme (2004–2009), with a special focus on the rights 
to livelihood, health and education. By monitoring the progress of the Government on these 
issues through research, raising awareness of the issues and mobilizing advocacy coalitions, 
the campaign hopes to have an impact on government policies and programmes. Initiatives 
like this offer important opportunities to research the impacts of multidimensional 
accountability work on changes in policy, practice and inclusion. 
Box 5: Gender budget analysis in Mexico 
Gender budget analysis involves interrogating budgets for their gender implications. The success of 
Mexico’s gender budgeting process was led by the Foro Nacional de Mujeres y Politicas de Poblacion 
(Foro), a network of women’s organizations in Mexico. The initial spark was the analysis of trends in 
federal spending, triggered by the need to know where Mexico stood in terms of spending, in 
keeping with the programme of action of the 1994 International Conference on Population and 
Development (Hofbauer, 2002). The discovery by women’s advocates that the allocation for 
reproductive health had dropped by 33 percent in three years led to a series of strategies advocating 
for change. Public finance workshops for women, advocacy for integrating a gender perspective into 
policy processes, sensitizing diverse stakeholders and undertaking research into gender implications 
of poverty programmes all contributed to an atmosphere of debate and dialogue, which benefitted 
from a change in government in 2000. Seizing the opportunity, Foro, along with the women’s groups 
Fundar and Equidad, worked to create spaces in government (such as a technical committee in the 
Women and Health programme), which led to more changes in the way in which budgets were 
developed and implemented. One of the biggest successes of the campaign was a ten-fold increase in 
the budget allocated to maternal mortality (Robinson, 2006). Continuous oversight has been an 
important part of the strategy. Challenges still remain, including access to gender-disaggregated 
information, low budget literacy at the grass-roots level and the need to expand work to other 
sectors beyond health. 
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3.2. Inclusive processes 
In theory, social accountability initiatives are intended to be participatory, but not all 
explicitly include steps to ensure that marginalized and vulnerable groups are adequately 
represented. Ensuring that considerations of access, literacy, opportunity costs of 
participation and capacity to exercise voice without fear of reprisal are adequately taken into 
account is extremely important. The evidence on this type of intervention can be assessed in 
relation to three processes—information gathering, mobilization and engagement. 
 
First, most social accountability processes involve some form of information gathering, 
processing and dissemination. Yet, not all initiatives are designed to respond to the concerns 
of people who are marginalized. In Andhra Pradesh, a civil society initiative by an NGO 
called People’s Power to bring about accountability in public services through the 
preparation of citizen charters, with clearly laid-out service-level expectations and 
accompanying penalties for non-delivery, was successful in improving services in urban 
areas but not as successful in rural areas (Sirker and Cosic, 2007). The reasons for this might 
be that despite information campaigns and training, the rural population lacked the 
confidence and capacity to demand compensation for failures in services.  
 
In another example of community monitoring of an employment generation programme in 
India, the Government provided online information through an information management 
system. Beneficiaries of the programme, however, did not have access to computers and 
were unable to use the information for accountability until a grass-roots organization, the 
Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan, provided the information in a simplified form (painted on 
the walls of the local public office) (Sahgal, 2011). Although in these two cases the initiative 
began with government, civil society organizations were required to translate government 
initiatives into social accountability actions. Such translation and brokerage roles are 
frequently required, particularly when accessing excluded groups. 
 
Second, parallel to information processes are processes of community mobilization. As the 
experience with gender budgeting suggests, motivating women to participate in collective 
advocacy is not simple. In Mozambique, a UN Women project found that there were few 
public spaces for women to voice their opinions.8 Requiring a minimum percentage of 
women for quorums might be one solution, as was done in the Sirajganj Local Governance 
Development Fund in Bangladesh, which required that at least 30 per cent of project 
schemes should be prioritized by women. Even then, the documentation notes that 
increasing women’s participation continues to be a challenge (Sirker and Cosic, 2007).  
 
Third are processes of engagement with public agencies and other service providers. These 
form the core of accountability initiatives. In the literature, several experiences highlight 
how being inclusive in community engagement is critical for inclusive outcomes but also for 
the overall success of the social accountability initiative. For example, in their experimental 
research design on community monitoring of health care facilities in Uganda, Bjorkman and 
Svensson (2009) prevented elite capture in the monitoring process by inviting participants 
from different groups in society, particularly the marginalized (young, old, disabled, 
women, etc.), to the community meetings but then arranged separate focus group 
discussions with them to solicit their views and suggestions for improvements.  
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The need for different approaches to encourage marginalized groups to engage has emerged 
as a concern, and reforms have attempted to respond to this issue. For example, the technical 
nature of a budget analysis project undertaken by ActionAid in Nepal resulted in low levels 
of participation in meetings and presentations, particularly by vulnerable and marginalized 
groups, which reduced the project’s overall impact (Sirker and Cosic, 2007).  
 
In some cases, the social accountability process itself can generate inclusive demands 
through collective deliberation. In the Gemidiriya Community Development and Livelihood 
Improvement Project in Sri Lanka, the scorecard approach was used to improve 
accountability in two villages (Agarwal and Shah, 2007). Although the process was designed 
to ensure 50 per cent women’s participation, one of the issues communities raised was the 
need to ensure inclusiveness: Everyone in the village needed to be in a savings and credit 
group, and the poorest should be given more time to repay loans. In others, existing 
organizations representing marginalized groups can push for inclusion in official 
accountability processes, thus ‘claiming’ spaces for participation. For example, Uganda’s 
Minority Rights Group International used the African Peer Review Mechanism (Africa’s 
home-grown governance promotion and monitoring tool) to ensure that minority issues 
were represented in the Country Self-Assessment Report (Corrigan and Gruzd, 2010). 
 
3.3. Inclusive outcomes 
Although many social accountability initiatives target improvement in service delivery, their 
success has varied. As some authors suggest, one of the drawbacks of social accountability is 
that it has no ‘teeth’—no official sanctions can be imposed (see Jayal, 2008). Indeed, such 
initiatives are successful to the extent that they can either trigger official accountability 
mechanisms and related sanctions or, alternatively, rely on political and reputation costs to 
incentivize public officials and providers into changing their behaviour.  
 
Box 6: Social audits in Andhra Pradesh, India 
It is impressive that unlike most states in India, Andhra Pradesh has institutionalized social audits 
in its large employment generation programme, regularly conducted since 2006. Nonetheless, the 
performance of the state government could be improved through inclusiveness in the social audit 
process as well as in tracking outcomes. 
 
Aiyer et al. (2010) identify three reasons for the relative success. First, champions of social audits 
have been careful to engage throughout with front-line workers as well as elected representatives 
to assure them that the process is not intended to be a witch hunt. That the social audit process is 
headed by a senior bureaucrat gives it some credibility. Second, the social audits were rolled out 
slowly in stages, thus minimizing large-scale opposition. Third, because Andhra Pradesh had no 
prior history of social audits, the process caught potential opponents at the front line by surprise, 
leaving them few incentives and little time to mobilize. Aiyer et al. conclude that although the social 
audit programme has been successful in bringing poor implementation and corruption to light, it 
has been less successful in the actions taken on these issues, and grievance redress mechanisms are 
still quite weak. 
 
Additionally, there is little analysis of whether the audits have been inclusionary or have benefitted 
marginalized groups more. Singh and Vutukuru (2010) find that the employment generated has 
increased considerably in districts that have had social audits, and delays in payments have 
reduced. Although those seeking employment can be assumed to be the poorest households, there is 
nothing concrete to say about specific groups within the poorest—for example, did women benefit 
more, or did lower-caste members find work? Neither is there much information about whether 
marginalized groups participated and were heard in the social audit process. 
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This weak link between social accountability initiatives and outcomes is even more tenuous 
when looking at the impacts in terms of inclusiveness. In fact, the literature is relatively 
silent in mentioning the outcomes of social accountability in terms of their benefits for 
particular income groups. In some cases, such as community monitoring or community 
scorecards, the extent to which the impacts are inclusive depends upon the services under 
question (are they those that are largely used by vulnerable groups?) and the local context 
(are the communities homogeneous?).  
 
The available literature does offer a few glimpses of disaggregated outcomes, however. For 
example, community monitoring of health services in Uganda led to some outcomes that 
particularly benefitted the poor and marginalized, such as the posting of information about 
free services provided by health centres (Bjorkman and Svensson, 2009). In an examination 
of the impact of a community-based information campaign on a variety of educational 
outcomes in three Indian states, Pandey et al. (2009) found that the entitlements received by 
students in two states were greater among higher castes, including girl children from elite 
backgrounds, and suggest that caste factors influence individual or collective action. The 
most important lesson from the literature on inclusive outcomes is that disaggregated 
tracking of outcomes needs to be built into projects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
4. Social inclusion initiatives and social accountability 
 
The portfolio of social inclusion initiatives in developing countries is vast. It would be 
beyond the scope of this chapter to review the whole range of experiences for their 
intersections with social accountability. What is attempted in this section is to give a flavour 
of the kinds of impacts that can be expected and some supporting illustrations. Thus, four 
routes of possible impact are highlighted: i) broad participatory initiatives, ii) civil society 
Box 7: Citizen-led accountability in East Africa 
Twaweza (We can make it happen) is an interesting citizen-led initiative. It started in 2009 in East 
Africa to trigger social action by enhancing citizen agency (for details, see www.twaweza.org). The 
goals are to i) provide information, ii) enhance citizen agency and iii) ultimately improve basic 
services. There are four steps towards these goals in terms of citizen engagement: to know and 
understand, to monitor existing services, to exercise voice and to take action. One of the most 
important aspects of Twaweza’s work is to make information on service delivery levels and processes 
available to citizens and generate public pressure on institutions through the media and citizen action. 
 
Although the initiative is fairly new and has not yet been evaluated on whether it has improved 
services, there are several anecdotal reports suggesting that its strategy is having some impact.  But 
there are also some issues that might affect an evaluation of its impact. Because of the broad and 
flexible strategy it uses, including partnering with relevant, like-minded institutions, its interventions 
are not easily comparable. Thus, counterfactuals are not easy to identify. In addition, there is difficulty 
in using experimental designs for evaluation because Twaweza’s work is “designed for seamless 
integration into the logic of everyday life, the ongoing quotidian events and practices of those already 
working within” (Kell, 2010, p. 10). The problem for evaluations, particularly regarding attribution 
versus contribution in such initiatives, is difficult to resolve. This is evident from the experiences of 
HakiElimu (a civil society organization also based in Tanzania whose work focuses on education), 
which Twaweza draws upon. While HakiElimu appears to have made some impact on the education 
system (such as improved teacher–pupil ratios), it has done so through a range of strategies, including 
budget analysis, research, media dissemination, policy analysis, monitoring and advocacy (IBP, 2008). 
This makes it difficult to separate out the impact of social accountability from the other strategies. 
Further, the project documentation does not explicitly aim to track disaggregated outcomes by 
different social and economic groups. 
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organization-led targeted inclusion that focuses on governance, iii) state-led inclusion 
initiatives that lead to social accountability and iv) other inclusion initiatives that might 
trigger accountability in the long run.  
 
4.1. Broadly inclusive participatory initiatives 
Over the past two decades throughout the world, there have been several institutionalized 
initiatives to make governance more participatory, more broadly inclusive and that give 
ordinary citizens a route for direct participation in the exercise of public authority (Cornwall 
and Coelho, 2006). Many of these examples are famous—the participatory budgeting 
experience in Porto Alegre, Brazil, participatory decentralized planning in Kerala, India, 
participatory governance councils in Brazil and popular participation in Bolivia. These 
inclusion initiatives have changed the landscape of how citizens and communities interact 
with governments and the ways in which they can directly engage in decisions that affect 
their lives. With a few exceptions (Box 8), however, these initiatives target inclusion broadly 
and there is a need for more carefully focused research to examine their impact on different 
groups within a society. 
 
There are two critical questions about these broad inclusive initiatives: Who is currently 
allowed to represent communities in institutionalized participatory spaces? And what steps 
must be taken to ensure that marginalized groups have adequate and appropriate 
representation? (Gurza-Lavalle et al., 2005).  
 
4.2. Civil society-led targeted inclusion initiatives 
There are many civil society-led specific inclusion initiatives that target governance and 
accountability, with a focus on citizens’ rights in service delivery. For example, a civil society 
campaign in India mobilized dalits (the so-called ‘untouchables’ in the Hindu caste system) 
to claim their rights from local governance institutions by presenting evidence of injustice to 
Special Justice Committees. Although it brought about more access to services for dalits, it 
was less successful in securing equal treatment or fighting harassment (Mohanty, 2010).  
 
Mohanty (2010) argues that local government institutions “restrict dalit imagination to 
development issues”, thus making them reluctant to take on issues of social discrimination 
or dignity. In Bangladesh, the women’s organization, Nijera Kori, focused its work on 
mobilizing the very poor, particularly women in rural areas, through a holistic approach, 
especially by disseminating information about rights (Kabeer, 2005). They have been 
successful in winning cases on land rights and improved wages and working conditions for 
members. Another women’s group in Bangladesh, Naripokkho, worked with young girls 
who were victims of acid attacks and was successful in restoring confidence in the girls 
(Huq, 2005), which was necessary in order for them to articulate their demands for better 
health services, financial subsidies, schooling and legal assistance. The work of Naripokkho 
led to several policy changes related to such attacks and reinforced accountability of the 
police in investigation of these crimes. 
 
In Afghanistan, the NGO, Humanitarian Assistance for Women of Afghanistan, specifically 
targets widows, helps them build networks and associations and educates them on their 
rights (CARE, 2010). As a result, around 9,000 widows have been organized and have 
challenged warlords on such issues as their rights to land and services and forced marriages. 
The literature indicates that empowerment groups often draw on social accountability tools 
(without being explicit) to pursue their advocacy agendas. 
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Other cases in the literature show how attempts to gain political rights and recognition can 
lead to accountability demands for basic services. In Chiapas, Mexico, for example, a 
movement for recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights focused on the political equality of 
women, but it was with the growth of artisan collectives that women started to gain access 
to health and social security services (Ruiz, 2005). The collectives enabled women to 
transform what had previously been perceived as individual issues into collective ones.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3. State-led inclusion initiatives that foster social accountability 
There are very few examples of state-led social inclusion initiatives targeting particular 
groups that have resulted in social accountability demands on the state. In many of these 
cases, the extent to which the initiatives led to social accountability demands depended on 
the way in which the new institutions interacted with civil society actors. For example, the 
Parliamentary Oversight Committee on the HIV and AIDS pandemic in Mozambique 
defined its work as one of assessing the situation in various parts of the country through 
extensive field visits and engagement with those affected (Meneses, 2010). By establishing 
the credibility of this process, those living with HIV were emboldened to come forward and 
report poor implementation of programmes and demand accountability. Relatively 
independent state agencies created to focus on expanding the rights of the marginalized can 
do this, although documentation of such examples is rare; this is an area in which rigorous, 
in-depth, long-term research can provide fruitful insights for accountability and inclusion 
work.  
 
4.4. Inclusion initiatives that lead to accountability demands 
Many social inclusion initiatives tend to focus on improving the livelihoods of particular 
groups. For example, microcredit programmes typically target women and employment 
generation programmes target particular communities (such as rag pickers). A participatory 
research project on natural resources with Mexico’s native communities led to a 
strengthening of accountability demands tied to locally based watershed management (Pare 
and Robles, 2010). Even though this chapter has not exhaustively reviewed all the literature 
on such initiatives, for the most part, many are not reported as targeted to strengthening 
accountability relationships with the state.  
 
Box 8: Law of Popular Participation in Bolivia 
The Popular Participation Law of 1993 in Bolivia attempted to decentralize power to the local level, 
where citizens would participate directly in governance. Citizens could directly elect members for the 
governing councils and also for the Vigilance Committees, which were tasked with preparing 
investment plans and overseeing their implementation. Although the overall programme was 
intended to increase participation for all people, it did empower indigenous groups who had, till then, 
not been part of the governance structures. The law accomplished three things that are relevant for 
inclusion: First, the number of elected positions rose from less than 300 to more than 2,900, offering 
opportunities to indigenous and marginalized groups for the first time to hold public office. Research 
found that people from the poorest quintile were elected as often as the richest, and the poorest 
municipalities were more likely to spend money on basic public services, such as health and 
education, that helped the most vulnerable (Grootaert and Narayan, 2004). Second, previously 
unrecognized traditional organizations were given official status in the form of Grassroots Territorial 
Organizations. And finally, the Vigilance Committees were given veto powers over municipal budgets, 
providing a degree of accountability to the grass-roots structures. In places dominated by indigenous 
groups, the planning reflected their own priorities and they gained a voice in governance (Kohl, 
2003). 
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5.  Lessons and implications 
 
The literature reviewed here suggests some general lessons for social accountability 
initiatives as well as specific lessons for such initiatives to be inclusive. 
 
From the point of view of social inclusion, several lessons emerge. First, social accountability 
mechanisms are not automatically inclusive, although the rhetoric implies that they would 
be. Even though the genesis of social accountability is typically a concern with the 
marginalized, initiatives rarely track disaggregated outcomes. As in all development 
programmes, successful accountability demands may benefit those who are better off more 
and may exclude already marginalized groups, thus exacerbating social inequalities. Explicit 
efforts must link social accountability mechanisms to the needs of the excluded and include 
them in social accountability processes so that outcomes benefit the most vulnerable and 
marginalized.  
 
Second and following from the previous point, social accountability demands that are 
targeted specifically towards marginalized groups are more likely to be inclusive. Gender 
budgeting and gender budget analysis aimed at the empowerment of poor women is a good 
example of such targeting. Yet, such targeting might be difficult, especially in cases in which 
there are no specific official targets in policy or accepted social norms and expectations. 
Disaggregated information is often not collected or is difficult to access. Additionally, 
narrow targeting of specific social groups might also alienate others from participating. 
Overcoming these constraints will shape whether social accountability initiatives end up 
inclusive.  
 
Third, a promising entry point is to target social accountability processes (information 
gathering, mobilization and engagement) to be inclusive by explicitly tailoring processes to 
match the capacities of excluded groups. For example, meetings can be arranged during 
times when women are able to attend, at locations that are easier for the disabled or use 
illustrations and enactments for illiterate populations. Identifying the constraints that 
excluded groups experience and redressing them is essential for enabling inclusive social 
accountability processes.  
 
Fourth, most social inclusion initiatives generally do not explicitly seek to improve capacity 
for demanding accountability, although they are concerned with having the voices of the 
marginalized heard. More explicit effort to make accountability demands one of the 
elements of their mandate could help to build more synergies between empowerment and 
accountability processes. For example, livelihood projects for indigenous groups can spread 
information about work-related rights and entitlements as part of the project, encouraging 
both monitoring and accountability.  
 
More generally, a review of the evidence suggests some general lessons for all social 
accountability initiatives, whether inclusion is an objective or not. First, successful social 
accountability seems to require working with both governments as well as societal groups. 
On the one hand, social accountability is intended to change the behaviour of public 
officials—in order to respond, they need to have adequate capacities as well as resources. 
Otherwise, social accountability demands will lead to frustration and, in the worst case, 
reprisal. On the other hand, citizen groups need to build their capacities to engage with 
public officials to demand accountability. As Sirker and Cosic (2007) point out, successful 
initiatives concentrated on both sides of the equation—initiatives were designed and 
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implemented with a degree of citizen and public provider involvement through credible 
platforms. 
 
Second, credible information (if possible, in disaggregated form) is essential (but not 
sufficient, see Fox, 2007) for social accountability to work. In most of the examples reviewed 
here, part of the social accountability initiative was to gather information that was accepted 
as credible by all stakeholders. Sometimes this requires alliances with reformists within the 
government; at other times, initiatives work with perceptions, as in the case of citizen report 
cards or community scorecards.  
 
Third, social accountability requires an engaged citizenry. Lack of participation by 
communities or particular groups may hinder accountability efforts. Whether or not people 
participate depends upon a range of factors, including trust in outcomes, fear of reprisal and 
past history of interactions with state institutions, which will vary by context. Building 
capacity for participation and mobilization is an essential element of social accountability 
work.  
 
Fourth, sustainability of initiatives is particularly an issue when the drivers of social 
accountability are external actors, as witnessed in the social audits in health care 
programmes in Pakistan (Sirker and Cosic, 2007, p. 43). Organically rooted efforts are more 
likely to be sustained in the long run. Working ‘with the grain’ of local institutions and 
organizations leads to the rooting of initiatives in local processes, and such initiatives are 
more likely to outlive the project cycle.  
 
What do these lessons mean for how UNDP works? A major strength of UNDP is that it 
works with governments to strengthen democratic processes. It can leverage its history of 
engagement with states to create credible platforms for the exchange of information as well 
as engagement with civil society organizations working on social accountability. Ensuring 
that inclusiveness is institutionally locked into social accountability projects from the outset 
should be an essential element.9  
 
A critical challenge for UNDP is to re-orient its governance and social accountability work to 
have more of a social inclusion focus. The current state of the art, as reviewed in this chapter, 
suggests that although both social accountability and social inclusion are complementary, 
there are only a few efforts that explicitly aim to target and measure both objectives. The 
potential for new approaches that build on synergies is quite high. To see how this might be 
done, it would be useful to see the extent to which other donors have integrated such a 
perspective. 
 
Social accountability work has largely been accepted as a way of improving good 
governance for most bilateral and multilateral donor agencies. The World Bank, for 
example, has been promoting social accountability work for more than a decade, under the 
broader label of ‘demand for good governance’. DFID has been working to empower civil 
society organizations through its Governance and Transparency Fund, with a built-in 
process for monitoring impacts. Other donors have a range of similar directly or indirectly 
funded programmes. Yet, as pointed out earlier, there is an urgent need to explore the 
conditions under which social accountability initiatives work, are inclusive and sustainable.  
 
Social inclusion work has been less obviously integrated with an explicit social 
accountability focus, although implicitly it is also connected to rights. Many donors are 
including social accountability activities in their social inclusion programming, but they are 
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not necessarily doing so in a consistent fashion. There is some ambiguity as to whether 
social inclusion work is a means to poverty reduction or an end in itself. There also seems to 
be some tension between including groups in the processes of policy formulation and 
project design and ensuring inclusion of particular groups in the benefits of particular 
policies (Meija Acosta, 2010a). For example, although the Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency does not have an explicit policy on social inclusion, DFID 
has an explicit policy statement defining social exclusion as a process by which “certain 
groups are systematically disadvantaged because they are discriminated against on the basis 
of their ethnicity, race, religion, sexual orientation, caste, descent, gender, age, disability, 
HIV status, migrant status or where they live” (DFID, 2005). 
 
The challenge that arises from not having an explicit policy towards social inclusion is that if 
it is too broadly defined, it can be understood differently within the organization. Moreover, 
operational guidance is missing for consistent translation into projects and programmes or 
tracking performance on social inclusion over time. An exception is the DFID Gender and 
Social Exclusion Analytical Tool that is used to assess programmes for their inclusion 
impacts.10 The use of such tools in programming can help bring the social accountability and 
social inclusion agendas together. An example of such use is the DFID Protection of Basic 
Services II Programme in Ethiopia, which included a Social Inclusion and Gender Annex in 
the memorandum of understanding and incorporated social accountability pilots into its 
design, with the intention of improving more effective, efficient, responsive and accountable 
public service delivery for marginalized groups (particularly women) (DFID, 2010). This 
experience suggests that UNDP could explore an explicit policy of tracking social inclusion 
in governance and accountability projects. 
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Conclusions  
Reflections on social accountability 
 
In the coming months, development actors around the globe will reflect on what has worked 
well in supporting Millennium Development Goal achievement and what lessons can be 
incorporated into the design of the post-2015 development framework to ensure a more 
equitable and sustainable future for all. UNDP and others should ensure that experiences to 
date with social accountability initiatives are drawn upon, not only to help improve service 
delivery and support progress towards the MDGs but also to support the realization of 
people’s expressed desire for governing institutions that are responsive and accountable to 
those they are designed to serve.  
     
This paper is a contribution to that reflection process, focused on insights and important 
lessons from recent experiences and good practices in social accountability work. Five 
lessons that cut across the paper’s four themes are presented in this brief conclusion. 
 
1. Social accountability initiatives supplement other existing 
mechanisms 
 
As noted previously, one of the criticisms often levelled against social accountability 
mechanisms is that they lack the ‘teeth’ necessary to sanction governments for failures. The 
insights offered in this paper illustrate that it is not the accountability mechanisms 
themselves that are important but, rather, it is how such interventions can enhance and 
supplement existing accountability mechanisms. Indeed, social accountability mechanisms 
act symbiotically with already existing horizontal and vertical mechanisms.  
 
Many social accountability initiatives collect, digest and repackage information in such a 
way that it is accessible and useful to citizens or the media and can be used to hold 
governments to account. Civil society has an important role as an information intermediary 
or bridge between the government and people, empowering them with the data with which 
they can use to exercise their rights. Information and communication technology is not the 
central part of the process, but it can empower citizens in new ways with the information 
needed to engage in existing processes. Therefore, it is important to see social accountability 
mechanisms—and the tools they use, such as communication technology—as one important 
element in the relationships between citizens and their governments. Programmes should 
thus be designed in light of the wider horizontal and vertical accountability mechanisms 
that may already exist. 
 
2. Work at the same time on both sides of the equation 
 
Another important insight is that initiatives that work simultaneously on building capability 
and responsiveness in government and on building capacities for collective action within 
civil society stand a better chance of achieving improved accountability. Social 
accountability efforts are most effective when stakeholders are engaged in the beginning, 
middle and end of planning processes.  
 
Social accountability interventions at the local level require capacity development, not just 
for communities and individuals engaged in monitoring but also with subnational officials 
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who must be willing and incentivized to create space for enhanced participation by 
communities. At this level, it is important to analyse the incentives that local officials may 
have for accountability and to understand the lines of accountability that may run upward 
to central government and also outward to communities. Local officials must have the 
financial and human resources and capacities to respond to community demands if they are 
to be held accountable for delivery. An important lesson is to be aware that new 
mechanisms of social accountability may threaten existing structures of power and thus 
place government bureaucrats under pressure not to comply with public demands. These 
pressures must be understood in a programme’s design.  
 
Particularly in low-income and conflicted-affected countries, civil society can act as an 
intermediary institution in contexts in which government institutions (especially local 
governments) are weak and unable to engage directly with citizens. But sustaining 
community-level involvement will require evidence that their participation has resulted in 
better impacts or – at a minimum – that their views are taken into account. Capacity 
development is therefore critical for both civil society and for local administrators; and over 
time, public administration reform must also include the allocation of sufficient resources to 
local administrators, given the demands of citizens for them to deliver. This suggests that 
efforts to support the state’s capacity at the local level are central to creating the conditions 
in which civil society can contribute to their accountability. 
 
Additionally, there can be important roles for informal institutions, such as indigenous, non-
state or traditional leaders, to engage communities in which the state is weak or historically 
perceived as illegitimate. Engaging informal institutions allows for local or historical 
accountability mechanisms to work. Although social accountability initiatives should build 
in participation and engagement of such leaders, at the same time it is important that the 
selection of monitors or participants goes beyond engagement with informal leaders and 
instead directly engages community members as participants in the monitoring and 
measuring of state performance or at least involved in the selection of those who will carry 
out such tasks.  
 
3. Special considerations are needed for conflict-affected 
countries 
 
Social accountability in the immediate post-conflict period is critical for two reasons. First, as 
essential security sector reform unfolds and demobilization, disarmament and reintegration 
are implemented, citizen monitoring, engagement and participation are critical for the 
legitimacy of the reform process. Second, civil society engagement with the state on issues of 
service delivery in education, health, water and sanitation and in employment creation can 
offer ways to develop politically more neutral ground on which to facilitate social inclusion 
and to create new institutions and processes of oversight of the allocation and delivery of 
basic services.  
 
Recent research has reaffirmed the importance of the use of public dialogues in deeply 
divided societies as a participatory and inclusive way to overcome historical divisions, 
identify points of common interest and vision and promote a culture of participatory 
democracy. Importantly, the inclusivity of such dialogues can foster participation of a 
country’s most vulnerable groups, reinforcing the view that peaceful resolution of conflict 
and collaboration across historical lines of division is possible and constructive. At the same 
time, dialogue cannot be forced. Preliminary work to prepare for dialogue processes 
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involves careful selection of the right national facilitators who are widely regarded for 
integrity and reputation, who can create formal and informal spaces for discussion, who can 
articulate awareness about the essence of dialogue and who can manage expectations about 
what dialogue processes can achieve. 
 
Successful implementation of social accountability initiatives in post-conflict countries 
requires a close assessment of the underlying drivers of conflict and of the ways in which 
the effects of conflict on civil society can be overcome, avoided or redirected. It needs 
flexible and innovative programming that seeks to address drivers of fragility through a 
variety of tools that span the spectrum, from information gathering to transparency 
initiatives and in creating spaces for direct citizen participation. At the same time, close 
assessment of the bridging contributions of civil society across lines of conflict is critical in 
finding partners for implementation; cross-cutting civil society organizations may be weak, 
but for sustainable peace, it is critical in the long-term to support economic integration and 
social ties that cut across identity lines.  
 
Supporting social accountability in post-conflict countries often means investing in social 
empowerment and facilitating the participation of marginalized or historically 
disadvantaged groups, including by facilitating access to information and forums through 
which such information can be contextually interpreted. 
  
4. Inclusion needs an explicit focus                                             
 
This report has provided insights on the importance of inclusion in social accountability 
initiatives. Many assessments that examine the progress towards the MDGs unfortunately 
use macro-level statistics that tend to suffer from the ‘tyranny of averages’ and hide pockets 
of exclusion and inequalities that are buried within the gross indicators. For inclusive 
progress on the MDGs, an important lesson is to look beyond the national data and 
determine where the most marginalized groups are located and then ensure that steps are 
taken to encourage their participation, including through social accountability initiatives.  
 
Due to the multiple complex variables at play, research on the outcomes achieved by social 
accountability initiatives generally is weak at best, making attribution difficult. The research 
suggests an even weaker link between the examining of outcomes of social accountability 
initiatives and the impacts in terms of inclusiveness. In fact, although there have been some 
examples of disaggregated outcomes data, the literature thus far is relatively silent about the 
outcomes of social accountability in terms of their benefits for particular income groups. In 
the case of some social accountability initiatives (such as community monitoring or 
community scorecards), the extent to which the impacts are inclusive depends upon the 
services under question (are they those that are largely used by vulnerable groups?) and the 
local context (are the communities homogeneous?). Thus, an important lesson is that 
disaggregated tracking of outcomes needs to be built into future programmes from the 
outset. 
 
As discussed in the preceding chapters, social accountability mechanisms are not 
automatically inclusive—although the rhetoric often implies that they are. And even though 
the genesis of social accountability initiatives is usually a concern for people who are 
marginalized, such initiatives rarely track disaggregated outcomes. As in all development 
programmes, successful demands for accountability may benefit people who are better off 
more and may exclude already marginalized groups, thus actually exacerbating social 
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inequalities. There is therefore a need to explicitly target social accountability mechanisms to 
the needs of the excluded and to include them in social accountability processes so that 
outcomes benefit the most vulnerable and marginalized. This is a constant and easily 
overlooked challenge, but it is crucial to link social accountability initiatives to the 
inequalities that threaten progress towards the MDGs. One way to support such an 
approach is to provide operational guidance to ensure a consistent emphasis on inclusion in 
projects and programmes, including tracking performance on social inclusion over time. The 
DFID Gender and Social Exclusion Analytical Tool (2010), which is used to assess 
programmes for their inclusion impacts, is a good example of how this may be done.  
 
Particular attention to inclusion is also needed in certain programming areas. For example, 
when international actors are supporting decentralization processes, they should ensure that 
checks and balances exist at the subnational levels so that benefits and decision-making 
under devolution processes do not become controlled by local elites. To address this 
tendency, strong local political capital and organizational capacity-building can help local 
people by enabling them to mobilize resources and negotiate better benefits. UNDP and 
other international actors can help to focus decentralization policy and social accountability 
tools on local interests. Fundamental here is diligence in ensuring that due process with 
meaningful participation by local interests is integrated early into the policy development 
process.  
 
Similarly, international actors should continue to strengthen their gender perspective in 
programming. Analyses carried out for the MDG Gap Task Force suggest that the biggest 
risk to MDG attainment is the failure to respond to the urgency of gender-based 
programming. Equitable development is central to the concepts of social accountability, and 
many initiatives have approached gender equality and women's empowerment both directly 
and indirectly. Some, such as gender budgeting projects, have the problem of gender 
inequality at the heart of their accountability campaigns and agendas. Other initiatives have 
supported the presence, autonomy and capacity of women's organizations in civil society. It 
is the centrality of gender equality, both to attaining the MDGs and to principles of social 
accountability, that makes taking a gendered perspective necessary for good practice. An 
essential element of this is redressing the lack of sex-disaggregated data in many countries 
and at many levels, which inhibits effective gender-based analyses and policy planning. Sex-
disaggregated data (and other gender-based information) should be built into the 
programming of social inclusion and governance and accountability projects from the 
outset. Donors and others should also further support efforts by local and national 
government agencies to incorporate sex-disaggregated data and gender information into 
their regular reporting.  
 
5. A rights-based approach to social accountability is highly 
important 
 
A final key insight is the importance of considering a more explicit rights-based approach 
that can even further enhance social accountability initiatives. The concept of accountability 
is at the core of both democratic, rights-based governance and equitable human 
development. These chapters have discussed how most transparency and accountability 
work is couched in the language of rights, such as the right to information or the right to 
carry out social audits on the use of public funds. Simultaneously, many social inclusion 
movements are also framed in the language of rights, such as children’s rights or the rights 
of indigenous people.  
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According to Jochnick (2001), the real potential of human rights lies in its ability to change 
the way people perceive themselves and are perceived by government or donors. Instead of 
talking about ‘beneficiaries with needs’ or ‘consumers with choice’, the rights-based 
approach speaks of ‘citizens with rights’. With this perspective, people are seen as active 
subjects in the political sphere and not objects of pity, charity or the benevolent intervention 
of government programmes or passive choosers in the marketplace (Tumukwasibwe, 2010).  
 
Another important value of the rights-based approach is its emphasis on the expressed and 
active link between economic policies and development and the law. This entails three core 
features. First, it means that projects should use the language of rights explicitly by making 
direct reference to the national, regional and international human rights instruments to 
which the country is a party. Second, it means empowering citizens to pursue the legal 
defence of their rights through accessible, transparent and effective accountability 
mechanisms—be they judicial, quasi-judicial, administrative or political (UNHCR, 2004). 
Third, in terms of poverty reduction policies to achieve the MDGs, it means that people’s 
participation and empowerment, affirmative action in favour of the most poor and 
vulnerable and the accountability of duty-holders should be institutionalized in law and not 
left to the goodwill of duty-bearers. Such an approach can create a fundamental shift in 
thinking and action by inviting citizens to become active in paying more critical attention to 
the systemic, institutional and political factors determining inequalities in access to public 
goods and services (Hawkins et al., 2005; Offenheiser and Holcombe, 2003). 
 
One problem identified in this paper has been the limits to the community scorecard 
approach, particularly when most of the decisions that affect the achievement of poverty 
reduction strategy goals—such as fiscal, monetary and financial policies—are not open for 
discussion with civil society or are not amenable to direct citizen rating via the scorecard 
tool (chapter 2). Other factors may ultimately constrain the impact of social accountability 
initiatives, such as the level of aid dependency and donor conditionality. On the one hand, it 
has been repeatedly observed that national ownership of the MDGs is critical to their 
attainment and strenuous efforts have been made to connect the MDGs to national poverty 
reduction strategy planning processes and to increase civil society opportunities to 
participate in those processes. On the other hand, certain economic policy conditions 
attached to aid by donors can sometimes mean that national governments have restricted 
freedom to make their own policy choices, which can in turn undermine their accountability 
towards their own citizens. 
 
To address this constraint, Balakrishnan and Elson (2008) and Balakrishnan and Heintz 
(2010) advocate that social accountability initiatives should go beyond budget tracking and 
even participatory budgeting initiatives and undertake ‘economic policy audits’ to broaden 
public debates about economic policy conditions attached to international support (such as 
that from the international finance institutions), using a legal analysis stemming from a 
rights-based framework. Such policy audits could be tools for raising awareness about 
policy alternatives by using a rights-based approach to integrate macroeconomic policies 
with human rights. With such an approach, citizens can identify which international human 
rights agreements their country has already committed to and which national constitutional 
rights might be violated, compromised or contradicted by economic policies attached as 
conditions by international programmes.  
 
For example, enacting deep cuts in public spending may constitute a violation of a 
government’s commitments under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
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Cultural Rights. Currently, 160 countries have made concrete obligations to ensure the 
realization of economic, social and cultural rights, with such obligations enshrined in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in a number of human rights treaties at the 
regional and global levels. As part of such obligations, parties to the Covenant and other 
treaties have committed themselves to achieving progressively the full realization of these 
rights by using the “maximum of available resources” (Balakrishnan et al., 2011). Although 
the Covenant did not specify exactly what the maximum available resources means in 
practice, several UN Special Rapporteurs and Independent Experts have attempted to define 
more precisely certain economic policies that are important for supporting the Covenant’s 
principles of progressive realization of rights and avoiding retrogression on fulfilling such 
rights for citizens. Undertaking policy audits to review policy choices and their impacts 
would mark a deepening of social accountability initiatives beyond poverty reduction and 
budget issues and could help influence national economic policies with a human rights-
based approach.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
110 | United Nations Development Programme 
 
Notes 
 
Introduction 
 
1. See www.un.org/en/mdg/summit2010/pdf/mdg%20outcome%20document.pdf 
2. Adapted from R. Nierras. Social accountability and child rights. Governance, Social Accountability 
and Children’s Rights: A Report on the Learning Event of Plan UK’s Meeting of Governance Coordinators 
and Advisors (London, Plan UK, 2010). 
3. “A Red Flag for the Post-2015 High-Level Panel”, drafted during the Bonn civil society 
conference, "Advancing the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda: Reconfirming Rights, 
Recognizing Limits, Redefining Goals" held in Bonn, Germany from 20-22 March 2013. 
 
Chapter 1: Social accountability and information and communications technology 
 
1. The literature review turned up no examples of the fourth, which capture the use of digital 
technology to bypass state and capitalist structures completely as an autonomist Marxist digital 
democracy. 
2. See www.opengovpartnership.org/open-government-declaration 
3. See www.egov4dev.org/transparency/case/indonesiatender.shtml. See for the other examples: 
Transparency International Pakistan and Greater Karachi Water Supply Scheme, “Integrity Pact: 
A Pakistan Success Story” (Karachi, 2003, p. 5), cited in Panos, 2007, p. 15. 
4. See http://transparency.globalvoicesonline.org/projects/all  
5. The Transparency for Technology Network: Excelencias in Brazil; Mam Prawo Wiedziec in 
Poland; Mzazendo, in Kenya; Kohovolit, Czech Republic; Jagoree in Bangladesh; ADR India; 
Congreso Visible, in Mexico; and Kepmutatas in Hungary. 
6. See http://twaweza.org/go/trac-fm--citizens-keeping-an-eye-through-radio-and-sms 
7. See http://cgnetswara.org/ 
8. See http://wougnet.org/ 
9. See http://getindaba.org/about/ 
10. See http://transparency.globalvoicesonline.org/project/penang-watch 
11. Section 4(1) of the Right to Information Act states: “Every public authority shall maintain all its 
records duly catalogued and indexed in a manner and the form which facilitates the right to 
information under this Act and ensure that all records that are appropriate to be computerised 
are, within a reasonable time and subject to availability of resources, computerised and connected 
through a network all over the country on different systems so that access to such records is 
facilitated.” 
 
Chapter 2: Social accountability in the context of urbanization 
 
1. Many official government poverty lines and the dollar-a-day poverty line enormously understate 
the scale and depth of poverty in locations where the costs of non-food needs are particularly 
high in most cities. This is because they make inadequate provision for the high costs that most 
low-income urban dwellers face, including rent for their accommodation, water (often purchased 
from kiosks or vendors at prices much higher than for those with piped connections), sanitation 
(especially the costs of using public toilets for those without a toilet in their home), health care, 
transport (many live in peripheral areas far from income-earning opportunities), fuel and keeping 
their children in school (often expensive due to the expense of school uniforms, books, meals and 
payments requested by teachers; it is also common for them to have to pay for private school 
because they cannot enrol their children into a government school). See Mitlin and Satterthwaite, 
2012. 
2. See the April 2012 issue of Environment and Urbanization, which has 11 papers on mapping, 
enumerating and surveying informal settlements and cities. 
 
 
Reflections on Social Accountability 111 
 
3. The indicator chosen in relation to income is the $1 a day poverty line, which, as noted earlier, is 
very inappropriate for most cities because the costs of meeting essential non-food needs are much 
higher than this. There is also the problem that a large proportion of those who have the lowest 
incomes also have to pay high prices for private services (school, health care, water supply, access 
to toilets) because they receive no public services. 
4. Quoted in Michaela Hordijk, Participatory governance in Peru: exercising citizenship. 
Environment and Urbanization, vol. 17, No. 1 (2005).  
5. See www.adb.org/water/actions/ind/bangalore-slums.asp 
6. See www.kara.or.ke for more details. 
7. Hasan, 2007; see also www.urckarachi.org/Home.HTM 
8. See www.sdinet.org/ 
9. See Bhan, 2009 and Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1989; see also the many publications by the Centre 
on Housing Rights and Evictions. 
10. For more details of the work of these organizations and federations and their international 
umbrella groups, see Satterthwaite et al., 2011.  
11. See www.sdinet.org/ 
12. See the April 2012 issue of Environment and Urbanization; see also Appadurai, 2012. 
13. See www.sdinet.org/ 
14. Social accountability measures applied to provision for water and sanitation often increase 
the quality of provision within households that were already classified as having ‘improved’ 
provision before this improvement. 
 
Chapter 3: Social accountability in conflict-affected countries 
 
1. According to Themnér and Wallensteen, “An armed conflict is defined as a contested 
incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force 
between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year. Of these two parties, at 
least one has to be the government of a state. For an intra-state conflict, the location is a country. 
For an inter-state conflict, it is two or more countries. Several countries (notably India) have 
several separate conflicts going on at the same time, fought over different incompatibilities, which 
is why the number of conflicts exceeds the number of locations.”  
2. Although there is no single, accepted definition of ‘fragility’ in the policy or academic 
communities, a common definition is the one reflected in the dialogue process between the 
OECD-DAC donors and beneficiary states in efforts to harmonize and coordinate aid flows in 
post-conflict contexts: “states are fragile when state structures lack political will and/or capacity 
to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the 
security and human rights of their populations.” See OECD-DAC, 2007. The 2010 Dili Declaration 
refers to countries and regions experiencing conflict fragility. See ‘The Dili Declaration: A New 
Vision for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding: International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and 
Statebuilding’, Dili Conference April 9-10, 2010. Available from 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/30/44927821.pdf. For further information on the definitional and 
typological aspects of the fragility term, see chapter 1, ‘Understanding Fragile States’ of the 
Governance and Social Development Resource Centre Resource Guide on fragile States, available 
from www.gsdrc.org/index.cfm?objectid=4D340CFC-14C2-620A-27176CB3C957CE79. 
3. See the New Deal available from  
www.oecd.org/document/22/0,3746,en_21571361_43407692_49151766_1_1_1_1,00.html.  
4. The 2009 Secretary-General’s Report on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict finds: 
“The immediate post-conflict period offers a window of opportunity to provide basic security, 
deliver peace dividends, shore up and build confidence in the political process, and strengthen 
core national capacity to lead peace building efforts. If countries succeed in these core areas early 
on, it substantially increases the chances for sustainable peace — and reduces the risk of relapse 
into conflict.” (para. 3). 
5. For the approach to state capacity development taken in Liberia, in partnership with the 
government of Liberia, see the 2008-2012 Country Programme Action Plan from 
www.lr.undp.org/Documents/RecentPublic/Final%20CPAP-signed.pdf. 
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6. A prevailing view is that “standard models for building state accountability by strengthening the 
voice of citizens to make demands, or providing citizens with choice over state services, do not 
work for women, as their access to public spaces to express voice, and to the market to exercise 
choice, is mediated by men. However, evidence shows that initiatives designed specifically to 
strengthen the voice of women and create a constituency that demands gender equality can help 
build state accountability to women, as can the inclusion of women at all levels of decision-
making”. See the report of the seminar ‘Strengthening Women’s Citizenship in the Context of 
state building, FRIDE (2008); the quotation is from page 4. 
7. Collier (2009) argues that “that the classic process by which effective and accountable states have 
been forged has not been followed by the many small, low-income countries that suddenly found 
themselves independent following decolonization. Instead, some of them have structural 
characteristics which make it extremely difficult for them to supply the public meta-goods of 
security and accountability without which economic development is liable to be frustrated”. 
8. On implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, see Report of the 
Secretary-General, 2010, Women’s Participation in Peace building, 7 September, A/65/354-
S/2010/466. For analysis of the impact of conflict on women and girls, see the 2003 Bridge report 
Gender and Armed Conflict, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton. Available from  
http://www.bridge.ids.ac.uk/reports/CEP-Conflict-Report.pdf. 
9. Conflict and acute fragility creates the economic and social conditions for stagnation (or, in the 
worst instances, reversals) in development gains in the midst of a vicious cycle of economic 
contraction, capital flight, unemployment and inability to access local or global markets, 
perpetuating and deepening conditions of chronic poverty. See the research of the Chronic 
Poverty Research Center Policy, 2010; see also Collier et al., 2003.  
10. The UNDP BCPR report (2008) on economic recovery in post-conflict environments highlights the 
critical need for investing in state accountability. It reports that while international actors, such as 
peacekeeping missions or technical assistance by civilians can substitute for national capacities to 
govern, “in the longer term.. there can be substitute for the state in post-conflict recovery. The 
sustainability of economic recovery and peace depends on the restoration of a legitimate, 
effective, and accountable state”.  
11. On the state’s responsibility to protect and its relationship to state capacity development, see 
Chapter 5, The Responsibility to Rebuild, in the final report of International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001), The Responsibility to Protect, December, available at 
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf.  
12. For consideration of crowdsourcing and interactive mapping in fragile states, see Bott et al., 2012.   
13. Ibid. 
14. For the use of new ICT in application by UNDP to crisis prevention and recovery, see UNDP, 
2012b, pp. 30-32.  
15. The dimensions of accountability are described in the UNDP Guidance Note, Fostering Social 
Accountability: From Principle to Practice (2010) August, pp. 10–14. 
16. On analysis of civil society in post-conflict countries and their work on monitoring and advancing 
protection of human rights, see Marchetti and Tocci, 2011.   
17. Galtung and Tisné (2009) find in their cross-national study of anti-corruption measures in post-
conflict countries that “short-term gains achieved by corrupt means inevitably backfire during the 
second phase of reconstruction… the legitimacy of the state and the resilience of its institutions 
are then tested, often violently”. 
18. The UNDP guidance note reflects that “it is also recognized that the capacities of government and 
systems of governance may be severely disrupted by crisis. Indeed, resolution of conflict often 
requires a renegotiation of institutional and systemic agreements; and significant adjustments in 
staffing and decision-making patterns can often overwhelm weakened structures and challenge 
their ability to keep pace with the demands of crisis response while also dealing with political 
settlement priorities. Early recovery action should recognize and adapt to these constraints and to 
sensitivities related to building confidence in a post-conflict setting. It should also be flexible so 
that it can effectively focus on local, community and civil society actors as important avenues of 
response”. (p. 9) 
19. For further information, see www.iwaweb.org.  
20. The reports are available at the democratic dialogue website, note 31. 
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21. The KEWS approach, methodology and reports are available from www.ks.undp.org/?cid=2,139.  
22. A 2006 evaluation found that: “International and local officials do not use or value much the 
analyses on which the recommendations are based, partly because they themselves are 
responsible for making similar analyses and partly because the reports’ analyses does not analyze 
in sufficient depth the data or the events occurred, nor does it result in daring statements or 
alerts.” See UNDP, 2006.   
23. See www.dtce.org.pk for further information including reports and videos of public forums. 
 
Chapter 4: Social accountability and social inclusion 
 
1. In some cases, accountability gaps are related to lack of funding. For example, teacher 
absenteeism is a significant problem in many countries and can be related to the low official 
salaries they are paid. Thus, gaps in delivery might be symptoms of insufficient wages, related to 
particular macroeconomic and social policy choices. 
2. Citizen report cards or public expenditure tracking surveys have not been elaborated on because 
in general they do not feature disaggregated analysis of process or impact for particular groups. 
Others are often more related to information dissemination (e.g. community radio), which require 
additional action on the part of communities on the information gained. 
3. The interesting question in this regard would be to examine social accountability initiatives that 
have successfully included particular hitherto marginalized groups and see the extent to which 
those initiatives are embedded in contexts characterized by prior social inclusion efforts. 
4. Although not explicitly mentioned, many of the initiatives in this cell are located in socially and 
economically excluded communities, thus implicitly addressing inclusion concerns. 
5. There may be a certain political logic to this strategy. Earlier research has shown how broader 
coalitions and networks often underpin successful social accountability initiatives. By pitching 
initiatives at broad categories such as ‘the poor,’ activists aim to a) prevent alienation of some 
groups who might object to others being explicitly targeted and b) to facilitate broadest buy-in to 
the initiative, when everyone feels that they have something to gain by supporting the initiative.  
6. The exception to this is when social accountability initiatives are directly targeted to particular 
social groups that have been excluded from or underserved by public services, for example, 
gender budgeting.  
7. The Gender Disaggregated Data Project in Thailand, supported by UNDP, goes some way 
towards overcoming this constraint by getting agreement on definition, calculation and data 
sources for gender disaggregated data. Key to this was the support of the Office of Women 
Affairs and Family Department. See www.gender.go.th 
8. See www.gender-budgets.org 
9. One approach, although not linked to its accountability work, for UNDP to consider, would be to 
work towards a more representative public sector that reflects the diversity in the underlying 
population. There is evidence to suggest that the presence of the under-represented in 
bureaucracies can lead to improved outcomes for excluded groups. See Joshi 2010b for a fuller 
exposition of this argument in relation to gender. 
10. The GSEA tool looks at qualitative and quantitative data on who is excluded, what are processes, 
impacts and implications of gender and social exclusion, what are the impacts of continued social 
inclusion on the MDGs and what are the implications for DFID (DFID, 2009, p. 3). 
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